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Abstract 
Lubieniechi, Simona, Ph.D. University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, December 
2011.  
GHG Policy Effectiveness in an Unharmonized World 
Supervisor: Dr. Richard S. Gray 
There is a convergence of scientific opinions about the necessity of a more 
focused global intervention to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite international 
agreements, the lack of a comprehensive global agreement has led to a mixture of 
policies across countries, complicating domestic policy making. For Canada, policy 
design became particularly complex when the United States failed to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
This dissertation explores various domestic emission policies in the context of 
international trade and heterogeneous policies. Using micro-economic models of vertical 
markets, a Muth model (Muth, 1964), and a social planner’s problem, the dissertation 
analyzes the impact of carbon tax, cap and trade and emissions intensity policies in 
various scenarios. 
The findings of this thesis illustrate that while cap and trade may be effective in a 
hypothetical world of single sector within in a closed economy, it is far less effective 
than a carbon tax in the real world presence of downstream emissions, input 
substitution, international trade, or firm relocation. Given the administrative complexity, 
cap and trade systems are designed to be enforced only in the upstream of an industry 
even though downstream consumers are responsible for a large share of emissions. 
When inputs and final outputs are traded with countries that do not have a similar policy 
in place, a cap and trade instrument is harmful for the domestic industry, while dirty 
foreign firms increase output to the detriment of the domestic industry and the global 
environment. While this can be remedied by border tax adjustments (BTAs) 
accompanying the cap and trade instrument, BTA’s are not allowed in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Distributed carbon taxes can avoid this dilemma. 
 Moreover, when emission permits are distributed for free, firms have additional 
incentives to sell the permits and relocate to countries with less stringent environmental 
regulations. Emission intensity policies reduce the incentive for industrial flight, and as 
such can be a more efficient emission trading instrument.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Mitigation of human induced climate change represents one of the most important 
environmental challenges faced by mankind. A growing body of scientific evidence of its 
adverse effects highlights the need for more focused intervention to reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. Despite the recognition of the problem, a very long period of 
international negotiations and the Kyoto Accord, national leaders have thus far failed to 
achieve a comprehensive global agreement with a common strategy to reduce emissions. 
The lack of a comprehensive global agreement has led to a mixture of policies 
across countries. The wide range of policy instruments and emission reduction targets has 
further complicated the challenge of creating effective domestic policy for all 
governments. Possible consequences of the diverse GHG emission reduction policies 
include the economic and environmental consequences of industrial flight (Jenkins et al, 
2002), where firms relocate from jurisdictions with strict regulations to pollution havens 
with lower reduction standards.  
The choice of emission reduction policy instruments is therefore influenced by the 
relative efficiency and effects of the policies on the domestic industries. The principal 
emission reduction mechanisms considered by governments are the market based ones 
like cap and trade and carbon tax, the non-market mechanisms such as design standards, 
and the quasi-markets based such as emissions intensity. Considering the cap and trade 
example, the relatively brief international experience with this policy reveals that 
industrial sectors that have to comply with these policies can face competitiveness issues, 
such as profit and market share loss and even incentives to relocate to other jurisdictions 
(Neuhoff 2007, McKinsey and Ecofys 2006). 
Canada has explored a wide range of emission reduction mechanisms in the last 
two decades. Beginning about 1990, voluntary policies and subsidies were undertaken 
but did not prevent the increase in the Canadian carbon emissions that came with 
economic growth. When the Kyoto Protocol (which Canada signed in 1997 and ratified in 
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2002) came into force in 2005 the Canadian government issued a comprehensive plan 
(Government of Canada, 2005). The plan included targets for heavy industry1, carbon 
capture and storage, fuel efficiency, air quality and various subsidy programs. The 
mechanism selected for regulating heavy industry emissions reductions is a capped 
emission intensity system.  
All these events took place in an environment where the United States, although a 
Kyoto signatory, never ratified the agreement. Given the size of the trading relationship 
and the near total integration of the two nations’ economies through the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), many Canadian firms (including those in the auto 
sector) indicated that they would be unable to compete under these circumstances. 
The updated version of the Canadian Project Green (2008) mentioned that, 
beginning in 2020, the emission intensity system will be replaced with a cap and trade 
system. This happened in a time when the United States was proposing, and later 
awaiting, the US Senate approval of a federal cap and trade system. This planned change 
of the Canadian carbon emission reduction policy is a tacit acknowledgement of the 
policy harmonization necessity. 
At an international level, many of these issues and more were discussed in 
December 2009 at the United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conference held in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. The main goal of the Copenhagen Accord was to renew the 
Kyoto Protocol and obtain a new global agreement on mitigating climate change effects 
beyond the 2012 expiration of Kyoto. During the lead up to the meetings, United Nations 
representatives, environmental groups and various governmental and non-governmental 
supporters built high expectations about the outcome of the unprecedented 194-nation 
UN conference (UNFCCC, 2009[1]). 
Much of these heightened expectations can be attributed to the timing of this 
conference and the perception that it represented a crucial step towards the development 
of a global climate change approach. The previous negotiations on countries’ GHG 
emission reduction targets and obligations needed to be renewed. As well, the 
international experience accumulated prior to the Copenhagen meetings with efforts to 
                                                 
1 Since 2002, the term mostly employed in governmental regulations when referring to Canadian heavy industry is Large Final 
Emitters (LFEs). This is the term that it is going to be used throughout this research.  
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reduce emissions and trade carbon, demonstrated there was a need to amend existing 
agreements and develop new commitments to real future emission reductions. 
Despite this sense of urgency and clear sense of what issues needed to be 
addressed, the negotiations failed to create a binding agreement and ended up only with a 
vague and non-binding agreement. This again highlights the difficulty of finding a 
consensus on globally reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
Developed and developing country leaders were divided on who should be 
obligated to pay for reduced emissions. The developing countries claim that, given the 
emissions accumulated so far in the atmosphere, it is the developed countries’ 
responsibility to pay for reducing not only their own emissions, but also for all the other 
nations’ reductions efforts. 
Despite the headlines suggesting the meetings were a total failure, there were 
limited signs of progress. One of the main achievements of Copenhagen Accord is that 
developing countries are going to receive financial help from industrialized nations for 
fighting climate change. Participant countries have also agreed that a 2 degrees Celsius 
increase in the global temperature should be prevented. Crucially, however, nations 
remain free to set their own emission reductions with no mandatory limits. It is therefore 
unlikely that the Copenhagen Accord will be effective in achieving this proposed target. 
The above developments show how difficult it is to reach an agreement on emission 
targets, let alone the choice of policies or how to implement them. 
The Copenhagen Accord goals were carried on by the 17th session of the 
Conference of Parties (COP 17) to the UNFCCC, at the beginning of December 2011 in 
Durban, South Africa. At the end of the two weeks of difficult and extended negotiations, 
the 194 delegate members have agreed to negotiate a new global agreement on climate 
change by 2015 (UNFCCC, 2011); however, this agreement will not come into effect 
until 2020. The participating countries also agreed to extend the Kyoto Protocol with a 
second commitment period, which will start on January 1, 2013 and establishing the 
Green Climate Fund, which will raise $100 millions per year aimed at helping developing 
countries cope with climate change adaptation issues. 
A major achievement of the COP 17 is that, the US, India and China have agreed 
to reduce emissions as part of the new legal treaty. However, the three countries have 
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only voluntary emission targets reductions until 2020, or whenever the new agreement 
will enter into force. Canada’s position at the climate change talks in Durban has shown 
clear intentions of withdrawing from Kyoto Protocol with the motivation that China, 
along with the rest of major polluting developing countries, is not equally bound by a 
legal treaty. Even though China and India have transpired more flexibility than expected, 
and ended up signing the future agreement, Canada has officially announced withdrawing 
from Kyoto Protocol one day after the conference has ended. While many developed 
countries have complained for a long time about the developing nations’ lack of 
obligations within Kyoto, Canada becomes the first country to withdraw from the 
Protocol (Kennedy, 2011). The Minister of Environment has further motivated this 
decision through the failure of the previous liberal government to achieve the emission 
reductions cut that was promised when Canada ratified Kyoto. Further, he expressed his 
disbelief in the Kyoto Protocol’s chances to represent the solution for mitigating climate 
change globally. However, the Minister has stated Canada’s willingness to participate in 
a future international climate change treaty that will involve all major emitters. 
Given the clear and compelling lack of a cohesive and binding international 
framework, this dissertation explores some economic aspects of implementing emission 
reductions policies at a Canadian heavy industry level in a globally unharmonized policy 
context. 
What are the economic concepts that motivate the international choices of policy 
instruments? What is the impact of enforcing these policies on producers and consumers’ 
welfare and who is going to finally bear the burden of the costs incurred? How important 
is the policy’s point of regulation and what is its impact on the economic surplus 
distribution when employing a cap and trade versus a carbon tax? Which one of the 
policies can be considered first or second best? Under which circumstances and policies 
will firms have the incentive to relocate to jurisdictions with lower environmental 
standards? What are the lessons to be learned and considered for a successful policy 
design and implementation? 
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1.2 Objective of the Study 
The main goal of this dissertation is to explore the distributional and welfare 
consequences of implementing alternate GHG emission reduction policies at a domestic 
industry level in a global context characterized by a lack of policy harmonization. 
The specific objectives of this dissertation, arranged in order of increasing 
complexity, are: 
1. To explore the equivalence of a carbon tax and a cap and trade policy in a 
vertical structure within a closed economy; 
2. To explore the consequences of implementing a carbon tax and a cap and trade 
policy at a specific industry level (called point of regulation) when trade is allowed in 
upstream inputs; 
3. To explore firms’ incentives to relocate to other jurisdictions and the effect on 
social welfare when a cap and trade versus an emission intensity policy are enforced at a 
domestic level. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
The methodological approach is characterized by employing first a very simple 
model restricted by various constraints. For exploring the above objectives, the 
constraints are gradually relaxed by developing a graphical analysis, followed by a Muth 
model, which allows quantification of the policies investigated, and a three stage 
sequential game which employs numerical simulations. 
To meet these objectives, this thesis uses various theoretical approaches. 
Regarding Objective 1, with the aim of exploring the equivalence of a carbon tax and a 
cap and trade policy, as well as their impacts on rents and economic surplus, the analysis 
is graphically performed firstly at a single firm level and then in a vertical market 
structure, in the very special case of a closed economy and fixed proportions production 
technology.  
Related to Objective 2, when approximating the welfare distribution within the 
vertical market structure, trade is allowed. Fixed proportions assumption is relaxed and a 
Muth model is employed to examine the impact of foreign competition on the rent 
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distribution in the system when a carbon tax and a cap and trade policy are implemented 
at the consumer and processor level. The goal of this part of the study is to identify which 
of the actors involved captures the rents and who will finally bear the burden of enforcing 
this policy. This is shown to depend on the level where the policy is enforced. The 
analytical modeling is followed by numerically simulating trade between the Canadian 
and the global petroleum industry.  
Based on this result, Objective 3 is addressed. The study continues to investigate 
firms’ incentives to relocate production abroad which, in the current global context of 
various emission reduction policies implemented, will eventually lead to pollution haven 
phenomenon. The model, employed as a two-country, three stage sequential game, 
involves the analytical derivations of a social welfare maximization problem for a 
regulator that takes into account not only the domestic emissions but also the emissions 
generated by the domestic firms even after relocating abroad. Two policies are analysed: 
the social planner decides to implement a cap and trade policy versus emission intensity 
policy. Further on, a sensitivity analysis is carried out using a numerical optimization 
software. 
 
1.4 Organization of the Study 
The remaining chapters of the dissertation are organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 explores the main greenhouse gas emission reduction policies and the 
environmental effects of their interactions at a global level. 
Chapter 3 focuses on exploring the equivalency between a carbon tax and cap and 
trade policy and their distributional impacts within a closed economy with fixed 
proportions vertical market structure. The findings identify that, under these assumptions, 
compared to carbon tax, a cap and trade policy enables producers to extract rents at the 
level of implementation. Hence, the two policies are only quasi-equivalent. Finally, it is 
shown that the quasi-equivalence quickly breaks down in a vertical structure when 
variable proportions technologies are allowed. Little attention has been paid so far in the 
literature on the effects of vertical markets on the design GHG emissions policies 
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(Hamilton and Requate, 2004), particularly for these policies and their distributional 
impacts. Chapter 3 addresses this gap in the existing literature.  
Chapter 4 continues this analysis and compares and contrasts the cap and trade 
policy with a carbon tax and, using real data from the Canadian crude oil industry, 
simulates introducing the policies in a variable proportions vertical structure. The chapter 
confirms the existence of producers’ rents as a result of enforcing a cap and trade and 
concludes that this policy also leads to industry relocation possibility. The methodology 
used in this chapter builds upon the models developed by Muth (1964), Alston (1995), 
Wohlgenant (1993), Gray et al. (2000) and others, which focus on the distribution of 
research benefits within a vertical market system, in a multistage production settings for 
various agricultural products. The novelty that this chapter brings consists of employing 
the Muth model for exploring the price, quantity and distributional effects of the two 
GHG mitigation policies within a vertical market system with and without input 
substitution. 
Chapter 5 takes the analysis one step further by comparing firms’ incentives to 
relocate if emission intensity or cap and trade policy are implemented. The findings 
illustrate that pollution haven effect can be enhanced when implementing a cap and trade 
policy through the ability to sell the emission permits and relocate. In addition, an 
emission intensity system does create an output subsidy effect and this makes it a second 
best instrument to impose for achieving real emission reductions. To my current 
knowledge, accounting for the saleability feature of emission permits which affects firms 
relocation decision along with the social welfare maximization where the domestic policy 
maker takes into account the pollution generated by domestic firms regardless the 
jurisdiction in which emissions were generated, address an existing gap in the literature. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings and concludes the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS 
2.1 Domestic Policy Instruments that Deal with Pollution 
2.1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the basic economic concepts related to negative 
externalities as motivation for the international choice of policy instruments designed for 
dealing with GHG emissions reduction. The first section of the chapter introduces the 
main greenhouse gas emission reductions policies and their economic and environmental 
impacts. Section 2.2 discusses the interactions of these policies at an international level 
when countries apply different degrees of stringency. Section 2.3 presents the 
international institutions created in the global effort of reducing carbon emissions, while 
Section 2.4 details the actions undertaken by the European Union, Canada and the United 
States. 
2.1.2 Externalities 
An externality is said to occur when a decision made by a person or group of 
persons creates uncompensated costs or benefits to other individuals and groups 
(Beckman and Wesseler, 2007). Externalities can be positive, when there are benefits for 
the third party, or negative, when there are costs incurred by the third party. For instance, 
a negative externality occurs when a plant or a company uses a technology that 
negatively impacts a third party through environmental degradation. 
When introducing the concept of externalities, Field and Olewiler (2005) explain 
the difference between private and social costs. They define the private costs of a firm as 
the costs encumbered by the party that decides to produce a specific good.  Meanwhile, 
social costs include all the costs of the action, irrespective of who experiences them. 
Thus, social costs include not only private costs but also any other costs. Among other 
costs involved could be those known as external costs (or externalities), which although 
they represent a cost for the society, they are not reflected in the price or costs of the 
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product. For example, environmental costs are a component of social costs (Field and 
Olewiler, 2005). 
 Figure 2-1.: Social and private marginal costs 
Source: Field and Olewiler, 2005  
 
Figure 2-1 illustrates the total social marginal cost curve (sum of private marginal 
costs and marginal external costs), the private marginal cost curve and the external costs. 
When graphically adding the private and the external marginal costs, the total social costs 
of producing are higher than those already accounted for in the private goods market. 
Therefore, when firms ignore social costs, the equilibrium is at (P*, Q*) but when they 
account for them, the equilibrium shifts to (PB, QB), leading to higher prices, smaller 
production and reduction in consumer and producer surplus. The area under the external 
marginal cost curve represents the environmental damages which are reduced when the 
equilibrium quantity shifts from Q* to QB. Social welfare is maximized at this point as the 
reduction in the externality more than offsets the loss in producer and consumer surplus. 
Thus, this market is inefficient since total net benefits are maximized at QB which is a 
different, in this case lower, level of output than Q*. 
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In environmental economics externalities are one of the main forms of market 
failures which, as demonstrated above, occur as a result of not taking into account the 
negative externality effects. In this context, if the market is not efficient, market failures 
may be resolved through governmental intervention. Especially in the environmental area 
governments intervene and create policy measures for correcting market failures by 
internalizing externalities, enabling the price of goods and services to reflect the full 
social cost, including the environmental costs of the economic activity.  
 
2.1.3 Policy Interventions and their Impacts 
2.1.3.1 The main economics concepts for market regulation 
Government often implements rules or restrictions, known as regulations, on 
firms to obtain or prevent a specific outcome. Through their coercive nature, regulations 
involve costs for certain groups and benefits for others. When a government intervenes in 
a firm’s activity by imposing specific emission limits thereby regulating pollution, the 
government is said to be using command and control regulations (Kolstad, 2000). 
Command and control regulations often involve standards that are uniformly applied 
across firms regardless of their marginal cost of abatement, which increases the societal 
cost of abatement. Other drawbacks include the high cost of monitoring and the lack of 
incentives for firms to do more than respective standards, e.g.: technological investment 
(Kolstad, 2000). Given the inherent inefficiencies of standards, regulators are searching 
for more efficient alternatives to protect the environment, correct the externalities and 
stimulate firms to reduce emissions.  
There are at least three commonly used alternatives to standards to get emitters to 
recognize social cost and reduce emissions: 1) regulate market activity through 
introducing a Pigouvian tax for emitters (set price of emissions to equal marginal external 
costs), 2) creating a new market by assigning property rights to the emitters and letting 
them bargain over the amount of emissions (Coase2 Theorem) or 3) creating a market for 
pollution rights or for tradable emissions permits.  
                                                 
2 Coase (1960) argues that establishing clear and firm property rights is a precondition to successful internalization (e.g Pareto 
optimal) achieving bargaining. However, transaction costs are not accounted for in Coase’s world. 
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Pigou, a twentieth century English economist, proposed a tax levy (from now on 
referred to as “Pigouvian tax”) on pollution emitters that equals the difference between 
marginal social cost and marginal private cost at the socially efficient level of production 
(Pigou, 1962). However, among the criticisms made of this tax are that the Pigouvian 
model ignores the reciprocal nature of the externality (Coase, 1960) and assumes that 
polluters pay, and also that in a world of asymmetrical information and governmental 
lobbying it is difficult to determine the size of the tax required to reflect the external 
costs. 
In his essay on the theory of social cost, Coase (1960) indicated3 that in the 
absence of transaction costs, the assignment of property rights to either the polluter or 
those negatively affected by the pollution could be used to address externalities. In what 
has become known as the ‘Coase Theorem’, it is stated that with zero transaction costs an 
efficient outcome will occur through bargaining regardless of the initial property rights 
allocation. Coase (1960) criticized Pigou’s unilateral approach of a negative externality 
which arises when one actor develops a harmful action on another party. Coase states that 
such conflicts are reciprocal, “both parties cause the damage” (Coase, 1960 p.13) and 
thus, each party involved can change its behaviour to “avoid the more serious harm”. It is 
important to mention that in his analysis Coase assumes perfect competition4 conditions 
which imply no transaction costs. Under these assumptions, externality is self-correcting 
and bargaining will lead to an efficient allocation of rights (Butler and Garnett, 2003). 
Therefore, in the absence of transaction costs the externality is internalized through the 
bargaining of the actors involved (Bird, 1980). Later on, Coase (1988) himself pointed 
out that transaction costs are often so high that effective bargaining and efficiency of a 
market outcome will not be achieved with assignment of property rights. In the context of 
GHG emission reduction, with the assignment of property rights every polluter would 
have to bargain with the entire human population, including representative of future 
generations, making transaction costs obviously prohibitive. 
                                                 
3 Actually, Stiegler (1966) has originated the phrase “Coase theorem” in its widely known formulation mentioned above. Coase (1988) 
acknowledged that the statement of the theorem is based on his earlier work “in which the same thought is found although expressed 
quite differently”. Coase (1960) states that, under zero transaction costs, assigning property rights is crucial to market transactions and 
that “the ultimate result …is independent of the legal decision”. Coase points out (1960, 1988) that he recognizes that the assignment 
of property rights matters in the presence of transaction costs.  
4 Under perfect competition there is perfect information as well and, in turn, the latter implies no transaction costs. 
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Furthermore, there is another solution for dealing with externalities: creating a 
market for pollution rights or for tradable emissions permits. Tradable emission permits 
can help achieve allocative efficiency, as an increase or decrease in demand and the 
change is evident in the price of the permits. In any case, the amount of emissions will 
not exceed the level determined by the number of pollution rights available. 
In this context, given that many of the industries subjected to GHG emission 
reductions are vertically integrated (e.g. oil, coal etc.), it is appealing to explore which 
policy is more efficient depending on the level of implementation in the vertical structure. 
When the regulator intervenes with any policy at a specific stage in an industry 
there are going to incur various costs (transaction costs) that can affect this specific level, 
but may also affect the upstream or downstream ones. Thus, important economic insights 
about the effects of a policy are not given only by the market of the final product but also 
by the other market forces (market structure, supply and demand elasticities, transaction 
costs etc.) from the upstream markets (McCorriston and Sheldon, 1996). At the same 
time, for specific industries and goods, a welfare distribution analysis carried out only at 
the final good level can not capture the changes in prices and welfare distribution for 
consumers and producers along the market chain (Sheldon, 2006). For instance, with 
regards to GHG emission reduction policies, while a carbon tax can be implemented at a 
consumer of an input or output level, a cap and trade can be implemented only in the 
upstream of an industry, as administratively it would not be feasible to trade permits at 
the final consumer level. On these grounds, Chapters 3 and 4 will be focusing mostly on a 
vertical industry structure.  
When a government is implementing environmental policies, a vertical market 
structure allows identifying in more depth what determines the final price of the product 
or where most of the transaction costs occur. In addition, there is a high occurrence of 
heavily polluting vertically structured industries: oil, coal and natural gas, the automobile 
industry, etc. For instance, considering the case of crude oil, when implementing a cap 
and trade policy at a refinery level, the impact of the policy will propagate at the 
downstream levels: distribution, retail and final consumers. The question that arises is 
which level is going to be more affected? If and to what extent are the producers of crude 
oil influenced by the impact of this policy? 
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Each industry sector reacts differently when an environmental policy is 
implemented. In this respect, the final result is impacted by the degree of exposure to 
trade of the economy, industry specific characteristics, market structure and the degree of 
vertical integration.  
 
2.1.3.2 Carbon tax, cap and trade and emission intensity 
The current primary mechanisms globally implemented for achieving GHG 
emissions reductions are carbon tax, cap and trade, and emissions intensity or 
combinations of them. A carbon tax levies a fee on the carbon content of fossil fuel as a 
production input or consumer product. A cap and trade mechanism requires that the 
quantity of emissions is limited by an absolute cap, while the emissions intensity 
establishes a certain intensity of emissions relative to some measure of output, input or 
economic indicators (Ellerman and Wing, 2003). 
Given their different nature, e.g. price-based versus quantity-based instrument, all 
the above instruments have pros and cons and have provoked disputes nationally or 
internationally. A carbon tax places an explicit price of CO2 (carbon dioxide) emissions 
which leads to the adjustment of the quantity of emissions corresponding to the tax level. 
Meanwhile, a cap and trade policy sets a specific quantity of emissions and allows the 
price of emissions to adjust accordingly (Murray et al., 2008). In this context, whether it 
is better to implement a price or a quantity instrument with the aim of achieving the 
proposed GHG emissions target has been thoroughly discussed starting with Weitzman’s 
(1974) seminal paper. Roberts and Spence (1976), Baumol and Oates (1988), Stavins 
(1997), Murray et al. (2008) and many others show that, when comparing a price versus a 
quantity mechanism when there is uncertainty about the costs involved may lead to 
different outcomes. It is expected to obtain such results for cap and trade policy, where, 
when emissions are capped their price will vary, while in the case of a carbon tax, the 
emissions price is held constant, but the quantity of emissions varies. This discussion is 
further developed in Section 3.2.2 of Chapter 3.  
By enforcing a carbon tax, the regulator determines a price on carbon emissions 
and allows the market to determine the quantity of emissions to be reduced. A carbon tax 
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is applied on the carbon contained in goods and services consumed and produced. This 
means that they can be applied to all fossil fuels according to their carbon content. A 
higher price of goods and services reduces demand (and implicitly emissions), as 
consumers will reduce their consumption and try to substitute with less emission 
intensive goods and services. For instance, in the case of energy and power generation, a 
carbon tax may encourage substitution with less emission intensive alternatives, e.g. 
using natural gas or biofuels instead of coal. According to Nordhaus (2006), a carbon tax 
is a dynamic Pigouvian pollution tax that ‘balances the marginal social costs and 
marginal social benefits of additional emissions’ (p. 4). 
Given that taxes are an instrument that have a long history and have been 
implemented in many jurisdictions, they are relatively well understood, which contributes 
to their ease of implementation. The supporters of carbon tax (Metcalf 2007[1], Mankiw 
2007) highlight that this system is a very transparent and familiar tool, while the fact that 
transaction costs are insignificant clearly represents an advantage. Implementing a carbon 
tax would also offer a stable price for carbon, which is the opposite of a cap and trade 
instrument. Nordhaus (2006) suggests that a price-based policy instrument does not 
encourage corruption, as a carbon tax would lead to revenues only from taxation on 
domestic consumption and, in the absence of emission permits, firms/industries would 
not be encouraged to lobby the regulators for special interests. The revenue that a carbon 
tax raises may be directed back to the tax payers (revenue recycling) or may be used to 
finance environmental programs and funds. At the same time, a carbon tax may be 
gradually increased so not to represent a burden for consumers. The carbon tax can be 
implemented at various levels: production, distribution, or final use of the fossil fuels and 
thus it can impact the producers or consumers differently. Moreover, carbon taxes can be 
implemented both upstream and downstream of an industry, taxing both producers and 
consumers. 
However, among the main drawbacks of a carbon tax are that it is not a politically 
popular measure, as another tax affects mostly the low income population. In addition, a 
carbon tax, as a price based mechanism, would not contribute to fixing a specific target 
on the amount of GHG emissions reductions as a cap and trade system does. The carbon 
tax opponents argue that this policy does not offer the opportunity to reduce emissions 
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where it is cheaper (e.g. Kyoto Protocol framework) and to trade the emission rights 
globally. As a response, Nordhaus (2009) details that a globally implemented carbon tax 
can be a strong element in an international agreement given that each participatory 
country would guarantee a minimum domestic carbon price. 
As mentioned before, allowing trade of emission rights or cap-and-trade policy is 
a quantity-based policy instrument. In the literature of emissions trading, one can find 
them referred to as tradable permits, GHG units, quotas, allowances5. Under a cap and 
trade policy, companies that emit greenhouse gases need to hold a number of permits 
equal to the number of tons of carbon dioxide equivalent that they will release into the 
atmosphere. Furthermore, the permits can be freely traded on the emissions market as 
there are companies that can abate their emissions at a lower price that will sell their extra 
permits, and companies that abate emissions at a higher cost that need to buy permits. 
This implies that firms or industries have a strong incentive to reduce their emissions as 
much as possible, and make significant profits from selling the permits allocated. The 
supporters of a GHG international emissions trading system consider that this is an 
efficient policy instrument that brings down the overall cost of GHG emissions abatement 
as it is more advantageous to buy emission permits from another participant country with 
excess supply if this is cheaper than the marginal investment required to reduce 
emissions. The main advantage of a cap and trade is that it does establish a specific 
emission reduction target, both domestically and internationally, through setting a 
specific upper limit on emissions.  
Concerning the downside of trading the rights to emit greenhouse gases, the 
transaction costs involved (e.g. informing and monitoring) may reach important amounts, 
much higher than in a carbon tax case. Another sensitive point of a cap and trade policy is 
that, given that this policy is administratively designed to be implemented in the upstream 
of an industry only (e.g. producers level), the price of tradable permits may be driven up 
easily when a group of firms or individuals is interested in increasing their profits. The 
opponents of the cap and trade system strongly argue about the unknown transaction 
costs that a country may incur and how this is going to impact the marketable price of the 
permits (Kolstad, 2005).  
                                                 
5 The term ‘permits’ is mostly employed along this research. 
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The criticisms brought to the cap and trade system are also related to the trading 
component of the policy. Specifically, by creating a market for carbon, those who 
purchase the rights to pollute will not reduce GHG emissions. Permit distribution is 
another issue, as permits can be allocated for free or can be auctioned. If permits are 
auctioned, the money obtained constitutes revenue that can be directed to low income 
population affected by the increase in price and to funding climate change related 
research. Permits grandfathering allocation method implies assessing each sector’s share 
of output in total production. Thus, if permits are allocated for free according to firms’ 
output, they will perform as an implicit subsidy to output. 
The European Union’s experience (Neuhoff, 2007) with the first phase of permit 
allocation shows numerous negative effects when permits are distributed for free (or 
‘grandfathered6’). EU countries experienced significant energy utility price increases as 
companies raised their prices as a result of introducing the policy, even though the 
companies had received the permits for free. These companies have registered ‘windfall 
profits’ (Sijm et al., 2006). At the second round of permit allocation, the EU distributed 
fewer permits for free, but the more trade sensitive industries claimed that the increased 
costs creates serious competitiveness issues for them and they even threatened to relocate 
(Ecofys, 2006).  
At the beginning of 2010, the US was contemplating introducing a cap and trade 
policy where around 85 percent of the permits will be distributed for free and only 15 
percent auctioned. The high percentage of grandfathered permits represented a debate 
topic in the US and Canadian newspapers, which blamed the regulators for actually 
creating ‘corporate welfare’ (Goldstein 2010, Carney 2009, Mankiw 2009).  
Emissions intensity are defined as a ratio of emissions to some economic or 
production indicator (e.g. unit of production or GDP). Thus, emission intensity might be 
reduced, but output or total amount of emissions may increase (Ellerman and Wing, 
2003). Therefore, when an economy or industries register economic growth, even if the 
intensity of emissions is under a certain limit, the quantity of emissions released in the 
atmosphere will be increased. The trading aspect of emissions intensity is similar to the 
cap and trade one. Companies that achieve a lower emission intensity than the regulated 
                                                 
6 The process known as ‘grandfathering’ refers to the initial allocation of permits, which are given for free to existing firms based on 
their historical output or emissions 
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rate will be able to sell this surplus to the firms that can not achieve the intensity rate. As 
an example, the Canadian federal government had previously proposed to implement 
emission intensity rates per unit of production that are capped and can be traded both 
domestically and internationally. Intensity caps are established through a baseline-and-
credit system, where the baseline represents firms’ emission intensity targets. 
The main criticism brought to the emission intensity is that its intensity specificity 
may not actually decrease the quantity of emissions. Under an emission intensity policy, 
a government can not guarantee that a specific level of emissions reductions is going to 
be achieved. It is also difficult to forecast a country’s real emissions reductions as firms 
can increase their output as long as they respect the intensity established. Following the 
previous example, trying to respect its Kyoto obligations, the Canadian government may 
adjust over time the intensity rate and Large Final Emitters can face an uncertain target 
from one year to another (Allan and Baylis, 2005). Regarding emissions intensity 
advantages, they were designed to encourage industrial or sector growth and to favour 
innovation. 
 
2.1.3.3 The point of regulation 
Another factor that contributes significantly to correcting externalities and 
reducing emissions is the point in the economic system where the regulation is 
implemented, also known as the point of regulation. The point of regulation can be 
established in the upstream (e.g. coalmine or refinery gate), in the downstream (e.g. 
gasoline station) of an industry or hybrid approaches. In other words, establishing the 
point of regulation means that the policy makers decide which entities are responsible 
and required to submit allowances that cover their emissions for each compliance period. 
There is still no clear consensus as to which point of regulation offers the most 
advantages as the point of regulation need not be coincident with the emissions point. 
When the point of regulation is decided to be in the upstream of an industry, reducing the 
cost of abatement at this stage means that emissions abatement costs will be passed on to 
the final product consumers. Paltsev et al. (2007) highlight that the mitigation cost to be 
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passed on to consumers depends on the elasticities of demand and supply of the regulated 
products and the specific market forces.  
In the downstream sector, the regulated entities are the direct emitters of 
greenhouse gases. Therefore, the downstream point of regulation can be at the point of 
combustion or the quantifiable process-related emissions. Among the main disadvantages 
of a downstream point of regulation can be identifying and covering all emission sources 
along with their respective administrative costs. At the same time, the compliance costs 
of implementing a GHG emission reduction policy at this point may represent an 
incentive for final users to find technical innovation solutions or use inputs that are less 
emission intensive. 
In these circumstances, policy makers can decide the point of regulation anywhere 
in the system or a hybrid approach after accounting emission sources, the amount of 
emissions to be mitigated and cost effective mitigation strategies for each particular 
industry (Hargrave, 2000). As an example, it would not be feasible to regulate the oil 
industry at the point of distribution as the refining processes would not be accounted for. 
In this case, it would be more efficient to regulate oil industry at the refinery level. 
However, hybrid approaches should be carefully considered to avoid double-counting 
which would create higher compliance costs. 
 
2.1.3.4 Pollution haven and industrial flight  
Along with other relevant concepts used within this thesis, pollution haven and 
industrial flight represent phenomena that may occur given that the emissions reduction 
instrument mode and level of implementation is at countries’ own discretion. 
Setting the environmental standards below socially efficient levels or failing to 
enforce environmental standards with the hope of attracting foreign investment from 
countries with more strict regulations is known as creating a pollution haven (Neumayer, 
2001). Copeland and Taylor (2004) differentiate between the pollution haven effect and 
pollution haven hypothesis. Pollution haven effects exist when tightening up the pollution 
policy in one country leads to a marginal rise in the production of a dirty good in another 
country. Meanwhile, the pollution haven hypothesis is motivated by the trade 
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liberalization which will ‘drive firms away from countries with strict pollution laws’ 
(Fullerton, 2006). The existence of the pollution haven effect is necessary to validate the 
pollution haven hypothesis. Copeland and Taylor (2004) also argue that, the presence of 
the pollution haven hypothesis becomes evident when trade liberalization leads to a shift 
of production from countries with more restrictive regulations to countries with more 
relaxed pollution regulations. 
There is no international consensus about implementing a specific policy for 
decreasing greenhouse gas emissions. Kyoto signatory or non-signatory countries can 
implement all the policies mentioned before or any combination of them that helps to 
reduce their emissions. As long as policies differ across jurisdictions one can imagine 
that, in a Kyoto-signatory country with a cap and trade policy, multi-product firms might 
find an incentive to shut-down one of their plants, make a profit from selling the allocated 
permits and move the firm to another country which, not being a Kyoto-signatory state, 
has lower GHG emission obligations. Whether pollution havens exist or not, has 
remained an open debate for researchers (Dean et al., 2003, Jaffe et al. 1995, Mani and 
Wheeler 1997, Kolstad and Xing 1998, Keller and Levinson 2002, Copeland and Taylor 
2003, Eskeland and Harrison 2003, Millimet and List 2004, among others). 
In this context, in the interest of attracting capital, countries may be tempted to 
further relax their environmental regulations, which would lead to what is known as a 
‘race to the bottom’ of environmental standards. Hence, a country with laxer regulation 
could become a pollution haven, as firms belonging to other jurisdictions/countries may 
find it more profitable to relocate. As an opposite effect, governments can try to prevent 
firms’ relocation by deliberately not strengthening their environmental legislations and 
thus, contributing to the creation of an ‘ecological dumping’ world, a process known as 
the chill effect (Bagwell and Staiger, 2001). 
Eskeland and Harrison (2003) consider that pollution havens occur as a 
consequence of the comparative advantage7 attained by the industries from countries 
with more lenient environmental policies and lower pollution control costs. 
Consequently, industry location/relocation will be strongly impacted, as well as 
industries’ structure and trade patterns. The issues occur when interpreting comparative 
                                                 
7 Comparative advantage being based on relative productivity differentials which determine international specialization (Balassa, 
1989). 
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advantage from a social perspective, where one considers that opportunity costs should 
include the externality. Thus, without a regulation, an industry may have an apparent 
comparative advantage, but when a regulation is implemented, this may no longer be the 
case. 
The particular significance of pollution haven occurs from its position as a direct 
link between environmental regulations and trade flows of various countries (Taylor, 
2004). Wheeler (2002) states that at the center of the pollution haven debate remains the 
domestic government’s willingness to promote growth through environmental measures 
even though polluting firms can be owned by either domestic or foreign investors and the 
products obtained may be destined to domestic or import markets.  
Regarding industrial flight, Kolstad and Xing (1998) point out that stringent 
environmental regulations have a strong effect on industry location and that different 
policies among countries will induce specialization and capital movement to the country 
with weaker regulations. In this context, the industrial flight occurs when overly stringent 
environmental regulations cause increased production costs for polluting companies 
which have incentives to ‘fly’ to countries with weaker environmental regulations. The 
authors present the following arguments that may determine industrial flight hypothesis. 
Firstly, strong environmental policies increase production costs as they require certain 
equipment. Secondly, the waste disposal capacity is restricted, and, last but not the least, 
severe environmental regulations often prohibit the use of particular input or outputs. 
In the context of a global policy harmonization and similarly with the pollution 
haven case, industrial flight has received attention from policy makers since the ‘70s. 
Levinson (1996) summarizes early attempts8 by industrialized countries to appeal to the 
United Nations for preventing industrial flight towards developing countries. Further on, 
the US Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1970 required a study on the competitive 
effect of environmental regulations on US firms and solutions that could have led to 
international harmonization. 
Some authors see pollution haven and industrial flight as two sides of the same 
coin that capture the implications of different environmental standards between different 
countries (Clapp and Dauvergne, 2005). At the same time, it should be highlighted that 
                                                 
8 The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. 
  21
the industrial flight is one of the factors that contributes to the creation of pollution haven 
effects, while the reverse may not always be true. The reason is that industries can 
expand or contract through internal redistribution of factors of production. This is the 
basis for models of international trade and the primary theoretical basis for trade induced 
pollution havens. Capital mobility between countries can speed up or strengthen the 
process but this is not necessary for pollution havens to emerge.  
Another interesting differentiation between pollution haven and industrial flight is 
made by Zarsky (OECD, 1999). She argues that pollution haven hypothesis has two 
versions. The industrial flight version means that polluting industries will escape the high 
environmental standards from the domestic country and relocate to countries with lower 
compliance and abatement costs, which exist because of lower environmental standards. 
This is known as the ‘push’ factor, as firms are pushed out of their jurisdiction by the 
high compliance costs. The ‘pull factor’ represents the decision of certain jurisdiction to 
employ low environmental standards to attract dirty industries. 
With regard to the empirical evidence of pollution haven, Levinson and Taylor 
(2008) acknowledge the lack of significant evidence for proving pollution haven effects 
and highlight that among possible sources of bias may be data heterogeneity, endogeneity 
and aggregation issues. They also mention that another possible explanation may be the 
low value of pollution abatement efforts. Furthermore, they consider that even though 
there are differences in approaching the issue (previous research being divided into plant 
location decisions and international trade studies) an important bias can come from the 
econometric techniques used. For instance, cross-sectional data make it difficult to 
account for unobserved characteristics of industries or countries and their relationships 
with the environmental regulations in place. Hence, the authors use a fixed effects model, 
which finally proves to understate the pollution haven effect. Their solution is to use a 
two stage least squares (2 SLS) estimation, whose estimates are more robust and 
consistent than the fixed effects estimates.  
In an attempt to clarify why the evidence of pollution haven is so vague, 
Neumayer (2001) and Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) summarized the literature on 
pollution havens. The authors highlight that, as long as the econometric approach and the 
scopes of the studies are quite different, the outcomes cannot be generalized. However, 
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they identify the main hypotheses tested with regard to pollution haven as well as the 
critiques of each study presented. 
 
Table 1-1.: Pollution haven hypotheses reviewed by Neumayer, Brunnermeier and 
Levinson 
Neumayer (2001) Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) 
Hypotheses 
1. Differences in environmental standards 
affect the allocation of investment flows; 
1. Economic activity shifts to jurisdiction 
with less strict environmental regulations; 
2. Developing countries’ production and 
exports have become increasingly pollution 
intensive; 
2. Trade liberalization encourages an 
inefficient race to the bottom; 
3. Pollution-intensive industries flee the 
high-standards countries. 
3. Trade liberalization shifts polluting 
economic activity toward countries that 
have less strict environmental standards. 
 
Both studies highlighted that, even with the weak statistical evidence of pollution 
havens existence, the policy makers’ interest and the public concern have repeatedly 
raised the issue of environmental regulations versus environmental quality. Brunnermeier 
and Levinson (2004) explain that empirical studies that have employed cross-sectional 
analyses find that environmental regulations have an insignificant effect on firm location 
decisions. At the same time, studies that controlled for heterogeneity and/or endogeneity 
using panel data or other instruments have found statistically significant pollution haven 
effects. However, the authors conclude that the reviewed studies can only show the 
capital and goods flow’s sensitivity to differences in environmental regulations but 
cannot prescribe policy conclusions based only on these results. 
Neumayer (2001) discusses the elusiveness of pollution havens due to the weak 
empirical results and proposes a wide range of policy options. Among the policy 
measures to be taken into account are: harmonization of environmental standards, 
minimum standards and proper enforcement of agreements by governments. Moreover, 
following the idea of competitive advantage, given the lower standards a country may 
have, direct restrictions such as import bans, tariffs, quotas and voluntary restrictions are 
also considered. Last, but not the least, the author suggests that when dealing with 
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developing countries, assistance for political-institutional capacity building and local 
empowerment should be offered by international organizations. 
Given the complexity encountered by policy makers when imposing appropriate 
environmental standards for their own socio-economic situation, arguments arise now 
from defining and/or measuring the severity of environmental policies. Eventually, 
stringent environmental regulations can cause increased production costs for firms, which 
in turn may lead to effects on firms’ competitiveness, industry location and a country’s 
trade structure, with little impact on global emissions reduction.  
 
2.2 Domestic Pollution Policy in Globalized Markets 
2.2.1 Competitiveness 
Policy makers and general public have always been concerned with the 
implementation of emission reduction policies and the costs they involve. Debate topics 
are further related to the magnitude of these expenses in the short or medium term and 
their uncertain effectiveness in the long term. Nevertheless, political debates are ongoing 
about the best policy choice given country’s economic and social circumstances, as well 
as the alleged environmental strictness.  
Participating in the Kyoto Protocol raises competitiveness issues for the 
governments involved, especially for countries dependent on emissions intensive 
industries or whose economy is expanding. Furthermore, if the respective industry is 
particularly exposed to exports and imports, it will face serious competitiveness issues 
from the countries that did not ratify Kyoto. Competitiveness of various sectors has 
become a source of concern for the European Commission as a result of the pressure 
from heavy industries from the member countries. Sectors such as aluminium, cement 
and lime (Euractiv, 2008) have requested some free emission allowances to help avoid 
industry relocation.  
As a result, the European Commission for Environment, together with various 
European research institutions, have been closely researching these issues. For instance, 
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the Climate Strategies group9 report advises a sector oriented allocation of permits. They 
acknowledge sectors’ sensitivity when coping with the cost and competition issues while 
achieving GHG emission reductions. For example, the report suggests that, while the 
cement sector is the most probable to suffer from the increase in cost, the steel industry is 
the sector more open to trade. Further on, the literature that focuses on the 
competitiveness loss issue for the European cap and trade system, relates competitiveness 
with the free granting of emissions allowances. In this context, Smale et al. (2006) and 
Reinaud (2005) highlight that the grandfathering of the emissions permits instead of 
using the auctioning allocation method will lead to over-compensating certain industries 
involved. 
A study by McKinsey and Ecofys (2006) reveals that, for certain industries (steel, 
pulp and paper, cement, refining, and aluminium), there is a lower percentage of the 
current emission permits allocated that would be enough just to cover industries expenses 
without over-compensating them. Neuhoff et al. (2007) call to attention that previous 
studies have indeed shown the positive impact of allowances on competitiveness at the 
aggregate sectors level, but little information is provided regarding what is happening at a 
firm or sector level and “…the distributional consequences of the scheme”. 
In a report issued by the Climate Strategy group, Neuhoff et al. (2007) analyze, 
among other issues, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
mechanisms in the context of carbon leakage10 and competitiveness in various industries. 
They conclude that for few sectors free allocation should be reduced to zero, while for 
other sectors, international negotiations should consider state-based sector agreements 
and border adjustments as options for reducing carbon leakage. The authors also 
acknowledge the relocation possibility for other sectors because of the carbon leakage 
issue. They conclude that the use of free emissions allocations is not the adequate 
instrument for addressing leakage and relocation aspects. 
In conclusion, the competitiveness issues that occur when introducing complex 
environmental policies are indubitable. These issues represent a continuous debate as 
                                                 
9 Non-profit company, funded by UK’s Carbon Trust and hosted by University of Cambridge, which brings together international 
researchers with the aim of carrying independent assessments on international climate change policy. Many of their submissions can 
be found on the European Commission Environment website.  
10 Carbon leakage concept refers to the negative effects of GHG emissions reductions within Kyoto Protocol: reducing emissions in 
one country also implies offsetting them through higher emissions in other countries which do not have binding caps. 
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under the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules trade liberalization may direct 
governments not to set optimal environmental policies because of the constraints of their 
trade instruments and policies (Sheldon, 2006). Porter (1999) reminds that there are two 
possible ways of solving the race to the bottom issue: one is to reduce the disparities by 
using ‘green countervailing duties’ such that environmental costs of both high standard 
countries and low standard countries are equalized. The second one is harmonizing 
environmental regulations across countries or jurisdictions (Esty, 1994). Given the 
various socio-economic interests and development stages of each country, this is not an 
easily achievable goal.  
2.2.2 International Agreements and Enforcement 
The importance of climate change international agreements is closely related to 
race to the bottom. It is argued that countries are likely to decrease their environmental 
standards in their willingness to attract foreign investment and keep domestic business at 
home. This is why harmonizing emissions standards through international agreements 
could eliminate the race to the bottom hazard. 
Levinson (1996) mentions the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment as an early attempt to harmonize environmental regulations. Among the 
issues raised at the meetings, industrialized countries requested certain environmental 
regulation that would prevent industrial flight from countries with more severe 
legislation. Developing countries argued that economic growth involves pollution. 
Levinson also notes that even the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
brought into light the disputes between environmentalists and trade economists regarding 
issues such as the environmental harm and the possible barriers to trade that may occur. 
For instance, Porter (1999) highlights that trade economists have questioned 
whether the harmonization of emission standards is a protectionist measure that would 
deter developing countries from using their advantage of exporting pollution intensive 
goods. He finds that the race to the bottom likelihood does not happen in countries with 
high environmental standards, but it has a significant impact, due to competitive 
pressures, on low standard countries. 
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Many environmental agreements, including the ones related to climate change, 
have been signed and agreed on at national and international levels. Klevorik (1996) 
highlights that when trying to find common grounds for harmonizing environmental 
standards, there are the fundamental disagreements that need to be understood first and 
then solved. This process, together with the difficulty of reaching measurable standards 
for various socio-economic conditions of the parties involved, suggests the high degree of 
transparency that should characterize any agreement. This reveals the vital role of the 
international GHG reductions institutions. 
 
2.3 International GHG institutions 
2.3.1 Brief History 
Environmental and climate change problems have always been international 
topics of interest, but the discussions related to them had become more and more 
concentrated in the last half of the 20th century.  
A fundamental document to be mentioned is the Brundtland Report (United 
Nations, 1987), which is considered representative of the growing awareness regarding 
environmental issues. In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED) convened by the United Nations (UN) publishes ‘Our Common Future’ report, 
also known as the Brundtland Report. The report is considered a stepping stone in 
developing long-term environmental strategies and policies, and uniting development and 
environment for achieving what is known now as ‘sustainable development’ to the year 
2000 and beyond. Moreover, the report drew attention and linked the concepts of global 
equity, resources redistribution towards less developed countries and environmental 
maintenance. Although the report was criticized at the time for forecasting errors, it 
remains a fundamental reference for initiating global environmental actions. 
In 1988, following numerous climate change discussions such as whether our 
planet was warming or cooling, the United Nations created the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), which brought together renowned scientists from all over the 
world. Two years later, the IPCC (1990) released its first report whose main conclusion 
was that the planet has been warming because of GHG accumulation in the atmosphere. 
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In 1989, the Brundtland Report was debated in the UN General Assembly, which 
decided to organize a UN Conference on Environment and Development, the famous 
Earth Summit that took place at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 199211. Over 160 nations 
signed the international treaty that later on became the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. The conference agreed on the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development which sets out 27 principles supporting sustainable development. 
The countries that ratified the Rio Convention agreed to organize yearly a 
Conference of Parties (COP). The first Conference, which took place in Berlin in 1995, 
encouraged identifying policies that would contribute to reducing GHG emissions and 
enhancing GHG sinks, and also specified time-frames for objectives. 
As a result of international cooperation, for overcoming the negative impacts of 
climate change, in 1994, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
was established. Its main goal was achieving steady and safe atmospheric concentrations 
of GHG in the long term. 
At the Third Conference of Parties (COP3), held in Kyoto, Japan, in December 
1997, developed countries agreed to specific targets for cutting their emissions of 
greenhouse gases. A general framework was defined, with specifics to be detailed over 
the next few years. The discussions and negotiations of the framework became known as 
the Kyoto Protocol which is going to be detailed in the following sections. However, at 
this conference, the US proposed to just stabilize emissions and not to reduce them, while 
the European Union called for a 15% reduction. Eventually, industrialized countries were 
committed to an overall reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases to 5.2 percent below 
1990 levels for the period 2008 – 2012. 
 
2.3.1.1 The IPCC 
The policy makers concern about climate change and global warming led to 
negotiating international agreements like the Kyoto Protocol, as well as to establishing 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC is an 
intergovernmental organization that was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological 
                                                 
11 This was the second Earth Summit, but the first successful one. The first Summit took place in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1982, but it failed 
to reach any significant agreements. 
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Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). The initial 
task attributed to IPCC (IPCC, 1990) was to prepare a report describing all relevant 
aspects of climate change impacts and to formulate realistic response strategies. This 
meant genuine co-operation among thousands of top scientists around the world; it meant 
that for the newly created Intergovernmental Panel to succeeded, it had to build itself 
with transparency and credibility. 
IPCC provides at regular intervals an assessment of the state of knowledge on 
climate change, as well as Special Reports and Technical Papers on topics where 
scientific information is necessary. The IPCC reports maintain their characteristic of 
being policy relevant and not policy prescriptive. The relevance and importance of the 
First Assessment Report follows from the fact that it was used as basis for negotiating the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Moreover, the 
fruitful relationship between UNFCCC and IPCC represented a framework for 
interactions between science and policy makers. 
The IPCC Third Assessment Report (2001) estimated that in the interval 1990 – 
2100, the global average surface temperature is projected to increase by 1.4 to 5.8 
degrees Celsius. Thus, immediate and worldwide concentrated effort is required to strive 
to restrain the emissions. The Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001) brought new and 
stronger evidence of global warming due to the increase in GHG emissions accumulation, 
and therefore more awareness from governments and/or private sectors regarding this 
issue. 
The Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007) has concluded that the climate is 
unequivocally warming and that the increase in the greenhouse gas emissions is very 
likely due to the increase in the average temperatures since the middle of the 20th century. 
Based on this conclusion, the European Commission has decided to take action such that 
the global average temperature does not increase more than two degrees above the pre-
industrial levels. However, in the Fourth Assessment report, the IPCC has estimated that 
this is possible if emissions are reduced between 25 to 40 percent by 2020 and 80-95% by 
2050 (IPCC, 2007). The Fifth Assessment Report is intended to be published in 2014. 
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2.3.2 Kyoto Protocol  
As mentioned before, the Kyoto Protocol was created as an international 
environmental treaty by the UNFCCC. The text of the Convention (UNFCCC, 2004, p.1) 
states that the primary goal of the Protocol is to stabilize GHG emissions in the 
atmosphere “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with a 
climate system”. 
The Kyoto Protocol, known also as the Framework Agreement on Climate 
Change was signed in December 1997 by 84 countries12 (UNFCCC, 2009 [1]) that agreed 
to specific targets for cutting their emissions of GHG to 5.2 percent below 1990 levels by 
the 2008-2012 commitment period (Jaccard et al., 2002). Canada ratified the treaty in 
December 2002, committing to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 6 percent below 
1990 levels, by 2008-2012.  
The Protocol came into force in 2005, 90 days after being ratified by 55 of the 
parties accounting for 55 percent of 1990 Annex 113 countries emissions. This milestone 
was reached once Russia ratified the agreement on November 18th, 2004. However, a 
notable exception from ratification remains the United States of America. 
The Kyoto Protocol acknowledges four greenhouse gases that are covered by 
international agreement: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride, 
and two groups of gases: hydroflurocarbons and perfluorocarbons. Among the 
greenhouse gases presented, further analysis of this research is going to concentrate on 
CO2 related issues. 
Three Kyoto Mechanisms will support Annex 1 countries in meeting their targets 
for GHG abatement: Joint Implementation (JI) between Annex 1 countries (Kyoto 
Protocol, article 6), Clean Development Mechanism (CDM, Kyoto Protocol, article 12) 
and International Emissions Trading (IET, Kyoto Protocol, article 17).  
The Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism was created with the goal of supporting 
collaboration among Annex 1 countries to partially achieve their commitment by 
investing in abatement projects that reduce GHG emissions from a certain baseline. 
                                                 
12As of October 2009, 184 countries had ratified the Kyoto Protocol.  
13 The Annex 1 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European 
Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. 
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On the one hand, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has the aim of 
supporting the sustainable development of non-Annex 1 parties through capacity building 
and capacity transfer. The other purpose is to facilitate Annex 1 countries to meet their 
abatement commitments by initiating abatement projects in the non-Annex 1 countries.  
The International Emissions Trading (IET) offers to an Annex 1 country that 
exceeds its GHG allocation the opportunity to buy the rights to emit GHG from another 
Annex 1 country that emitted less GHG than its quota. 
As of spring of 2009, the issues encountered by the European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS) are related mainly to the characteristics of each industry 
involved and the permit allocation methods (whether they are auctioned or distributed for 
free). Neuhoff et al. (2007), McKinsey and Ecofys (2006) found that while many sectors 
lose profits and competitiveness from policy, other sectors gain short-term profits from 
the current trading system. 
Kyoto Protocol has many supporters but also opponents among environmentalists 
and economists (Mendelsohn 2007, Hilsenrath 2009, Prins and Rayner 2007, etc.). Thus, 
to some, Kyoto Protocol is seen as an inefficient institution whose costs are higher than 
the benefits, with a trading scheme that will actually achieve far less than the numbers 
proposed, and will not contribute at all to slowing down the global warming process.  
As of 2004 (UNFCCC, 2004), the information regarding the actual achievements 
of Kyoto Protocol in reducing greenhouse gas emissions (considering 1990 as a base 
year) reveals that Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia and Norway 
respected their commitment and accomplished even more than their obligations. The 
Eastern European countries registered emission reductions as their economies declined or 
because of shutting down many of the inefficient polluting plants. There still is a long and 
unknown path to be followed in reducing emissions and trading them, however, the EU 
countries as main Kyoto supporters believe that they can attain their obligations. 
2.3.2.1 Future horizons 
The future of the Kyoto Protocol was discussed in December 2009 at the UN 
climate change conference held in Copenhagen, Denmark. The 2009 negotiations, also 
known as the Copenhagen Accord, were intended to focus on establishing new 
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commitments (15 to 30 percent below business as usual) for both developed and 
developing countries, creating an effective market for carbon trade and finding solutions 
for financing the appropriate measures for reducing GHG emissions (European 
Commission, 2009). The pre-conference report “Towards a comprehensive climate 
change agreement in Copenhagen” (European Community, 2009) brought to attention the 
necessity of cooperation between developed and developing countries. The crucial 
importance of a cohesive effort was led by the main aim of the negotiations: to limit the 
global average temperature increase to less than 2 degrees Celsius compared to the pre-
industrial level. The report acknowledges that this could be possible if the greenhouse 
gases peak before 2020 and then could be cut to less than 50 percent of 1990 levels by 
2050. 
However, the outcome of the Copenhagen negotiations did not meet the 
expectations. The result of the negotiation ranged from being considered “not a full 
success” (de Boer, 2010) and not “everything that everyone had hoped for” (Ki-moon, 
2009) by UN representatives to a “total failure” by environmental activists and journalists 
all over the world. The 12 days of discussions did not convince the 119 world leaders to 
walk out with a legally binding agreement and new commitments to reduce GHG 
emissions. The main reason was that developing countries argued that developed 
countries should put more effort and finances into reducing emissions, as in their opinion, 
the former are to be held solely responsible for the current emissions accumulation in the 
atmosphere. The consensus achieved were that global temperature should be limited to no 
more than two degrees Celsius increase and developed countries will raise 100 billion 
dollars a year by 2020 to help ameliorate climate change effects in developing countries. 
However, even the actions agreed upon are not clearly stated, for instance it was not 
decided how much each country will contribute to the Climate Fund or which country 
will benefit from it. Regarding emission reduction issues, there is no long term (2050) 
agreement on emission cuts, while for the medium term commitments (2020), participant 
countries are expected to submit their targets until January 31, 2010 to the UN 
representatives. However, on January 31, 2010 only 20 out of 194 nations officially 
stated their emission reduction targets and actions to be taken. The following UNFCCC 
Annual Meeting took place in December 2010 in Mexico City. Its outcome was as well 
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an agreement and not a binding treaty and it pretty much mirrored the Copenhagen 
Agreement result. The next Conference of the Parties is expected to take place at the 
beginning of December 2011 in Durban, South Africa. 
 
2.4 Evolution of Domestic GHG Policies 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Global warming currently represents one of the fundamental issues that 
governments all over the world confront when formulating environmental policies. 
Although countries contribute differently to the greenhouse gas accumulation, all of them 
are affected, and, at the same time, each of them is taking different measures for reducing 
carbon emissions. 
Despite the international controversies regarding the scientific proof of climate 
change as human-induced phenomenon, the growing global concern has led most of the 
governments to participate in environmental agreements. Nevertheless, given the 
transboundary specificity, the punch line remains that the climate change would happen 
as a result of the entire quantity of greenhouse gas emissions accumulated in the 
atmosphere and would affect all nations regardless of each country’s contribution to 
emissions. 
However, as the chance of an international agreement where all the countries in 
the world consent to implement similar mechanisms and measures for reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions represents utopia, governments need at least to reach some common 
points in the current international environmental agreements. Definitely, coupling the 
economic power of each country with their political orientation, free riding incentive and 
the unknown of climate change manifestation and timing, the image of ideal international 
agreements is far from being simple. Given the context of common environmental action, 
creating rules that would make each participant government happy, it is a state impossible 
to achieve. One of the major disputes of the protocol arises from delineating the emission 
rights allocation between developed and developing countries. 
The signatory countries, whether they ratified the Protocol or not, have started 
implementing various emission reductions policies. Definitely, two of the reasons that 
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influence the success of the agreement are, on the one hand, the emission reduction 
mechanisms proposed and, on the other hand, the environmental policy that each 
government will implement for achieving its targets (Nordhaus, 2009). 
2.4.2 European Union 
All EU countries ratified Kyoto and are currently trading permits under the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Despite the predominant view 
that cap and trade systems are useful, and the passage of twelve years after the creation of 
the Kyoto protocol (1997), the EU has been the first and, until recently, the only one14 to 
have implemented a cap and trade system to deal with greenhouse gas emission 
reduction. 
The EU countries, 15 by that time, had ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. The 
emissions produced by EU countries amount to 22 percent of the world’s total 
greenhouse gases. Their commitment is to reduce their emissions by 8 percent from 1990 
levels by 2012. However, few countries have committed to reduce their emissions more 
than requested. For instance, Sweden and Germany announced an intended 21 percent cut 
from 1990 levels by 2010, while United Kingdom has set a 20 percent reduction. Other 
countries have joined the EU15 since then but they already had their individual targets. 
According to a 2007 report of the European Commission (European Commission, 2007), 
in their latest constitution, the E.U countries have registered a drop in emissions of 7.9 
percent. However, the emissions of the initial 15 signatory countries have fallen by only 
1.5 percent. 
Although the EU countries are using the flexible mechanisms proposed by the 
Kyoto Protocol, the scheme that ensures that the greenhouse gas emissions are reduced at 
least cost is the EU ETS which was the first international trading mechanism for 
emissions. The first phase of the EU ETS introduced in 200516, achieved trading permits 
that cover 17 percent of the carbon dioxide emissions in the entire world (Ellerman and 
Buchner, 2007). 
                                                 
14 New Zealand has an Emission Trading Scheme established since 2008, in which, due to political delays, only the forestry sector has 
registered trading activities. Other sectors of the economy have different entry dates in the trading scheme. Australia was planning to 
start using a similar trading scheme in 2010, but on April 2010, the Australian Prime Minister announced that the implementation is 
postponed until 2012, after the end of Kyoto’s Protocol commitment period. 
15 27 countries form the EU as of October 2011. 
16 EU ETS had already become operational before Kyoto Protocol entered into force, in January 2005. 
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The Climate Change section of the European Commission comprises the latest 
information about the international negotiations that took place in Copenhagen in 
December 2009. The EU countries have decided to commit to tougher emission cuts 
independent on what other signatory countries decide about their own emissions 
reductions. Thus, the EU decided to commit to an ambitious 20 percent emissions 
reduction by 2020, compared to 1990 levels (European Commission, 2009). Furthermore, 
if the other developed countries will decide on comparable targets and proper reductions 
to be taken by developing countries, the EU stated its willingness to increase its 
commitment to 30 percent. 
2.4.3 The United States 
The US signed the Kyoto Protocol but did not ratify it because the American 
administration felt that the US economy would be harmed if costly environmental 
measures were implemented. Since 1997, the US Senate has questioned the efficacy of 
the Protocol, given that it did not require fast growing developing countries such as China 
and India to reduce their emissions. 
The main policy framework of the US is a complex one. Issues such as energy 
security, pollution reduction and sustainable economic development are supported 
through promoting biofuels, renewable energy, and advanced nuclear technology with the 
aim of achieving economic and environmental benefits (US Department of State, 2007). 
Based on estimated GDP loss and developing countries insufficient participation, 
the Clinton administration did not submit the Kyoto Protocol for ratification and the 
arguments recurred for the next administrations. In 2002, the Bush administration had 
announced that the main policy at the federal level was going to consist of emissions 
intensity reduction up to 18 percent until 2012. However, the main criticism brought to 
this policy was that actually this intensity reduction allows an increase in the overall US 
emissions (Krugman, 2002). 
Despite the reluctance of the US federal government to ratify Kyoto, many US 
states and cities have tried to organize various institutions or agreements in an effort to 
prove to the federal government that greenhouse gases can be reduced at low cost. An 
example is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which includes ten US 
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states17, and implements an emissions cap and trade system for power plants. A second 
example is the Western Climate Initiative, which is an independent organization started 
by a few US states and Canadian provinces, as well as one state in Mexico18, with the aim 
of reducing GHG emissions. A third example, the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Accord19, has similar goals. 
Moreover, international partnerships have been developed. The Asia Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate has brought together Australia, Canada, 
China, India, Japan, Korea and the United States for achieving common goals related to 
energy security, pollution reduction and climate change deterrence20.  
On May 20, 2009, the House Energy and Commerce Committee passed the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454, US Senate 2009) which intended 
to create a national cap and trade program that limits the amount of GHG emissions of 
power plants, manufacturers and oil refiners. The emitters were to be allocated 
allowances, free in the beginning of the program and auctioned later. Regarding the 
renewable energy, the bill stipulated that by 2020 the electricity demand should be met 
by using 20 percent renewable energy, out of which 5 percent is to constitute electricity 
savings. The bill passed the approval of the House of Representatives in June 2009 (H.R. 
2454, US Senate 2009). The 2010 federal budget proposed to support the cap and trade 
program had with the following targets: reducing GHG emissions to 14 percent below 
2005 levels by 2020 and to 83 percent below 2005 levels by 2050 (Eber, 2009).The Bill 
was supposed to receive the US Senate approval at the end of 2010, but in July 2011, the 
Bill ended up being rejected by the American Senate. 
After dropping the Bill, in all media releases and future US climate change plans, 
cap and trade policy implementation priority seem to have been replaced by clean energy 
goals. As of the fall of 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is now issuing 
regulations under the federal Clean Air Act that requires emitters to control GHG 
emissions by installing best available technologies. In addition, over the last 20 months, 
                                                 
17 Participant states: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland, 
Rhode Island. Observers: Pennsylvania, District of Columbia, Eastern Canadian Provinces, and New Brunswick are observers in the 
process. http://www.rggi.org/states.htm  
18 Participant states: Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington. Observers: Colorado, Kansas, Nevada, Wyoming 
(the US), Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan (Canada), Sonora (Mexico). 
19 Participants: Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Kansas, Ohio, South Dakota and the province of Manitoba 
(Canada). http://hometownsource.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3098&Itemid=29  
20 http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/default.aspx  
  36
the US president’s administration has been announcing the most stringent fuel economy 
standards that have ever been issued for the US. Initially, the plans have stipulated that, 
all car and light trucks produced between 2012-2016, meet the average fuel economy 
standards21 of 35.5 miles per gallon by 2016. Moreover, it was calculated that this plan 
would reduce GHG emissions by 900 million metric tons and would also reduce oil 
consumption by 1.8 billion barrels by 2016. Further on, in August 2011, fuel efficiency 
and emissions standards were released for commercial trucks, vans and buses made 
between 2014 and 2018. These standards are expected to reduce oil consumption by 530 
million barrels of oil during the four years. However, the US still does not have in place a 
price for carbon. 
Among other efforts toward climate change mitigation in the US, the only 
voluntary GHG emission reduction trading system, the Chicago Climate Exchange22 
(CCX) was the first US trading emission sources and trading offsets in North America. 
CCX was established in 2003 and, until 2010 was operated by a public company. In 
2010, CCX was bought by the European company Intercontinental Exchange (Lavelle, 
2010). Few months after the acquisition, Climate Exchange announced that it will cease 
trading carbon credits, but it will continue to assist carbon exchanges. Although CCX has 
always advertised its transparency as a vital institution to mitigate GHG emissions in 
North America, the company was exposed to political scandal since the beginnings. 
Speculations about important American politicians who supported, funded or contributed 
to the existence of CCX along its lifespan started to subside only a while after the 
acquisition. Briefly, for part of the mass-media, CCX had constituted the classical 
example of rent-seeking shield for opportunists. Far from drawing any conclusions with 
this respect, the hot media debates (Efstathiou, 2009) on CCX’s real aims, financial 
evolution and policy makers’ intentions illustrate media’s intensely focus on the assumed 
vested interests in the GHG emissions reduction sector. 
 
                                                 
21 This standard refers to manufacturer’s annual fleet of cars or trucks production. 
22 http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/ 
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2.4.4 Canada 
The evolution of Canadian policy regarding GHG emission reductions has 
followed an expected learning curve, starting from simple voluntary actions to more and 
more refined compulsory activities. The main tendency of the Canadian government with 
regards to climate change policy has been acknowledging the necessity of stimulating 
technology development, promoting the use of incentives, and encouraging investment 
stability. At the same time, another important aspect has been to encourage behavioural 
change in consumers and industries that will further stimulate developing new markets 
(Government of Canada, 2002 [1]).  
The Canadian federal government attitude towards climate change in the interval 
1990-2002 was characterized through the promotion of voluntary action, increased 
funding and an incentives-based approach. Thus, prior to the 2002 Kyoto ratification, 
measures (Government of Canada, 2006) implemented by the federal government ranged 
from establishing programs like the Efficiency and Alternative Energy (1991) program to 
creating the Climate Change Action Fund through the federal budget (1998) or to 
facilitating national consultations for the Climate Change Plan of Canada (2002 [2]), 
initiatives that are going to be detailed further on. 
In 2002, Canada became the 99th country to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Within the 
Protocol it is mentioned that during the period 2008 – 2012, Canada committed to reduce 
its greenhouse gas emissions by 6 percent below the level of 1990, which means a 
reduction of approximately 129 MT CO2e (carbon dioxide equivalent) per year during 
the 2008-2012 commitment period (Fulton et al., 2005). However, this was considered a 
difficult target to reach given that in 2003, Canada’s emissions were 24 percent above 
1990’s level (Environment Canada, 2007 [1]). 
Over time, the Canadian government has been issuing and refining different 
strategies for cutting GHG emissions. Briefly, the two main streams of reductions have 
been oriented towards the activities of big polluting companies (known as the Large Final 
Emitters or LFEs) and towards sequestering carbon in agricultural or forestry sinks 
(known as domestic offset credits). However, given the focus of this research, the 
following review will focus only on the Large Final Emitters regulations. According to 
the Canadian government, approximately 700 firms (Government of Canada, 2005) were 
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responsible for almost half of Canada’s GHG emissions, of which less than 100 are 
responsible for about 80 percent of those emissions. 
Based on the existing regulations and measures, in April 200523, the Canadian 
government issued an updated climate change plan called Moving Forward on Climate 
Change: A Plan for Honouring Our Kyoto Protocol (Government of Canada, 2005). As 
the Large Final Emitters were forecasted to contribute approximately 50 percent of 
Canadian emissions by 2010, various tools were established to help LFEs meet their 
emission intensity targets in the most cost effective way. The LFE system comprises 
companies in the mining and manufacturing, oil and gas, and thermal electricity sectors. 
The LFEs options for compliance were: reducing their own emissions through 
investments in their own facilities, purchasing emission reductions from other LFEs that 
exceeded their target, and buying domestic offset credits or eligible international Kyoto 
units24. 
As a financial incentive to exceed their targets, the LFE could invest in 
technology developments and consider them as compliance activity. The Greenhouse Gas 
Technology Investment Fund introduced in the 2005 Federal Budget, was designed to 
support domestic innovative technologies that can reduce GHG emissions. The 
contributions to the Fund were designed to help promote technological innovation and 
reductions beyond the 2008-2012 interval.  
However, according to the 2005 Climate Change plan (Government of Canada, 
2005) there are two types of emissions that LFEs should reduce: fixed process emissions 
and other types of emissions measured in tonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions. This 
distinction is essential, as reducing the levels of fixed process emissions can only be done 
by lowering production entirely because there is no alternative technology that will 
reduce them. For example, when extracting limestone (used to produce cement and lime), 
the process involves releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. The issue is that this is 
the only way known so far for extracting limestone. In contrast, existing technology have 
allowed industries to reduce other types of emissions without lowering production, 
particularly through fuels switching. 
                                                 
23 The 2002 plan established that in the 2008 – 2012 interval the average annual emission reduction target of the LFEs would be 55 
million tonnes (Mt) CO2 emissions (CO2e). In 2005 the target decreased to 45 Mt CO2 emissions. 
24 Units issued under the Kyoto Protocol regulations; they are divided in the following categories: Emissions Reduction Units (ERU), 
Certified Emissions Reductions (CER) or Removal Units. 
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Under the 2005 Climate Change plan, to account for these differences in the two 
types of emission reductions, fixed process emissions had a 0 percent reduction target 
while other emissions had a 15 percent intensity reduction target relative to a 2010 
business-as-usual (BAU). LFE companies could comply by reducing their own 
emissions, buying credits from other LFEs, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
Joint Implementation (JI) credits, "greened" international permits (Assigned Amount 
Units or AAUs) and domestic offsets or Technology Investment Units. According to the 
above mentioned plan, the Technology Investment Units represented investments in 
technology development as a compliance option for LFEs. They had a cost of $15/tonne 
CO2e and would be limited to 9 Mt, which meant that the LFE target would be met 
through domestic reductions, offset and Kyoto credits (Government of Canada, 2005). 
While there has been some recent progress in the development of Canadian GHG 
emission reduction policy, the Canadian government also had some drawbacks. On April 
5, 2006 Canadian mass-media reported that the new conservatory government had 
decided that federal funding for climate change programs in the new fiscal year would be 
reduced by 40 percent and 15 climate change programs were to be cut. These government 
decisions led to great concern among environmentalists, scientists and opposition parties. 
In response, ninety top Canadian scientists25, in an open letter to the Prime Minister, 
insisted that the government develop a national strategy on climate change or risk 
devastating consequences for the country’s ecosystems, economy and society. 
While the government actions discussed above indicate a sometimes confused 
direction on GHG emissions reduction strategy, the balance of activity indicates that the 
government’s policy shift did not define the Canadian attitude towards climate change 
issues at that time. One year later, the Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions 
(Environment Canada, 2007 [2]) was released. The plan outlines reductions in GHG 
emissions and air pollutants that are to be achieved by setting up measures for the 
following sectors: electricity generation produced by combustion, oil and gas, forest 
products, smelting and refining, iron and steel, some mining, and cement, lime and 
chemicals. Moreover, the Canadian policy addressed issues of indoor air quality, 
emissions from transportation sources, and emissions from consumer and commercial 
                                                 
25 France-Press Agency (AFP), April 19, 2006. 
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products. Regarding air pollutants, national emission caps were fixed as percentage 
reductions from 2006, the new base year, with air pollutants reductions coming into force 
by 2012. Following a progressive approach, the existing Large Final Emitters have to 
reduce their emission intensity26 by 6 percent each year. The base year of production for 
the firms considered is 2006; thus, the expected emissions intensity cuts are 18 percent by 
2010. A continuous reduction of 2 percent each year after 2010 was proposed for 
achieving a 26 percent reduction in intensities by 2015. Regarding Canada’s position on 
carbon leakage, the Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions clearly specifies that, as 
long as emission-intensity system ties targets to production, credits will be earned only 
through cleaner production. Thus, firms will not be allowed to claim emission reduction 
credits by shutting down production or moving production out of Canada.  
In March 2008, Environment Canada published another regulatory framework 
that details the mandatory reductions for industry as well as new measures for the oil 
sands and electricity sectors. The new regulation proposes tough measures to be followed 
such that, according to the Government commitment, by 2020 it will be possible to 
achieve the 20 percent total emission reduction proposed in the 2007 plan. Moreover, the 
long-term goals include a proposed 60 to 70 percent emissions reduction by 2050 which 
are intended to establish Canada as a low emission-economy. The plan lays down the 
targets for each of the industrial sectors, the creation of a carbon emissions trading 
market as well as the carbon offset system as an option for Canadians who want to 
contribute to GHG reductions. The regulations regarding Large Final Emitters highlight 
that the emission intensity reduction target for each sector remains 18 percent – as 
mentioned in the previous framework. However, companies will be free to choose how to 
reduce their emissions among the following: in-house reductions, contributions to a 
technology fund, access to emissions trading and the offset system, and access to the 
CDM. 
By tying emission reduction targets to production, Canadian regulations have 
taken into account the sell-and-move issues. With regard to GHG emission, the current 
Canadian Regulatory Framework for Air Emissions has clearly specified that “firms will 
not be able to claim emission reduction credits by shutting down production for economic 
                                                 
26 Emission intensity measures the amount of emissions per some unit of economic output. It can be unit of production, GDP, GNP, 
etc. 
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reasons or obtain credits for moving productions out of Canada” (p. 10). While the intent 
of the regulation is straightforward, it may stifle new investments in emission reduction 
when it involves the shutdown of a plant. Designing effective mechanisms that can 
distinguish economic from environmental reasons, or the relocation of production in a 
multi-plant multi-product company, could prove very difficult. 
It is interesting to note that the Canadian government had considered shifting the 
current emission-intensity policy to fixed emission caps for the 2020-2025 interval. This 
shows that the regulators had taken into account the possible expansion of trading 
emission reductions not only with the European Union but also with the US.  
 
2.4.5 Other Conflict of Interests among Involved Countries 
2.4.5.1 Developing versus developed countries 
In 1997 UNFCCC has framed Kyoto Protocol to operate under the idea of 
“common but differentiated responsibility” which means that developing countries have a 
different status than developed and transition countries. Developing countries are not 
considered to have contributed to the current share of emissions and, given their low 
share of emissions per capita, should be supported by a climate change fund initiated by 
developed countries. However, developing countries still share the responsibility of 
reducing emissions by establishing their own absolute targets and planning emission 
reduction actions. The issue arises from the fact that, since Kyoto Protocol inception, 
developing countries like China and India have displayed a rapid economic development, 
thus emitting high levels of greenhouse gas and positioning themselves as main 
contributors for emissions in the future. China is currently considered to emit the largest 
amount of total GHG emissions, surpassing even the United States’ on per capita 
emissions are lower than major industrialized economies. However, it is difficult to show 
real data as long as China does not release information about its carbon dioxide 
emissions, although it claims to be very actively involved in finding solutions for climate 
change challenges. 
The fact that developing countries, especially China and India, do not have 
binding targets represents one of the reasons why the United States refused to ratify the 
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Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, during the 2009 Copenhagen climate change negotiations 
the US position was firm in stressing that it is essential that developing countries, 
especially China, should also have firm GHG emissions commitments in any future 
international agreement.  
2.4.5.2 Border tax adjustments and protectionism issues  
Both EU and US considered accompanying climate policies (either cap and trade 
or carbon tax) with border measures applied on imports from countries who have a less 
strict environmental policy (LaFleur and Rosaasen, 2011). The terminology mostly 
employed for border measures are border tax adjustments (BTAs) or border carbon 
adjustments (BCAs). This tax would be levied by countries which have higher production 
costs due to respecting carbon mitigation policies upon goods produced in carbon 
intensive countries. Initially, a few EU countries considered implementing these 
measures due to US refusal to ratify Kyoto Protocol (Hontelez, 2007), but the European 
Commission did not want to strain the trade relationships with the US Another major 
reason was that the World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations on BTAs are not clear 
with respect to taxing inputs that are not physically incorporated into the final product 
(McCorriston and Sheldon, 2005). 
From the US point of view, the American Clean Energy and Security Act 
proposes the cap and trade system, which would protect the US borders by using BTAs 
on carbon intensive imports. This measure is targeted primarily at emitters such as China, 
India and Brazil, which, under their developing countries status, do not have binding 
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. The difference between employing border taxes 
between the EU and the US is that in the proposed US legislation, the GHG intensive 
countries would have to buy GHG emission permits (US Senate, 2009), which may 
represent less of a challenge for WTO rules than the European version. 
Furthermore, the Clean Energy Act proposes employing low carbon standards for 
energy intensive goods, which has already raised protectionism issues versus using 
Canadian cement, chemicals, and especially fuel derived from Alberta’s oil sands. 
Canadian environmentalist forums and newspapers have started pointing out the 
protectionist repercussions of the American climate bill measure for the proposed cap and 
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trade system. Mach (2009) is warning the issue of restricting imports of higher carbon 
fuels such as oil sands can be a challenge under the WTO rules. Under international trade 
rules, how a good is produced should not be a ‘determining factor in purchasing 
decisions’ (p. 1).  
 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
In the light of the above, the diverse range of GHG emissions reduction 
mechanisms employed by various countries along with the participation in the Kyoto 
Protocol raises competitiveness issues for the governments involved, especially for 
countries dependent on emissions intensive industries or whose economy is expanding. 
At the same time, if a particular industry is more involved in trade, it can face severe 
competitiveness issues from the countries that did not ratified Kyoto. Some of the above 
sections have detailed the competitiveness issues of various sectors when introducing 
environmental policies which have become a source of concern for the European Union. 
These issues represent a continuous debate as under WTO rules trade liberalization will 
deter governments from seeking optimal environmental policies because of the 
constraints created for their trade instruments and policies (Sheldon, 2006).  
The lack of international harmonization in GHG emission reduction policies and 
governments’ incentives to manipulate trade through environmental policy may lead to a 
race to the bottom in governments’ environmental standards (Bagwell and Staiger, 2001), 
and subsequently to pollution havens or industrial flights phenomena. Narrowing down 
the consequences of different environmental regulations at industries level, there are 
competitiveness issues that occur among trade dependent industrial sectors whatever the 
choice of emissions reduction policy. Neuhoff et al. (2007) make a distinction that 
competitiveness is more important at the firm or sector level, as at the country level, in 
long run, the exchange rates will adjust to compensate for possible competitiveness 
losses. The ‘chain’ effect that takes place within an industry, when the government 
decides the stringency of its climate policy, leads to competitiveness issues which in turn 
can determine loss of profitability and market share. Therefore, when countries all over 
  44
the world experience various stages of economic development, harmonization of 
environmental regulations is not a straightforward achievable goal.  
Each industry sector reacts differently when an environmental policy is 
implemented. In this respect, the final result is impacted by the degree of exposure to 
trade of the economy, industry specific characteristics, market structure and the degree of 
vertical integration. 
In the light of the above, policy impact and efficiency may have a higher 
complexity, different motivations and interpretation when the industry subjected to GHG 
emission reductions is vertically integrated. As previously noted, while a carbon tax can 
be implemented at a consumer of an input or output level, a cap and trade can be 
implemented only in the upstream of an industry, as administratively it would not be 
feasible to trade permits at the final consumer level.  
When a government is implementing environmental policies, a vertical market 
structure allows identifying in more depth what determines the final price of the product 
or where most of the transaction costs occur. The question that arises is which level is 
going to be more affected? If and to what extent are the producers of crude oil influenced 
by the impact of this policy? 
Given these circumstances, the following chapter will seek insights and compare 
and contrast the policies presented earlier within an industry’s vertical market structure. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EQUIVALENCE OF REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS IN A VERTICAL 
MARKET 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 introduced GHG emission reduction policy instruments by examining 
the environmental and economic consequences of their implementation at an international 
level and identified the need to decipher the effects of the policies at an industry level. To 
this end Chapter 3 explores carbon taxation and cap and trade instruments within a 
vertical industry market structure. 
This chapter contributes to an interesting important debate among senior 
economists whether a carbon tax or tradable permit system is the best policy instrument 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Nordhaus (2006) and Metcalf (2009) and others 
argue that carbon taxes should be the policy of choice, while Keohane (2009) and others 
argue that cap and trade systems are the superior instrument. Those in favour of a carbon 
tax argue that this price based instrument can create effective incentives, it can create a 
revenue source to reduce income tax and other distortionary taxes, has no price risk for 
firms, and it is simpler to administer with lower transactions costs (Stavins, 1995). Those 
in favour of cap and trade argue that very little is known about the marginal cost of 
abatement, so a quantity based market instrument is superior as it will allow a more 
precise target achievement; cap and trade systems tend to be more politically acceptable 
because they are less transparent, that transaction costs are minimal when dealing with 
large final emitters, and finally, the experience with the SO2 emission trading was an 
unqualified success. This important debate stands in sharp contrast with the well known 
result in the environmental economics literature which states that in the presence of 
perfect competition and in the absence of uncertainty, a carbon tax and a cap and trade 
system (where the permits are auctioned) are equivalent with regards to the level of 
abatement, the price of carbon and the price of carbon intensive goods.  
The existing literature on the choice of GHG emission reduction instruments has 
focused more on the policies’ efficiency and cost-effectiveness and less on rent and total 
economic surplus distribution (Stavins, 2008). At the same time, many of the industries 
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subjected to GHG emission reductions are vertically integrated. Moreover, in the 
environmental trade literature to date, little discussion has occurred on the effects of 
employing environmental policies in vertical structured industries (Hamilton and 
Requate, 2004). For these reasons, this chapter examines a vertical market structure with 
input substitution, to analyze the equivalency of the two policies. The revealed 
differences in efficiency and welfare impacts between the policies are an additional 
consideration for policy makers. 
The chapter compares these competing policy instruments by examining under 
what conditions a carbon emissions tax policy (price based) and a cap and trade policy 
(quantity based) are (and are not) quasi-equivalent. Building on a growing literature, the 
chapter examines these policies within a vertical industry structure and shows that input 
substitution can be an additional source of non-equivalency. The analysis begins by 
exploring the two policies equivalency in a simple market under restrictive assumptions 
(perfect competition and absence of uncertainty), then in a vertically structured market, 
first under fixed proportions assumption and then when input substitution is allowed in 
the vertical structure. 
The conclusion drawn at the end of this chapter is that the two policies generally 
are not equivalent. They can be quasi-equivalent when implemented on the same good or 
level within a vertical market structure. They can also be quasi-equivalent regardless of 
the level of implementation within the vertical structure with a fixed proportions 
technology within a closed economy, but even in this case can differ substantially in 
where the rents accrue. However, in the more general case of open economy and/or 
substitution among inputs is possible, the quasi-equivalence quickly breaks down when 
policies at different levels in the vertical structure are compared. A cap and trade system 
imposed in the upstream of LFEs producing substitutable inputs will be less effective and 
less efficient than a generally distributed carbon tax. 
The chapter is organized in four parts. Section 3.2 introduces the graphical and 
theoretical illustration of the quasi-equivalence between a carbon tax and a cap and trade 
policy in a simple market. Section 3.3 develops a vertical market structure, and illustrates 
policies’ enforcement at all the levels and their quasi-equivalency from a distributional 
point of view. Section 3.4 presents the importance of input substitution possibility when a 
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regulator chooses the GHG emission reduction instrument. Section 3.5 concludes the 
chapter and focuses on key components of vertical linkage in both the upstream and 
downstream markets of an industry. 
 
3.2 Quasi-Equivalence  
3.2.1 Carbon Tax and Cap and Trade Policies – Graphical Analysis in a Simple 
Market 
A well known result in the environmental economics literature is that in the 
presence of perfect competition and in the absence of uncertainty, a carbon tax and a cap 
and trade system (where the permits are auctioned) are quasi-equivalent, which implies 
that they are equivalent with regard to the level of abatement, the price of carbon and the 
price of carbon intensive goods, and only differ in terms of rent distribution. This 
important result is illustrated in a simple graphical framework as point of departure for 
the remainder of the chapter, which discusses other sources of non-equivalency including 
those identified in the literature, and those differences that arise in a vertical market 
structure. 
For a better understanding of the concepts of equivalency, quasi-equivalency and 
non-equivalency of cap and trade versus carbon tax, and prior to exposing the first model, 
the following definitions should be presented and explained. 
Definition 1: one policy is said to be equivalent to the second one, if both policies, 
when set at appropriate levels, yield the same prices, quantities and welfare distribution. 
E.g.: in a closed economy, a tax on producer is equivalent with a tax on consumer. 
Definition 2: one policy is said to be quasi-equivalent to the second one, if both 
policies, when set at appropriate levels, yield the same prices and quantities but differ in 
welfare distribution. E.g.: under certainty, an auctioned cap and trade and a carbon tax 
policy are quasi-equivalent as they differ in welfare distribution, as further shown. 
Definition 3: One policy is said to be non-equivalent to the second one, if both 
policies, even when set at appropriate levels, yield different prices and quantities. E.g.: 
command and control instruments are not equivalent to a carbon tax as costs will differ 
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(Helfand, 1991); tariffs and quotas are non-equivalent in the presence of monopoly 
(Bhagwati, 1965). 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the above definitions. 
 
Figure 3-1.: Equivalency, quasi-equivalency and non-equivalency representation  
Based on the above definitions, Figure 3-1 can be interpreted as follows: the 
equivalency is included in the quasi-equivalency, as long as prices and quantities (P & Q) 
are the same, and the difference consists of welfare distribution (W). Thus, it can be said 
that the contour of the equivalency set is represented by the welfare distribution attribute. 
Meanwhile, non-equivalent is everything outside the octagon. Similarly, the contour of 
the quasi-equivalency concept (the octagon) is represented by the market impacts in the 
sense that it has non-equal prices and quantities. Therefore, non-equivalent policies are 
neither equivalent nor quasi-equivalent. However, it should be mentioned that the 
mapping of the policies in the above diagram will change under different conditions and 
assumptions such as market power, vertical structures or input substitution. In other 
words, the quasi-equivalency in the current framework can quickly break down into non-
equivalency in a different framework of assumptions. 
Returning to the basic illustration of quasi-equivalency, it should be noted that it 
involves the market before and after enforcing an emission reduction policy for any good 
whose production process leads to releasing carbon emissions produced in fixed 
Non-equivalent 
Non-equal P & Q impacts 
Equivalent 
Equal P, Q & W 
Quasi-equivalent 
Equal P & Q 
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proportions to output27. Given the fixed proportion, the vertical axis shows the output 
price, the horizontal axis shows the quantity of output, which is also equivalent with 
emitting a certain quantity of carbon dioxide. Under the restrictive assumptions of perfect 
competition and complete information, while rent distribution differs, the policies result 
in the same price and quantity outcomes and hence are quasi-equivalent. 
The incidence of a carbon tax at a firm level is illustrated in Figure 3-2. Before 
introducing the tax, the optimal quantity and price are determined by supply and demand, 
'Q  and 'P , while consumer and producer surplus are represented by area FCP’ and P’CA 
respectively. After introducing the tax, the quantity of output is reduced to Q’’, and 
implicitly emissions from producing the output are reduced as well (which represents a 
gain for the environment). The price that consumers pay increases to Pd and consumer 
surplus is reduced to FHPd. Meanwhile, the new price after tax that producers get is a 
lower one, Ps, and producer surplus decreases to PsGA, while the area PdHGPs 
represents government revenue. As a result of output and emissions reduction there is an 
environmental damage reduction, and the improvement in the environment in shown by 
area HKCG28. However, triangle HCG represents the loss, while, triangle HKC illustrates 
the net welfare gain as a result of introducing the carbon tax.29 
                                                 
27 The investigation further developed assumes that abatement takes place only through reductions in output alone (i.e. enforcing a 
carbon tax or a cap and trade policy). 
28 The per unit externality is described by the distance Pd- Ps. 
29 It should be noted that, in a perfect competition environment, the decrease in the producer surplus implies an initial drop in the 
firms’ profits. This comes as an effect of the decrease in price that producers experience after the tax is enforced. Thus, some firms 
will downsize, releasing some fixed factors of production, or exit the market if they can not cope with the price decrease. This is the 
reason why, under the new price Ps, profits will rise to zero again and producer surplus is PsGA. 
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Figure 3-2.: Producer and consumer surplus at a firm level, before and after 
implementing a carbon tax 
A cap and trade policy can be set such that to yield the same results as a carbon 
tax policy. As illustrated in Figure 3-3 if government will allocate free permits to the 
firms up to a quantity of Q’’ the supply will be restricted to Q’’, which will increase the 
price of output to Pd. At this quantity, some firms will be willing to pay a Pd – Ps for a 
permit that would enable them to expand output. Similarly, a firm would be willing to 
accept this amount to sell a permit, and forgo their margin last unit of production. This 
permit value, which reflects to price of carbon in this market, creates an additional 
marginal opportunity cost of production. The supply curve S will shift vertically up to S’ 
by the price of a permit. After introducing the cap, the output is reduced to Q’’, the new 
output price increases to Pd, consumer surplus is reduced to FHPd and producer surplus 
increases to PdHGA. The new producer surplus is made up by triangle PdHPs and 
rectangle PsHGA, which is the additional producer surplus resulting from the rents 
accruing to permit allocation. HKCG is the improvement in the environment and HKC 
shows the net gain in social welfare. While equivalent in all other respects, the additional 
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rents that accrue to permit holders, in the case of a free allocation of permits of Q’’, is 
quasi-equivalent to a carbon tax of Pd – Ps. 
A cap and trade policy where the permits are auctioned can be fully equivalent to 
a carbon tax under competitive markets and complete information. As noted above, when 
a cap and trade policy is implemented with an auction to allocate Q’’ emission permits, 
firms will bid on permits up the point where it will not be profitable anymore to purchase 
additional permits (in the Figure 3-3 an amount Pd-Ps). This point corresponds to the 
values of permits being equal to the price of carbon. In this case, the firms pay the 
government for any rents that accrue from permit holding. This policy, where the permits 
are auctioned, is fully equivalent to a carbon tax, where firms will lose producer surplus, 
consumer will lose consumer surplus, emissions will be reduced and revenue will be 
generated for the government.   
 
Figure 3-3.: Producer and consumer surplus at a firm level, before and after 
implementing a cap and trade policy 
Comparing the effects of introducing a carbon tax with a cap and trade policy, the 
difference consists in a reduction of producer surplus. So practically, the efficiency 
impacts from imposing the two policies are identical, but differ in the distribution of the 
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surplus. With a carbon tax in place, the difference between the price paid by the 
consumer and how much it costs a producer to obtain the good constitutes revenue for the 
government. Under a cap and trade policy with grandfathered permits the owner of the 
permit receives a rent equal to the difference between the selling price and the cost of 
production. 
Given the distributional implications, there is an ongoing debate whether GHG 
emission permits should be grandfathered, auctioned or allocated as a combination of 
grandfathering and auctioning. In the auctioning process, once the regulator decides the 
cap on emissions, she issues a certain number of permits that can be regularly auctioned 
and emitting firms can purchase credits for their emissions. The advocates of auctioning 
highlight that grandfathering can encourage non-efficient incumbent firms to continue 
producing as long as they receive permits for free. At the same time, grandfathering can 
represent a barrier to entry for new firms who have to buy permits from the existing 
firms.  
The permits allocated for free represent a valuable asset for the receiving firms. 
The possibility of holding a share of these assets creates incentives for the industries 
involved to lobby the regulator. This behaviour is known in the economic literature as 
rent-seeking activity, which is characterized as a socially wasteful activity that leads to 
inefficient outcomes (Paltsev et al., 2007). Thus, given the rent-seeking opportunity that 
grandfathering leads to, LFEs have an incentive to lobby the regulators for allocating the 
permits for free based on historical output. 
Among others, Metcalf (2007[2]), Dinan and Rogers (2002) and Parry (2004) 
investigate the distributional results of a cap and trade policy with freely allocated 
permits and find that grandfathered permits lead to rents accrued to shareholders. While a 
cap and trade system with a free allocation of permits is quasi-equivalent to a carbon tax, 
the existence of rent seeking incentive could have implications for the choice of policy 
instrument and how it is administered. Firms’ rent seeking activities can also influence 
the total supply of permits that the regulator decides to distribute (Ellerman and Buchner 
2007, Hanley and MacKenzie 2010). Implicitly, the amount of emissions to be abated (or 
the size of the cap) and the price of the permits would be impacted by the rent seeking 
activities. For example, a stringent cap determines a high value of the permits and thus a 
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higher value of the rents captured by firms. Vice-versa, it can be said that the size of the 
rents captured by firms depends on the size of the cap enforced for a specific industry.  
Related to the relationship between the industry’s elasticity of supply and demand 
and the rents extracted, Goulder and Parry (2008) investigate a cap and trade policy 
where the emission rights are distributed for free. They found that the rents that firms 
extract can overcompensate their compliance costs. They explain this situation through 
the value of the elasticity of supply relative to the elasticity of demand for that industry; 
e.g. the greater the relative elasticity of supply, the greater the increase in price and the 
greater the size of the rents. A permit system that restricts the level of a certain economic 
activity provides positive rents to holders of permits. Society can choose to implement 
various policies related to GHG emissions reductions, but the actual choice that would be 
implemented is going to be influenced by the rent-seeking activities that might be 
available to the interested groups of individuals or firms. 
 
3.2.2 Carbon Tax and Cap and Trade Policies under Uncertainty 
This section details first the main conditions that lead to policies quasi-
equivalency, e.g. uncertainty and imperfect information, and then discusses other 
conditions that contribute to the non-equivalency of the two policies such as the existence 
of transaction costs and rent seeking.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, carbon tax is a price regulatory instrument while a 
cap and trade is a quantity regulatory instrument. Both policies place a price on CO2 
emissions30, but they differ in the choice of policy instrument. A carbon tax places an 
explicit price of CO2 emissions which leads to the adjustment of the quantity of emissions 
corresponding to the tax level. Meanwhile, a cap and trade policy sets a specific quantity 
of emissions and allows the price of emissions to adjust accordingly (Murray et al., 
2008). Under certainty, the two policies can be set to obtain the same emissions 
reduction, but under uncertainty, this is not achievable. The reason is that in the real 
world, regulators are confronted with uncertainty and incomplete information regarding 
the exact structure of the cost and benefits curves (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Thus, 
                                                 
30 In most jurisdictions several greenhouse gases are included in policy, but are measured in terms of CO2 equivalents.  
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policy makers cannot know ex-ante the effect that the tax would have on the quantity of 
emissions and the effect that the emissions cap will have on the price. So there will be 
differences between the desired effect of any of the policies and the actual outcome in the 
market. For instance, in the context of international GHG emissions, the uncertainty 
issues are particularly severe as the damage value of the emissions accumulated can not 
be assessed. The following paragraphs explore these issues in more detail.  
Starting in the mid seventies numerous economists have argued that, both in 
practice and theory, Pigouvian taxes and emission permits are equivalent only under 
perfect certainty. Thus, Weitzman (1974), Adar and Griffin (1976), Roberts and Spence 
(1976), Baumol and Oates (1988), Stavins (1997) and many others show that under 
uncertainty, taxes and emissions permits can yield significant differences in both 
emission reductions and social welfare. Indeed, as long as the regulator has perfect 
information about the marginal cost and marginal benefit functions, it can enforce a 
Pigouvian tax where marginal cost equals marginal benefits. Alternatively, the regulator’s 
decision to enforce a cap and trade system will be based on determining the aggregated 
amount of emissions that needs to be abated and then issuing a number of permits such 
that the amount of emission reductions is at the level that equates marginal cost and 
marginal social damage (Stavins, 1997). Allowing trade in permits among firms equates 
marginal cost of emission reduction across firms, thereby minimizing the aggregate cost 
of abatement (Lipsey and Chrystal, 2007) and the permits market will determine the 
market clearing price. Thus, in both cases, the same amount of emissions is reduced, and 
the shadow price of emissions is the same. 
Baumol and Oates (1988) outline the differences between a tax and an emission 
permit system in a perfect competitive market setup, considering firstly the case where 
the marginal benefits curve is unknown to the regulator and then, when the marginal cost 
curve is subject to uncertainty. The authors illustrate that uncertainty regarding the 
position of the marginal benefits curve will result in either too low or too high emission 
reductions, but the abatement results are similar for both policies considered. Thus, 
analyzing the impact of not knowing ex-ante the position of the marginal benefits curve 
does not offer additional information about the different impact of the two policies. In 
contrast, the authors argue it is the uncertainty on the marginal cost function that brings 
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out the differences between the two policies. Baumol and Oates (1988) show that when 
the marginal cost curve is actually positioned lower than initially estimated, an emission 
permits system will achieve lower than optimal emissions reductions, while a carbon tax 
will attain more emission than planned. If the actual marginal cost curve is on a higher 
position than the expected one, the reverse is true. Further on, it is shown graphically and 
mathematically that, for each of the policies, the slopes of the two curves will impact 
both the magnitude of the emissions reduction distortions and the producer and consumer 
surplus. Baumol and Oates (1988) confirm Weitzman (1974) theorem, and state that, 
under the same assumptions as above, the two policies will determine the same 
magnitude of the welfare loss only when the slopes of the two curves are equal. A tax 
would be the preferred instrument by a social welfare maximizing regulator when the 
marginal cost curve is steeper than the marginal benefits curve and vice-versa. However, 
the authors do not support a specific policy over the other; they prefer to acknowledge 
both policies’ drawbacks in a world of uncertainty and imperfect information. 
Just as a simple example of climate change related uncertainty is the vast range of 
values attributed to the social marginal damages of GHG emissions. Metcalf (2009) 
underlines that a carbon tax should be set such that to maximize social welfare and the 
optimal tax value should be based on emissions’ social marginal damages. Indeed, Stern 
(2007) estimates the social cost of carbon dioxide at $85 per ton, while Nordhaus (2009) 
estimates a value of $11 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. The IPCC report (2007), 
based on a survey of 100 estimates, attributes a possible range of values from $3 to $95 
per metric ton of carbon dioxide. Even if the report explicitly considered risk in their 
estimation, they still suggest that the net damage costs of climate change may be even 
higher over time. 
Stavins (1995) makes a compelling argument that transaction costs should be 
considered in GHG emissions instrument choice, given the uncertainty created by 
transaction costs. He argues that transaction costs are often substantial with trading 
systems and these must be included in any examination of efficiency across instruments. 
Metcalf (2009) argues that governments are very experienced in collecting taxes, which 
reduces potential transaction costs in carbon tax schemes. Governments have also 
recognized transaction costs in the design of emission trading systems, thus, rather than 
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having a system where all firms and households can participate, these systems are 
typically targeted toward large final emitters. Taxes, on the other hand, can be applied at 
many different levels including the retail and small business level. As it will be shown 
later, the ability to implement a policy at any level in a vertical structure is particularly 
important in the presence of international trade when policies are not harmonized.  
As previously mentioned in Section 3.2.1, another issue that should be taken into 
account when the government implements policies for certain industries is the possibility 
of creating rents and thus, rent-seeking behaviour for the industries involved. In the 
context of implementing a tradable permits scheme, this case requires policies that can be 
updated without creating undesirable incentives for government or for the regulated 
entities. 
However, along with and besides uncertainty, imperfect information, transaction 
costs or rent seeking, there are other criteria that need to be considered when assessing 
GHG emissions reduction policies, as will they impact policies’ quasi-equivalency. 
According to Stavins (2008), the decision factors mostly employed when deciding to 
implement a GHG emission reduction policy are cost efficiency, environmental 
effectiveness and distributional equity. As policy efficiency is related to its ability to 
maximize net benefits, it implies the existence of correct information on the cost and 
benefits of abatement, which are quite difficult to estimate in the current context of the 
challenges raised by climate change (Baumol and Oates 1988, Stavins 2008). 
The environmental effectiveness criterion addresses the necessity of assessing 
which of the policy instruments would achieve the proposed carbon emissions target and 
which one of them would create more incentives towards the development and adoption 
of new GHG emissions reduction technologies. Both market-based (e.g. carbon taxes, cap 
and trade) and command and control instruments (emission or performance standards) are 
considered to encourage the development and adoption of new technologies (Downing 
and White 1986, Jung et al. 1996, Tientenberg 1985). However, there is no consensus on 
which one of them is a better alternative (Montero 2002, Bruneau 2004). Thus, Montero 
concludes that in the presence of oligopoly, when considering the induced output effects 
derived from lower abatement costs, standards can offer stronger incentives than 
emission permits, while in perfect competition conditions, permits are equivalent to 
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emissions standards and superior to performance standards. Bruneau (2004) shows that 
actually, under perfect competition, performance standards generate stronger incentives 
to innovate than emission permits when production costs are accounted for. Meanwhile, 
Requate (2005) argues that under perfect competition, market-based instruments perform 
better than the command and control ones regarding the adoption and development of 
advanced abatement technologies. 
The dispute on whether the cap and trade or carbon tax policy generate stronger 
incentives for technological innovation is ongoing. With regards to invention and 
innovation stages, Fischer et al. (1998) found that an unambiguous ranking of policies 
depends on the number of polluting firms, the environmental benefit functions and the 
innovator’s ability to spillover the benefits to other firms. Milliman and Prince (1989) 
and Jung et al. (1996) examine firms’ incentive for technology diffusion as the 
anticipated changes in producer surplus and found that auctioned permits provided the 
best incentive for adoption, followed by taxes and free allocated permits. On the other 
hand, Parry (1998), assuming that free and auctioned permits and emission taxes are 
equivalent before diffusion occurs, concludes that a tax is a superior instrument to 
permits. The authors explain their findings through the lower equilibrium permit price 
due to technology diffusion; thus, firms have lower incentives to adopt. 
Summarizing the above, carbon dioxide emissions represent a negative externality 
which can be corrected (meaning finding the social optimal level of emissions) only 
through regulators intervention. In the absence of uncertainty and in the presence of 
perfect competition conditions, the two policies are equivalent and have similar outcome. 
However, when accounting for the existing uncertainty over the marginal damages and 
abatement costs curves and their respective slopes, the two policies are no longer 
equivalent (Metcalf, 2009). While there is an extensive literature on assessing the 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the two policies, the same is not true for the analysis 
of distributional impacts. 
The remainder of this chapter acknowledges previous findings and the quasi-
equivalency of the two policies, but highlights the importance of considering the 
economic surplus distribution when deciding which is the instrument of choice for 
reducing GHG emissions. If the welfare loss or redistribution is straightforward to 
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graphically illustrate for a single firm, the situation becomes more complex when 
analyzing it in a vertical market system. The following section graphically compares and 
contrasts the distributional effects of a carbon tax and a cap and trade policy in a vertical 
market structure with fixed proportions when considering permit trade and the point of 
regulation. The analysis of vertical market structures under variable proportions is 
performed in Chapter 4. 
 
3.3 Quasi-Equivalence in Vertical Markets Structures 
3.3.1 Vertical Markets Structures, Rent Seeking and Environmental Policies 
The present section focuses on key components of vertical linkage in both the 
upstream and downstream markets of an industry when enforcing a carbon tax and a cap 
and trade policy. The goal of this analysis is to investigate the welfare distribution quasi-
equivalence of the two policies. Little attention has been paid so far in the literature on 
the effects of vertical markets on the design of domestic or international environmental 
policies (Hamilton and Requate, 2004). This is particularly important for trading systems, 
where permits are often allocated to large upstream firms to reduce transaction costs. The 
analysis initially employs a simple fixed proportions comparative static model within a 
vertical market system; the more general case of input substitution is developed later in 
this chapter.  
The importance of modeling environmental policies in a vertical market structure 
comes firstly from the high occurrence of vertically structured industries: oil, coal and 
natural gas, automobile industry, etc. Hamilton and Requate (2004) argue that even the 
state trading enterprises with their payment arrangements actually are a vertical structure 
mechanism. The authors analyze a non-cooperative environmental policy game between 
governments where a domestic exporter is considered in a vertical market structure. They 
highlight the high degree of sensitivity and the importance of the impact of vertical 
structures when environmental regulation is levied on a polluting input when trading an 
intermediate or final downstream good. 
In this context, the current analysis compares two GHG emission reduction 
instruments, carbon tax and cap and trade in a vertical market setting under the 
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assumption of fixed proportions technology. The analysis of the distributional impacts of 
the policies illustrates that, when the policies are setup to determine the same GHG 
emissions reduction, they determine the same impact on producer and consumer surplus 
at all the levels except for the surplus (rent) that accrues in the cap and trade case. Thus, 
this result shows the quasi-equivalency of the two policies under fixed proportions 
assumption. 
 
3.3.2 Carbon Tax and Cap and Trade Policies – Graphical Analysis in a Vertical 
Market Structure with Fixed Proportions 
A fixed proportion model is defined through the non-substitutability among the 
production factors involved. The non-substitutability of inputs implies both a fixed 
proportions technology and a closed economy where traded substitutes for inputs are non-
existent. A fixed proportions model employed in vertical markets means that the inputs 
that enter at each stage of the vertical system cannot be substituted one for the other. 
Moreover, as the amount of output increases proportionally, the required amount of each 
input increases by the same proportion. In turn, as long as output is associated with GHG 
emissions, the latter will increase as well, each time the inputs will increase 
proportionally. Thus, under fixed proportions assumption, this pattern will repeat 
irrespective of production, consumption or efficiency. Furthermore, as earlier mentioned 
in the present chapter, when a GHG emissions regulatory policy is implemented in a 
market equilibrium, there will be rent distribution. Under the conditions underlined 
above, when enforcing a GHG emission reduction policy in a fixed proportions vertical 
market system, rent distribution will be affected firstly by the choice of input where the 
policy is applied and secondly by the choice of policy instrument. This is one of the 
reasons why, a similar analysis with the same assumptions but performed on a different 
sector which employs other inputs may infer a totally different research outcome. 
A vertical market system illustrates the chain of technological processes that 
inputs pass through until they reach the final consumer in an output form. The graphical 
representation of vertical integrated firms shows the relationships between the upstream 
and downstream markets, and how the changes at any level in the system lead to welfare 
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impacts throughout the system. Therefore, a vertical market system will allow observing 
what is happening in the downstream markets when a GHG emission reduction policy is 
employed upstream. In other words, how distributional impacts of implementing the 
emissions reductions at a certain level propagate in the system and who will bear the 
burden of this reduction. 
The vertical system employed in the following analysis is developed with three 
layers that illustrate the production, processing and retail level31. For this analysis perfect 
competition conditions are assumed, while for graphical ease the input supply curves and 
output demand curve are assumed to be linear. The competitive equilibrium in the 
vertical market occurs where the sum of input costs per unit of output produced is equal 
to the price of the output produced. Under the fixed proportions assumption, the carbon 
dioxide emissions released into the atmosphere are always directly proportional to input 
use and output. 
The methodology of deriving the final user supply and the derived demand curves 
for each input for factors used in fixed proportions in a vertical markets system is 
straightforward to derive. When the horizontal scale for each input is expressed in terms 
of units of output, the supply function for the retail level will be the vertical sum of all the 
upstream marginal cost curves, such that the marginal cost of a retail unit equals the sum 
of the marginal costs of the corresponding inputs used in production (Malla, 1996). 
Although under fixed proportion technology the total economic surplus is the 
same at each level, the magnitude of consumer (downstream) and producer (upstream) 
surplus will differ according to slope of supply or derived demand at each level32. The 
following section presents the graphical illustrations. 
 
3.3.2.1 Enforcing a carbon tax in a vertical market structure 
As previously explained, under a fixed proportions technology inputs are 
combined in the same proportion regardless of their relative prices. The increase in 
average cost (which is the price in competitive markets) due to a tax on any input is equal 
                                                 
31 The last layer in the vertical market is labelled as retail and it embeds as well the wholesale stage. 
32 In turn, the supply and demand at each level depend on the supply and demand curves of the upstream and downstream firms within 
the system. 
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to the per unit tax rate multiplied by the number of input units required to produce one 
unit of output. Therefore, it is the sum of taxes that will matter for price levels, not the 
level where they are applied. In other words, in fixed proportions technology, it does not 
matter where the tax is enforced, the impact is the same regardless of the point of 
regulation. For instance, assuming that a tax is enforced on a processor’s output, the 
impact of the tax will determine a wedge between the price of the final good and the price 
received by the processor. The processor will produce where his marginal cost of 
processing equals the derived demand for processing services minus the per unit tax. The 
resulting reduction in the quantity processed will cause a proportional reduction in the 
quantity of final product sold, an increase in the product’s price and a reduction in 
consumer surplus. Because of fixed proportions technology, there will be a corresponding 
proportional reduction in the quantity of each input used, a decrease in these inputs’ price 
and thus, a loss in the surplus of inputs’ producers. Furthermore, under fixed proportions, 
any combination of input and product tax that has the same total impact on per unit cost 
will have the same impact on the quantity of final product sold and the quantity of inputs 
demanded. Because of this identity, the impact on prices and producer surplus will be 
identical regardless of where the tax is imposed.  
In this context, the following figures have as main aim detailing the graphical 
representation of enforcing a carbon tax at various levels of the vertical market system. 
Figure 3-4 illustrates the effects of implementing a carbon tax at the retail level. As a 
result of the per unit tax, the marginal cost curve shifts upward determining a new 
equilibrium while the quantity of output/emissions is reduced by Q* minus Q1. The 
effects of this shift at retail level impact the upstream derived demands. The new demand 
for the processing level is vertically derived by subtracting the sum of the retail and 
production marginal cost curves from the retail demand. Similarly, the derived demand at 
the production level is the result of vertically subtracting the sum of retail and processing 
supplies from the retail demand. Consequently, the new derived demands for processing 
and production will shift downwards. At the retail level, the new equilibrium will 
diminish both producer and consumer surplus. Meanwhile, at the processing and 
production level, as a result of the drop in demand (i.e. lower sales), both producer and 
consumer surplus diminish. 
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Figure 3-4.: The impact of enforcing a carbon tax at retail level in a fixed proportion 
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The next case investigated assumes that the carbon tax is enforced at the 
processors’ level, as illustrated in Figure 3-5. As explained at the beginning of this 
section, enforcing the policy will also shift the marginal cost curve upwards, reducing 
both producer and consumer surplus. This shift will propagate downwards and upwards 
in the vertical market system determining an upward shift of the retail supply curve and a 
downward shift of the production derived demand. Therefore, producer and consumer 
surplus will have lower magnitudes at both production and retail levels. 
Recalling the above, Figures 3-4 and 3-5 illustrate that under fixed proportions, 
the impact of a carbon tax in a vertical market structure is equivalent regardless of the 
level of implementation. 
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Figure 3-5.: The impact of enforcing a carbon tax at processing level in a fixed proportion 
vertical market structure 
The enforcement of a carbon tax at the production level will lead to an upwards 
shift of the marginal cost at retail level and a downward shift of the derived demand for 
the processing stage, leading to a lower consumer surplus and producer surplus for 
retailers and lower producer surplus for processors.  
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3.3.2.2 Enforcing a cap and trade policy in a vertical market structure 
The investigation continues with the analysis of enforcing a cap and trade policy 
at various levels in the vertical market structure. As shown in Figure 3-6, it is assumed 
that emissions are capped at retail level by the same value that the carbon tax induced in 
the above analysis, Q* minus Q1.  
 
 
Figure 3-6.: The impact of enforcing a cap and trade policy at retail level in a fixed 
proportion vertical market structure 
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The graphical representation shows that, according to the new policy, retailers 
will receive freely allocated permits as long as they limit their output at Q1. When this 
limit is overcome, retailers will incur the cost of buying permits such to comply with the 
new regulation. This is the reason why firms’ marginal cost kinks upwards at Q1 and 
shifts upwards for any higher quantity of output than Q1. This shift propagates similarly in 
the upstream and downstream of the system as the derived demands will also kink at Q1 
and then shift downwards. The reason is that, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, when 
the firm releases one more unit of emissions than allowed, it has to buy emission 
reduction permits from other firms, which increases firm’s marginal cost. According to 
production pricing regulations, the firm will distribute this increase in marginal cost for 
the entire quantity emitted, not only for the last unit (McKinsey and Ecofys, 2006). 
Regarding the welfare distribution, at the retail level, consumer surplus decreases 
while producers earn rents as previously shown on Figure 3-3. However, the welfare 
changes at the other two levels show that consumers extract rents and producer surplus 
magnitude is lower than before introducing the policy, just like in the carbon tax case. 
Comparing the two policies under the assumption of fixed proportions 
technology, carbon tax and cap and trade have similar welfare distribution effects along 
the vertical market system, apart from the rents that producers earn at the retail level, 
where the cap is introduced.   
When implementing the cap at the processing level, the derived demand and 
supply shifts and the new equilibrium will be similar to the carbon tax case. However, the 
difference is that for cap and trade the derived curves will kink where the cap is placed. 
As a result of introducing the cap at the processors level, processors extract rent, 
consumers lose surplus, while upstream primary producers lose surplus. 
When the cap is placed at the primary production level, rents are extracted at that 
level and all marginal cost curves in the downstream of the vertical market system will 
kink upwards, thus determining lower consumer surplus and rents for processors. 
Therefore, it can be stated that under fixed proportions, the impact of a cap and trade in a 
vertical market is equivalent regardless of the level where it is implemented. 
The above graphical development confirms that a carbon tax and a cap and trade 
policy are quasi-equivalent in a fixed proportions vertical market structure. Specifically, 
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both policies determine the same effects along the vertical market system, with the key 
difference that for cap and trade with freely allocated permits, producers at the level 
where the policy is introduced will gain rents. So it is the value of the freely distributed 
permits that gives firms who receive them the opportunity to gain windfall profits. 
Actually this value can be accounted later as an opportunity cost of holding the permits 
by the firms that received them, so the profits in the sector will be driven to zero again. 
As with a single market case, when permits are auctioned, all producing sectors and 
consumers lose the same amount of the rent regardless of which level in the vertical 
structure the policy is administered. In the case where permits are grandfathered or given 
to the sector, the level which is granted the permits will capture rents at the expense of 
the upstream and downstream participants.  
The graphical representation of both cap and trade and carbon tax under fixed 
proportions show that the impact of a cap and trade and carbon tax is quasi-equivalent 
regardless of the level of incidence. The quasi-equivalence means that the two policies 
have the same effect within the vertical market structure at all possible levels of 
enforcement, except for the rents that accrue for cap and trade. Therefore, cap and trade 
and carbon tax are quasi-equivalent under fixed proportions regardless of the level 
where the policies are enforced. 
The result of quasi-equivalence in the vertical market structure is derived with the 
very strong assumption of a closed economy with a fixed proportion technology. 
Allowing some technical substitution among inputs requires variable proportions 
modeling. The existence of quasi-equivalence in variable proportions is examined in 
Section 3.4, below. However, in a variable proportions model, the effect of enforcing a 
GHG emissions reduction policy at any level of the vertical market structure will 
propagate less in the upstream and downstream firms as long as input substitution is 
available. 
In this context, Section 3.4 has the aim of illustrating the importance of input 
substitution when the price of a domestic input increases as a result of enforcing a GHG 
emission reduction policy and there is a possibility to substitute the domestic input with a 
foreign one. In a vertical market structure, where there are available foreign inputs that 
could be nearly perfect substitutes for the domestic input, deciding which domestic inputs 
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would be subject to a carbon tax or a cap and trade policy could really matter. The 
subsequent analysis begins with a brief reminder of the basic economic concepts related 
to input substitution and then comparing and contrasting non-substitutability and 
substitutability effects. 
 
3.4 The Choice of GHG Emission Reduction Policies and Input Substitution 
In the case of GHG emissions reduction, the ability to substitute inputs could have 
a profound impact on the incidence of a carbon policy. The greater the substitution 
among inputs, the more important it is to tax those inputs associated with GHG 
emissions. The presence of foreign inputs that could be nearly perfect substitutes for 
domestic inputs suggests that, in a vertical market system, the choice of which inputs to 
be subjected to carbon tax or cap and trade policy could really matter. 
Unlike the case of fixed proportions, when the elasticity of substitution is not 
zero, the taxation of one input can impact other inputs in very different ways. When there 
is a large elasticity of substitution, the taxation of one input could increase the derived 
demand for other inputs and have a very limited impact on marginal cost. Thus, the 
degree of substitutability between inputs profoundly affects the economic impact of 
increasing the price of one input. For instance, assuming input substitution possibility 
instead of fixed proportions on Figure 3-4, enforcing a GHG emissions reduction policy 
at any level of the vertical market structure will propagate less in the upstream and 
downstream firms as long as input substitution is available; this means that prices, 
quantities and welfare will be impacted to a lesser degree. 
The following discussion is useful for illustrating the different impacts of the 
elasticity of substitution on the cost of production when only the price of one input 
increases. For instance, when a government unilaterally enforces a domestic GHG 
emission reduction policy on a specific industry through an increase in the price of a 
single input, the result will be an increase in the domestic good’s price. In this case, it is 
interesting to reveal the effects of this price increase on the production cost of the input 
when there is a possibility to substitute the domestic input with a foreign one. 
In a very simple formulation, when referring to production functions, the degree 
to which two inputs can be substituted for each other when relative input prices changes 
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is known as elasticity of substitution. When a production function has the property that 
inputs are economically combined in constant (fixed) proportions, regardless of relative 
input prices, it is known as a Leontief or fixed proportions technology. This implies that 
when increasing only one of the inputs, without a proportional increase in the other one, 
output will not increase.  
In general, isoquants are used to illustrate producers’ problem to combine two 
inputs33 to maximize output and minimize costs. When moving on an isoquant from one 
point to another, it is shown how one input can be substituted for the other one while 
holding output constant. On the other hand, holding one input constant and reducing the 
other one has to reduce output. Figure 3-7 shows the isoquants of a Leontief technology. 
 
 
Figure 3-7.: Leontief isoquants 
The L-shaped isoquants that are shown along the expansion path on Figure 3-7 
illustrate that for any particular output there is a specific combination of inputs A and B 
which can not be substituted. In other words, elasticity of substitution is zero. The 
optimal input combination of Figure 3-7 are O’, O* and O** for isoquants A’B’, A*B* 
                                                 
33 In production economics, labour and capital are the two inputs usually employed. 
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and A**B** respectively. The isocost curves q’, q*, q**, h’ and h* show the combination 
of the two inputs that can be purchased at fixed input prices for a given total cost. The 
isocost curves denoted q and h show that although there is a variety of input combination 
that can be purchased for a given cost, output for any given cost will be maximized along 
the expansion path.   
When the elasticity of substitution increases34, the isoquants will still show the 
combination of inputs that produce the same quantity of output, but in contrast to the 
Leontief relationship, in this case the inputs can be substituted one for another, as shown 
in Figure 3-8. 
 
Figure 3-8.: Isoquants for substitutable inputs 
Isoquants D* and D** show different quantities of output that can be obtained for 
different input prices. The figure also shows that if output was initially produced on 
isoquant D** at point H, when the price of only one input increases and input substitution 
is allowed, the new isocost will be N* and not M** anymore. It also shows that it is more 
expensive to produce the same output, and the new equilibrium is point F.  
                                                 
34 The case relevant for the analysis is to assume a positive elasticity of substitution which implies that the isoquants are strictly 
convex 
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Further, Figure 3-9 is employed to illustrate the possible effects of a price increase 
on the production cost of an input when there is a possibility to substitute the domestic 
input with a foreign one. This situation can occur when a government unilaterally 
enforces a domestic GHG emission reduction policy on a specific industry through an 
increase in the price of a single input. Therefore, Figure 3-9 illustrates the effects of an 
input price increase on cost with and without input substitution. 
 
Figure 3-9.: The impact of an input price change on cost with and without substitution 
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remains at point a and the cost increases to C1. The increase in the production cost can be 
calculated as the units number of input A times the input price increase. This means that 
the cost can be increased to any arbitrary level by increasing the price of a single input. In 
the case of the substitutable production function, an increase in the price of input A would 
cause a shift in the cost minimizing input combination to point b and lead to a reduction 
in the number of units of input A and to an increase in the number of units of input B. 
Compared to the Leontief case, the cost does not increase as much, as the new value is 
C2. This can be easily seen on the vertical axis as the price of input B is assumed to be 
fixed. If inputs A and B were perfect substitutes, an increase in the price of input A would 
result in a complete substitution for input B, and the cost would not increase at all. Unlike 
the case of fixed proportions, when the elasticity of substitution is not zero, the taxation 
of one input can impact other inputs in very different ways. When there is a large 
elasticity of substitution, the taxation of one input could increase the derived demand for 
other inputs and have a very limited impact on marginal cost. Thus, the degree of 
substitutability between inputs profoundly affects the economic impact of increasing the 
price of one input. 
In the case of GHG emissions reduction, the ability to substitute inputs could have 
a profound impact on the incidence of a carbon policy. The greater the substitution 
among inputs, the more important it is to tax those inputs associated with GHG 
emissions. In the presence of trade and the availability of foreign inputs that could be 
nearly perfect substitutes for domestic inputs suggests that, in a vertical market system, 
the choice of which inputs to be subjected to carbon tax or cap and trade policy could 
really matter. 
The trade and environment literature widely acknowledge that free trade has a 
significant impact on welfare distribution; trade can lower welfare in the absence of 
environmental regulations or it can raise it in the presence of near optimal emission 
targets (Bruneau 2005, Copeland 1994, Krutilla 1991, Beers and Bergh 1996). In this 
context, Bruneau (2005) acknowledges the gains from trade when market-based 
instruments are employed for reducing GHG emissions. He shows that identifying the 
level of emissions is not a sufficient condition for achieving gains from trade, the 
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necessary one is the mode of regulation, meaning the emission reduction instrument of 
choice. 
With the aim of exploring the differences between fixed and variable proportions 
regarding welfare distribution when enforcing a carbon tax and a cap and trade policy in 
a vertical market structure, a Muth model is employed in Chapter 4. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
The international concern with global warming and the debate on common efforts 
and actions for limiting the greenhouse gas emissions have induced a variety of domestic 
policy responses. In theory, governments choose policies that are most efficient in 
achieving environmental goals keeping in mind their social and political interests. 
Nordhaus and Yang (1996) emphasize that it is the implementation of domestic policies 
that will ultimately determine the performance of international agreements. 
The economic surplus redistribution, as a result of introducing any of the two 
policies, will depend on a large number of factors: the cost of the policy, the consequent 
shifts in affected output’s demand and supply, the structure of the industry and its 
exposure to trade, etc. In this context, Paltsev et al. (2007) and Stavins (2008) highlight 
the importance of assessing not only policies’ impacts on costs, but also the distributional 
implications and who will bear the ultimate distributional burden. For example, as a 
result of enforcing an emission reduction policy, some firms may experience windfall 
profits (Sijm et al., 2006), while others firms can be negatively affected through a 
decrease in the demand of their products and profits. However, these firms’ suppliers and 
final consumers will be affected, as the welfare effects of enforcing a climate change 
policy will be transmitted through market prices. Within the focus of this dissertation, 
distributional impacts of the two policies are also examined and assessed in Chapter 4, 
firstly under the assumption of fixed proportions technology in a vertical market system 
and later when input substitution is possible in the vertical market structure. The 
investigation illustrates the policies’ quasi-equivalency in fixed proportions and their 
non-equivalency when input substitution is allowed. 
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In conclusion, this chapter examines the equivalence of carbon taxes and cap and 
trade policies within a simple market and a vertical market structure. The results show 
that in the very special case of a closed economy, with a fixed proportion production 
technology, with perfect competition and with no uncertainty, a carbon tax policy and cap 
and trade are quasi-equivalent in the sense that the gain in total economic surplus and 
pollution abatement is equal regardless of the level in the vertical system where either 
policy is implemented. However, in the case of cap and trade, rents are extracted as a 
result of introducing the policy, and occur at the point in the vertical system where they 
are imposed.  The policies remain equivalent from a rent distribution perspective only 
when the permits are auctioned off. These results suggest implementing a cap and trade 
system at the Large Final Emitters level will generate economic rents for these industries.  
When the far more general case of input substitution was modeled, equivalency 
breaks down and the point of regulation matters a great deal. The first best policy 
outcomes can only be achieved when the emissions associated to each input and output 
are priced, which may require regulation at every level of the vertical structure. The result 
is particularly pronounced when identical or highly substitutable inputs are available 
through international trade. This result is particularly troublesome for cap and trade 
policies where the costs of implementing a system for each input would require a great 
deal of transaction costs. 
These results are not surprising. Paltsev et al. (2007) recognize the importance of 
the level where the allowances are allocated and highlight that, when considering the 
distributional impacts of a cap and trade policy, the focus of regulators should be on who 
eventually bears the economic cost of the policy and even try to direct the revenue from 
auctioning permits or from distribution of free allowances to them. 
In Chapter 4 the impact of input substitution is examined in more detail by 
constructing a Muth model which can more formally relax the assumption of fixed 
proportions and quantitatively model the incidence of alternative policy choices in the 
presence of input substitution which includes measuring possible leakage to unregulated 
jurisdictions (Bushnell and Chen, 2009). 
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CHAPTER 4 
CARBON TAX VERSUS CAP AND TRADE IN A VERTICAL MARKET SETTING 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the quasi-equivalence between a carbon tax and a cap and 
trade policy was shown to exist even in a vertical structure. In the special case of fixed 
proportions modeling in a closed economy, the point of regulation did not affect the 
efficacy of the policy, but it did affect rent distribution for cap and trade when permits 
were grandfathered. In a more general case of variable proportions, the analysis showed 
that the point of regulation could affect both the efficacy of the policy and rent 
distribution. This result is particularly important because, unlike carbon taxes, which are 
easy to impose at multiple points in a vertical structure, most cap and trade policies are 
restricted to large upstream firms because of transaction costs. 
This chapter builds on Chapter 3 by using a simple Muth model of the oil sector 
in Canada to illustrate the impact of carbon policies in the presence of foreign 
competition in refining within a vertical market made up of crude oil, refining and retail 
levels. The Muth model, which simulates the vertical relationship among markets, has the 
ability to represent both fixed proportions and variable proportions. For a more precise 
representation of trade within a vertical structure and, unlike previous literature on the 
matter, the Muth model is modified to incorporate a nested Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) production function. This model format allows the employment of a 
greater elasticity of substitution between domestic and ROW refining while maintaining 
more limited substitution between the other vertical market levels. Using a model of an 
existing sector allows a better assessment of the extent that policy instrument choice 
could affect economic outcomes. 
To illustrate the imposition of a carbon tax policy in this industry, when input 
substitution is not possible, it is assumed that a carbon tax of $15 per tonne of CO2 is 
introduced at the same time at the final consumers’ level and at the processors’ (refiners’) 
level. This carbon tax policy is compared to an analogous cap and trade policy 
implemented only at the processors’ level. These two policies are maintained when input 
substitution is allowed for refining within the vertical structure, which provides an 
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opportunity to compare the effects of a carbon tax policy and a cap and trade policy when 
there is trade in refining services. 
It is acknowledged that the institutional global effort and GHG emissions 
reduction policies are directed towards mitigating climate change effects, and thus, 
improving overall social welfare. While recognizing the broader aspects of improving 
social welfare through reducing climate change effects, the present welfare analysis 
mainly captures the changes that occur in the economic surplus. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the 
role of the elasticity of substitution in trade models and its use in Muth models. Section 
4.3 introduces the model and discusses numerical simulations for carbon tax and a cap 
and trade policy with no (limited) trade and in the presence of trade. Section 4.4 presents 
the conclusions of the analysis. 
 
4.2 The Elasticity of Substitution and Muth Model 
As illustrated in the latter part of Chapter 3, the effects of carbon policy within a 
vertical market structure will be impacted by input substitution when the assumption of 
fixed proportions is relaxed. This is a well known result in the literature. Freebairn et al. 
(1983) and Wohlgenant (1993) reveal that both the magnitude and the distribution of the 
benefits differ. The authors acknowledge that when a fixed proportions technology is 
analyzed, the distribution of research benefits is not impacted by the type of technical 
change or the stage where it occurs, while for variable proportions it does matter. 
Holloway (1989) separates the marketing sector into distribution and processing for 
illustrating that more of the benefits are distributed to those producers who are closer to 
the stage where technical change is implemented. 
In the case of carbon policy, variable proportions and input substitution can exist 
within the vertical structures involving large final emitters through the production 
technology that allows the physical substitution of inputs in the production function, e.g. 
the substitution of capital for labour, or through international trade where foreign 
produced inputs can substitute for domestically produced inputs. 
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Variable proportions in production technology has been studied empirically for 
decades. Price movement among factors of production induces input substitution. While 
fixed proportions can exist for some portions of the production space due to chemical or 
physical relationships (e.g. 2 Hydrogen plus 1 oxygen = 1 H20), in general there is some 
ability to substitute inputs for one another (Berndt and Christensen, 1973). 
The other source of input substitution that is relevant for domestic policy analysis 
is the ability to substitute foreign produced factors of production and goods for 
domestically produced factors and goods. Regarding the substitution between foreign and 
domestic goods, Armington (1969) introduced the idea that foreign imports are imperfect 
substitutes for domestically produced goods. The product differentiation concept that he 
uses is related directly to the product’s physical attributes, but, more generally, could 
reflect the spatial location of products along the border. Elasticity of substitution is a 
concept extensively used by trade policy economists when analyzing how tariff or tax 
policies influence the trade opportunities, employment, economic welfare and other 
macroeconomic variables that are specific to a country (McDaniel and Balistreri, 2001). 
Blonigen and Wilson (1999) estimate elasticities between US domestic and 
foreign products across more than 100 sectors and find that a higher degree of foreign 
ownership in the downstream sectors of an industry generates a higher elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The authors also reveal that limited 
competition leads to lower elasticity of substitution. Furthermore, Vos (2008) reviews 
various studies with econometrics estimates of Armington elasticities and concludes that 
the higher the value of the elasticity of substitution the greater the trade creation. 
In the case of carbon policy there is often a great deal of foreign trade in energy 
intensive industries. Crude oil, steel, natural gas, gasoline, electricity are few examples of 
factors of production that move across borders. In an industry like auto manufacturing, 
some components can make several trips across international borders during the 
manufacturing process. It is therefore reasonable to assume that policies which make 
domestically produced factors of production more expensive relative to foreign produced 
factors will result in input substitution. 
To illustrate the effect that input substitution could have on the efficacy of carbon 
tax versus cap and trade, a model of the oil refining gasoline sector in Canada is built, 
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while explicitly recognising that some of the oil consumed in Canada is refined in the rest 
of the world (ROW). The stylized model of the gasoline consumed is produced using 
retail services in Canada, refining in Canada, refining in the ROW and oil produced in 
Canada levels. The model is first used to simulate carbon tax versus cap and trade in a 
situation where all inputs are used in fixed proportion. Second, simulations are carried 
out when there is significant substitutability among inputs. 
To assess how input substitution can affect the incidence of carbon policies, a 
Muth model is used. As shown in Chapter 3, a graphical representation of the various 
scenarios of a price increase effect for one or two substitutable inputs, with constant 
output, can be carried out on an isoquant map. However, for a more general case of 
several inputs, with endogenous determination of output, the graphical representation of 
variable proportions in a vertical structure is quite challenging and somewhat 
uninsightful. In his seminal paper, Richard Muth (1964) developed a model using 
comparative statics that measures the impact of changes of the output demand and factor 
supply curves on the downstream markets using their price elasticities and elasticity of 
substitution among factors. 
The Muth model has been developed and particularly applied on the relationship 
between the elasticity of demand and supply and the distribution of benefits from R&D 
(research and development) in agricultural production. Although R&D in agricultural 
production is not related to the focus of this thesis, it is still interesting to reveal the 
impact of the elasticity of substitution and point of regulation in a different context. 
Research carried on by Alston (1991), Alston et al. (1995), Freebairn et al. (1983), 
Wohlgenant (1993) and Mullen et al. (1988, 1989), Gray et al. (2000) focuses on the 
distribution of research benefits in multistage production settings for various agricultural 
products. Using various assumptions and modeling setups, the main idea that emerges 
from this literature is that the benefit distribution depends not only on the elasticity of 
substitution between inputs, but also on the production structure, the technical change 
specificity, and the stage where the technical change takes place. 
For instance, Alston and Scobie (1983) explain that, although the elasticity of 
substitution plays a major role, the type of technical change and the stage where it 
manifests will determine where most of the research benefits will be directed. The 
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authors point out that a higher elasticity of substitution will lead to increased gain for 
producers when technical change takes place at other levels of production. Further on, 
based on empirical evidence, Mullen et al. (1988) reinforce the crucial impact of the 
elasticity of substitution magnitude in the distribution of research gains. 
 
4.3 The Theoretical Model 
The variable proportion model developed by Mullen et al. (1989), Alston et al. 
(1995) and Gray et al. (2000) is modified for comparing and contrasting carbon tax and 
cap and trade policy under the assumptions of fixed proportions and input substitution 
possibility. 
In this investigation it is assumed that the oil sector has four inputs provided at 
three levels in the vertical structure. As shown in Figure 4-1, starting from upstream, 
input four (at first level) represents the quantity of crude oil that is ultimately sold only in 
Canada. The second level, refining, is made up of two inputs: input two is the ROW oil 
refining; input three is Canadian oil refining. This structure allows the explicit 
recognition of international trade among inputs. Input one, the retail services provided in 
Canada, represents the third level in the vertical structure. The main goal of separating 
inputs two and three is to represent the potential choice of the industry to refine oil in 
either Canadian or ROW refineries according to their profit maximizing decisions. Out of 
all refined products that can be obtained from crude oil, only gasoline was chosen as 
representative product, not only due to its importance, but also because of the information 
availability regarding elasticities and quantities refined, distributed and their respective 
prices. 
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Figure 4-1.: The vertical market model with three levels and four inputs 
In general, the assumption of fixed proportions implies that the elasticity of 
substitution used in the model is zero. For technicality reasons, assuming this value in the 
following Muth model will not reveal the impacts that propagate in the system, so it is 
assumed that the elasticity of substitution under fixed proportions is 0.0001. Moreover, in 
the present setup of the Muth model where Canadian and ROW refining services are 
within the same vertical market system, it can not be simulated a ‘no trade’ scenario, but 
one where there is trade, and both refining services, domestic and foreign, are used in 
fixed proportions. This is the reason why the results obtained for the fixed proportion 
assumption have an informative role only, and are not further compared to the second 
scenario where input substitution is possible as a consequence of assuming that trade is 
allowed. 
To illustrate the introduction of a carbon tax policy when input substitution is not 
possible, it is assumed that a carbon tax of $15 per tonne of CO2 is introduced at the same 
time at the final consumers’ level and at the processors’ (refiners’) level. This carbon tax 
policy is compared to an analogous cap and trade policy implemented only at the 
processors’ level. These two policies are maintained when input substitution is allowed 
for refining within the vertical structure. 
Retail services 
Canadian refined oil ROW refined oil 
(for Canada) 
Canadian crude oil 
for Canadian market Input four 
(first level) 
Input two 
(second 
level) 
Input three 
(second 
level) 
Input one 
(third level) 
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Regarding the point of regulation choices for the model, there is ongoing debate 
whether a carbon tax should be implemented in the upstream (producers level) or 
downstream (consumers level). For instance, Metcalf (2007[2]) favours a carbon tax 
levied in the upstream and argues about the ease of implementation of such a tax, given 
that the number of producers (oil, coal, natural gas) is limited and thus, the costs of 
administration are much lower. In a very much discussed carbon tax system proposal, 
Mintz and Olewiler (2008) suggest replacing the current Canadian federal fuel excise tax 
with a broader environmental tax designed to reduce GHG emissions. The federal fuel 
excise tax is applied only to gasoline, diesel and aviation fuel, while other GHG emitting 
sources of energy, such as natural gas used for transportation or coal used for generating 
electricity, are not under this tax incidence (Government of Canada, 2008 [2]). Mintz and 
Olewiler (2008) propose to convert the fuel excise tax to a carbon tax equivalent which 
would be extended to other fuels in proportion to their carbon content. One of the main 
arguments behind this proposal is that, by applying this tax at consumer level, the price 
signal leads to reduced consumption and emissions. Courchene (2008) recognizes the 
merits of Mintz and Olewiler carbon tax model but highlights the need to account for the 
carbon emissions that result from the production process “for creating these fossil fuels in 
the first place (refineries for oil and gas, etc.)” (p.11). In this context, the current 
investigation assumes that the carbon tax is introduced at the levels where most carbon 
emissions take place: the consumers and refiners’ level. 
As per current existing literature knowledge, in the simulation part of the Muth 
model, under the assumption of fixed proportions, the same (close to zero) elasticity of 
substitution is employed between all inputs. With the aim of a precise representation of 
input substitution with trade between input two (ROW) and three (Canada), a nested CES 
production function is employed.  
If a CES production function exhibits constant elasticity of substitution among 
inputs, a nested CES production function uses different nests (levels) which allow the 
introduction of the appropriate elasticity of substitution between inputs. The nested CES 
production function implies output is a function of inputs and factors shares. Moreover, 
the nested CES function allow employing the factor shares and the elasticities of 
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substitution that take a particular value to calculate the specific values of the other 
elasticities of substitutions (Bovenberg and Goulder 1996, McDougall 2009). 
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Where Y= output, X1 = retail services, X2 = Refining services ROW, X3 = Refining 
services Canada, X4 = crude oil, s1 = factor share retail services, s2 = factor share refining 
services Canada, s3 = factor share refining services ROW and s4 = factor share crude oil. 
ij represents the elasticity of substitution between two inputs, while A  is a constant 
efficiency parameter. 
The elasticity of substitution values obtained using a nested CES for fixed and 
variable proportions are presented later. 
In the Muth model, the basic equilibrium equations of the variable proportions 
technology are modeled in a small country assumption considering a competitive industry 
producing a homogenous product. 
 
),,,,( 14321 twwwwcP   market clearing condition (gasoline supply for consumers)  (4.5) 
),( 2tyfP   Canadian consumers demand for gasoline                               (4.6) 
ytwwwwhx ),,,,( 3432111   demand for retail services         (4.7) 
ytwwwwhx ),,,,( 4432122   demand for refined oil from ROW refineries      (4.8) 
ytwwwwhx ),,,,( 5432133   demand for refined oil from Canadian refineries      (4.9) 
ytwwwwhx ),,,,( 6432144   demand for crude oil       (4.10) 
),( 7111 txgw   supply of retail service        (4.11) 
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),( 8222 txgw  supply of ROW gasoline        (4.12) 
),( 9333 txgw   supply of Canadian gasoline       (4.13) 
),( 10444 txgw   supply of crude oil         (4.14) 
 
Table 4-1 introduces the symbols employed in the above equations. 
 
Table 4-1.: Definition of symbols used in the Muth model 
f  
c  
y 
p  
hi  
 
gi  
 
wi  
 
xi 
 
ti 
wholesale demand of gasoline 
cost function for gasoline 
quantity of gasoline (final output) 
price per unit of gasoline 
hi = h1-4 – demand  for: retail services (e.g. from gas stations), refining services 
from ROW, refining services from Canada and crude oil respectively 
gi = g1-4 – supply of: retail services, services from the ROW refineries, services 
from Canadian refineries and crude oil respectively 
wi = w1-4 – price of: pre-tax gasoline at retail level, refining services from ROW, 
refining services from Canada and crude oil respectively  
xi = x1-4 – quantity of: gasoline at retail level, refining services from ROW, 
refining from Canada and crude oil respectively  
ti = t3-6 – exogenous shifter of: demand of retail services, refining services from 
ROW, refining services from Canada and crude oil respectively  
ti = t7-10 – exogenous shifter of: supply of retail services, refining services from 
ROW, refining services from Canada and crude oil respectively  
t1= exogenous shifter of gasoline supply for final use  
t2 = exogenous shifter of consumers’ final demand 
 
The industry output (y), the price per unit (p), the quantities of the factors used by 
the industry (xi), and the factor prices (wi) are the endogenous variables of the model. The 
exogenous variables are the ti variables which illustrate the potential parallel shifts in 
either supply or demand. 
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By totally differentiating equations (4.5) to (4.14) we can observe how the 
endogenous variables react when exogenous variables change. Following mathematical 
manipulations developed by Muth (1964), Alston et al. (1995), Mullen et al. (1989) and 
Gray et al. (2000) the above system of equations can be expressed in terms of relative 
changes and elasticities. The symbols used are defined in Table 4-2. 
144332211 EtEwsEwsEwsEwsEp        (4.15) 
2
1 EtEyEp             (4.16) 
EyEtEwEwEwEwEx  34143132121111      (4.17) 
EyEtEwEwEwEwEx  44243232221212      (4.18) 
EyEtEwEwEwEwEx  54343332321313      (4.19) 
EyEtEwEwEwEwEx  64443432421414      (4.20) 
71
1
1
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2
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93
3
3
1 EtExEw            (4.23) 
104
4
4
1 EtExEw            (4.24) 
 
Table 4-2.: Definition of symbols used in the derived Muth model 
i  elasticity of supply for each of the levels 
  own price elasticity of demand for gasoline 
is  cost share of gasoline, refined gasoline from the ROW, refined gasoline 
from Canada and crude oil 
ij  elasticity of input substitution 
Ep , Ey , 
iEw , iEx , iEt  
relative change of gasoline prices, quantity of gasoline for final 
consumers, input prices, quantities, exogenous shifters 
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There are a few assumptions essential for solving the mathematics part of the 
model and rewriting it in elasticities form. One of them is that the production function 
used is characterized by constant returns to scale. Mullen et al. (1988) explain that this 
assumption is made to show that the industry cost function is separable between input 
prices and output. Moreover, equation (4.16) imposes the long run condition that product 
price equals minimum average total cost. Equations (4.17) to (4.20), which describe the 
output constrained demands for inputs, are obtained by applying Sheppard’s lemma to the 
total cost functions, and thus, allows cross-price elasticities to be expressed in terms of 
cost shares and elasticity of substitution. 
Previous assumptions and mathematical manipulation of the equations allow 
writing the system using matrices, as follows: 
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Where: 
A1  s212  s313  s414, 2112 sA  , 1313 sA  , 4114 sA  , A 5  s212, 
A 6  s112  s323  s424 , A 7  s232 , A8  s242 , A 9  s313 , A10  s323 , 
A11  s113  s232  s434 , A12  s334 , A13  s414 , 24414 sA  , A15  s 434 , 
A16  s114  s224  s334  
 
Regarding the elasticity of substitution values, in the case of fixed proportions, the 
inputs’ non-substitutability property implies that the elasticity of substitution at all levels 
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of the vertical market system has very low values, i.e. 0001.0ij . Thus, for the fixed 
proportions case, in the nested CES production function all elasticity values are set at 
0.0001. 
In the case of variable proportions, the main aim is to allow input substitution 
between Canada and ROW refined gasoline ( 23 ), by assuming an elasticity of 
substitution of 10. At the same time, it is assumed that crude oil and final consumption 
elasticity remain in fixed proportions ( 14 ), which implies that the elasticity of 
substitution is 0.0001. Based on these assumptions, employing the nested CES production 
function (equation 4.4) determines a greater elasticity substitution than in the fixed 
proportions case for the rest of the inputs. Hence, computing the nested CES production 
function (equation 4.4) when 23  equals 10 and 14  equals 0.0001 reveal that the values 
for 12 , 13 , 24 and 34  are 2.2 as illustrated in Table 4-3. 
 
Table 4-3.: Elasticity of substitution values assumed for variable proportions 
ij  
Crude Oil (1) 
Canadian 
refined (2) 
ROW refined 
(3) 
Retail 
Services(4) 
Crude Oil (1)  2.2 2.2 0.0001 
Canadian refined (2)   10 2.2 
ROW refined (3)  10  2.2 
Retail Services (4)  2.2   
Source: own calculations 
 
4.3.1 Scenarios and Assumptions of the Model 
When the percentage change in the exogenous shifters is known, the matrix 
format enables the relative changes in the endogenous variables to be calculated. 
Knowing the elasticities of demand and supply, the elasticity of substitution, the value of 
the cost shares, the approximate value of the exogenous shifts, Muth model allows 
obtaining fairly accurate approximations for the endogenous variables and implicitly for 
the magnitude of producer and consumer surplus along the vertical market system. Table 
4-4 introduces the values of the parameters used in the simulations. For the following 
calculations it is assumed that the price of emitting one ton of carbon dioxide is $15 per 
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ton, which is the ceiling price for carbon dioxide that the Government of Canada assured 
when ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The interpretation of this value is that each ton of 
emission reductions would produce $15 worth of avoided damage. 
 
Table 4-4.: Parameter values used in the simulation 
  Quantity
(billion 
litres) 
Value 
(billion 
dollars)
Dollars/
Litre 
Factor  
Shares35 
Price 
Elasticity
Output      
Retail Canadian Gasoline 
Demand 40.0500
36 39.1289 0.977037  -0.800038 
Pre-tax Retail Demand 40.0500 20.4255 0.510039 1.0000 -0.417640 
       
Factors of production      
Retail Services 40.0500 1.6340 0.0408 0.0800 1.470041 
ROW Refining 7.2818 0.8170 0.1122 0.0400 2.770042 
Canadian Refining 32.7682 3.6766 0.1122 0.1800 0.250043 
Canadian Crude for Canada 40.0500 14.2979 0.3570 0.7000 1.100044 
       
C02 emissions at $15/ton      
Gasoline Burning 40.0500 1.3751 0.0343   
ROW Refining 7.2818 0.0437 0.0060   
Canada Refining 32.7682 0.1966 0.0060   
Note: the bold numbers are inputed and form the base assumption. All other numbers are calculated from 
them to ensure consistency. 
Source: own calculations 
 
The cost of carbon dioxide emissions per litre of gasoline burned is calculated as 
the quantity of GHG emitted when burning one litre of gasoline (2.289 kg of CO2/litre, 
Natural Resource Canada 2006) multiplied by the proposed price of emitting one tonne of 
carbon ($15/ton of CO2 ). The cost of emission reductions from upstream and refining45 
                                                 
35 Factor shares are employed in equation (4.15) and in the matrix. 
36 Natural Resources Canada (2006). 
37 Natural Resources Canada (2006). 
38 Gallini (1983), in the model is the own price elasticity of demand. It is employed in equation (4.16). 
39 Natural Resources Canada (2006). 
40 Calculated as the product of the own price elasticity of demand and the pre-tax retail demand divided by the retail Canadian gasoline 
demand, it is employed in the matrix. 
41 Yang and Hu (1984), employed in equation (4.21) and in the matrix. 
42 Own calculations. employed in equation (4.22) and in the matrix. 
43 Considine (2002), employed in equation (4.23) and in the matrix. 
44 Krichene (2002), employed in equation (4.24) and in the matrix. 
45 Value estimated by Nagy and Gray (2006) assuming a value of CO2 equivalent of $15 per permit. 
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(Nagy and Gray, 2006) per litre of crude oil refined (measured in $/litre), and assumed 
the same for Canada and ROW, have a similar formula. 
 
$/l 0.0343 $/kg 0.015*kg/l 2.289  Burning Gasoline Emissions     (4.25) 
$/l 0.0060$/kg 0.015*kg/l 0.04Refining Emissions      (4.26) 
 
4.3.2 Scenario 1 – Fixed Proportions 
The first scenario assumes an economy with a fixed proportions technology and 
hence no (very limited) ability to substitute ROW refining for Canadian refining. It 
should be mentioned at this point of the analysis that this scenario has an informative aim 
only, as the results cannot be compared with the variable proportions scenario. 
The carbon tax is imposed at two levels in the vertical market system: on the 
amount of gasoline supplied for final use and at the Canadian processing level for taxing 
the carbon emitted in the process of refining. Thus, the two exogenous shifts modeled are 
at t1, which is defined as the exogenous shifter of gasoline supply for final use46, and at t9, 
which is the exogenous shifter of the Canadian refined gasoline supply. The exogenous 
shift parameters represent equilibrium displacements relative to an initial equilibrium 
(Alston, 1991). 
The magnitude of the exogenous shift for the gasoline supplied for final use, t1, is 
calculated as the product of the cost of emissions per litre of gasoline burned and the 
Canadian retail gasoline demand, divided by the value of the pre-tax retail gasoline 
demand, as follows: 
%7.6067.0  $ bill. l)/20.4255 bill. 40.0500*$/l (0.0343 t shift Exogenous 1  (4.27) 
 
Similarly, the second exogenous shift at the refineries level, t9, is obtained by 
multiplying the cost of emission reductions from upstream and refining with the quantity 
of Canadian refined gasoline and divided to the value of Canadian refined gasoline: 
%3.5053.0  $ bill. l)/3.6766 bill. 32.7682*$/l (0.0060 t shift Exogenous 9   (4.28) 
                                                 
46 The motivation for choosing T1 as an exogenous shifter is that a carbon tax is a per unit tax on the amount of gasoline supplied for 
final use regardless of the amount of retail services that are embodied in it. 
  89
 
Given that a cap and trade can be implemented only in the upstream of an 
industry47, the second case of the first scenario assumes that a cap and trade policy is 
introduced at the refiners’ level, which is t9. Regarding the exogenous shift magnitude at 
t9, the calculation is based on the value of a permit. Thus, it is assumed that a permit’s 
value should embed the amount of carbon emitted in both processes of refining and 
burning one litre of gasoline, for the proposed price of $15/ton of CO2. Hence, the 
exogenous shift magnitude at the refiners’ level is obtained by dividing the value of a 
permit to the refining margins: 
43.9%0.439$/l 8$/l)/0.091 0.0060$/l (0.0343  t 9 shiftExogenous   (4.29) 
Further in the investigation, the Muth model is developed with the aim of 
calculating the magnitude of producer and consumer surplus based on the percentage and 
relative changes (Mullen et al. 1989, Alston et al. 1995). Moreover, according to Mullen 
et al. (1989), the sum of these formulas represents the total change of the industry from 
an initial equilibrium to a future one. Both papers mentioned specifically that the surplus 
measures are correct if assuming linear supply and demand functions and parallel shifts 
of the curves as a result of the exogenous shifts. 
 
)5.01)(( 1 EyEpEtpyCS         (4.30) 
)5.01)((1 17111 ExEtEwxwPS         (4.31) 
)5.01)((2 28222 ExEtEwxwPS         (4.32) 
)5.01)((3 39333 ExEtEwxwPS         (4.33) 
)5.01)((4 410444 ExEtEwxwPS         (4.34) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 As previously mentioned, cap and trade policy was designed to be implemented in the upstream of an industry; the implementation 
of this policy in the downstream may lead to administrative issues due to the very high transaction costs involved. 
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4.3.2.1 Scenario 1 – Carbon tax versus cap and trade when input substitution is not 
allowed – impacts on prices and quantities 
The aim of this scenario is to reveal the changes in prices, quantities, welfare and 
cost of emissions along the vertical market system under the assumption of input non-
substitutability. Table 4-5 compares the results of introducing a carbon tax versus a cap 
and trade policy under the assumption of input non-substitutability. The table presents the 
parameter values used for each of the simulation case, the exogenous shifts for each 
scenario and the changes in prices and quantities that occur along the system as a result of 
implementing each of the policies under fixed proportions.  
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Table 4-5: Changes in prices and quantities for a carbon tax and a cap and trade policy 
under fixed proportions  
Parameters Fixed prop. 
Fixed 
prop. 
Own price elasticity of demand -0.418 -0.418 
Elasticity of supply retail services 1.470 1.470 
Elasticity of supply ROW refinery 2.770 2.770 
Elasticity of supply Canada refinery 0.250 0.250 
Elasticity of supply crude oil 1.100 1.100 
S1 = Factor share retail services 0.080 0.080 
S2 = Factor share ROW refined 0.040 0.040 
S3 = Factor share Can. refined 0.180 0.180 
S4 = Factor share of crude oil 0.700 0.700 
Elast. of substit. between crude – final consumption levels 0.0001 0.0001 
Elast. of substit. between ROW – Canada refineries 0.0001 0.0001 
   
Policy Instruments (exogenous shifts) Carbon tax 
Cap and 
trade 
Consumer Carbon tax (%) - t1: consumer level 
(in $/l this is 0.0343) 0.067 0.000 
Refiner Carbon tax (%) - t9: refinery level 
(in $/l this is 0.006) 0.053 0.000 
Refiner carbon trading Permit value (%) - t9: refinery level 
(in $/l this is 0.0403) 0.000 0.439 
   
Price and Quantity Impacts   
Change in pre-tax gasoline price48 for final consumption (%) 4.824% 4.953% 
Change in the quantity of gasoline final consumption (%) -2.014% -2.068% 
Change in price of retail services (%) -1.370% -1.407% 
Change in price refining services ROW (%) -0.727% -0.746% 
Change in price refining services Can. (%) -2.710% 35.615% 
Change in price of crude oil (%) -1.831% -1.880% 
Change in retail services (%) -2.015% -2.068% 
Change in quantity refined oil from ROW (%) -2.015% -2.068% 
Change in quantity refined oil from Canada (%) -2.014% -2.071% 
Change in quantity of crude oil (%) -2.014% -2.068% 
Change in CO2 from burning (%) -2.014% -2.068% 
Change in CO2 from Can. refining (%) -2.014% -2.071% 
Change in CO2 from ROW refining (%) -2.015% -2.068% 
Source: own calculations 
                                                 
48 The pre-tax gasoline price refers to the price of gasoline before the provincial, sales or transit taxes. 
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The simulation values for the two policies are relatively close, though not 
identical, as the elasticity of substitution assumed was not zero and because of rounding 
the values obtained. If, in the present Muth model, it is assumed that the elasticity of 
substitution is zero, the simulation results are zero, and thus not-representative. This is 
the reason why it was decided to employ a value close to zero. For an elasticity of 
substitution of 0.0001, introducing a carbon tax at the consumers’ and refiners’ level 
implies an increase in the pre-tax gasoline price and a decline in the quantity of gasoline 
for final consumption. Except for the final retail price, all prices fall as a result of the 
drop in the demand. Consistent with the fixed proportions assumption, the change in the 
quantity of inputs used decreases proportionally along the vertical market system.  
A cap and trade policy implies similar results to a carbon tax even though the 
magnitude of the exogenous shift at the refiners’ level is much higher for a cap and trade 
policy versus a carbon tax. One notable exception is the Canadian price of refining 
services which, as a result of introducing a cap and trade policy only at Canadian 
refineries’ level, increases by a considerably large amount (35 percent). Relating the 
results of this scenario with previous literature findings, Freebairn et al. (1983) conclude 
that the distribution of benefits within the vertical market system is independent of where 
the innovation applies in the system. The scenario presented above confirms this finding, 
in the sense that the distribution of surplus within the vertical market system is 
independent on where the exogenous shift occurs in the system. 
 
4.3.3 Scenario 2 – Variable Proportions   
The goal of Scenario 2 is to determine the impact of the two policies on prices and 
quantities, the economic welfare redistribution within the system and the environmental 
impact when input substitution is allowed. Hence, the carbon tax and the cap and trade 
policy are introduced at the same levels and with the same magnitude as in the previous 
scenario. 
In this scenario the difference consists in setting the elasticity of substitution 
between crude oil and final consumption ( 14 ) to 0.0001, which means that no 
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substitution is allowed between these levels, while allowing substitution between refined 
gasoline from Canada and ROW ( 23 ) with a value of 10. Other substitution values were 
considered during the simulation process, but given the pattern in the results, they were 
not considered significant. As in the previous scenario, the carbon tax is imposed at two 
levels in the vertical market system: on the amount of gasoline supplied for final use (t1) 
and at the Canadian processors level for taxing the carbon emitted in the process of 
refining (t9). Meanwhile, the cap and trade policy is introduced only at the refiners’ level 
(t9). 
4.3.3.1 Scenario 2 - Carbon tax versus cap and trade when input substitution is 
allowed – impacts on prices and quantities 
Table 4-6 presents the impact of introducing a carbon tax versus a cap and trade 
policy on prices and quantities along the vertical market system under the assumption of 
input substitutability. The table presents the parameter values used for each of the 
simulation case, the exogenous shifts for each scenario and the changes in prices and 
quantities that occur along the system as a result of implementing each of the policies 
when input substitution is allowed at the refining level.  
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Table 4-6: Changes in prices and quantities for a carbon tax and a cap and trade policy 
under variable proportions  
Parameters Var. prop. Var. prop. 
Own price elasticity of demand -0.418 -0.418 
Elasticity of supply retail services 1.470 1.470 
Elasticity of supply ROW refinery 2.770 2.770 
Elasticity of supply Canada refinery 0.250 0.250 
Elasticity of supply crude oil 1.100 1.100 
S1 = Factor share retail services 0.080 0.080 
S2 = Factor share ROW refined 0.040 0.040 
S3 = Factor share Can. refined 0.180 0.180 
S4 = Factor share of crude oil 0.700 0.700 
Elast. of substit. crude – final consumption levels 0.0001 0.0001 
Elast. of substit. between ROW – Canada refineries 10.000 10.000 
   
Policy Instruments (exogenous shifts) Carbon tax 
Cap and 
trade 
Consumer Carbon tax (%) - t1: consumer level 
(in $/l this is 0.0343) 0.067 0.000 
Refiner Carbon tax (%) - t9: refinery level 
(in $/l this is 0.006) 0.053 0.000 
Refiner carbon trading Permit value (%) - t9: refinery level 
(in $/l this is 0.0403) 0.000 0.439 
   
Price and Quantity Impacts   
Change in pre-tax gasoline price final consumption (%) 4.941% 1.747% 
Change in the quantity of gasoline final consumption (%) -2.063% -0.730% 
Change in price of retail services (%) -1.490% 0.773% 
Change in price refining services ROW (%) -1.348% 1.653% 
Change in price refining services Can. (%) -1.842% 5.288% 
Change in price of crude oil (%) -1.838% 0.953% 
Change in retail services (%) -2.190% 1.136% 
Change in quantity refined oil from ROW -3.733% 4.579% 
Change in quantity refined oil from Canada (%) -1.797% -9.653% 
Change in quantity of crude oil (%) -2.022% 1.049% 
Change in CO2 from burning (%) -2.063% -0.730% 
Change in CO2 from Can. refining (%) -1.797% -9.653% 
Change in CO2 from ROW refining (%) -3.733% 4.579% 
Source: own calculations 
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The results illustrate that for carbon tax, given the increase in the final price of 
gasoline and the drop in the demand at the final level, the prices for refining services 
decrease. Under the assumption of a higher elasticity of substitution for the ROW, the 
change in price of refining services ROW is lower than the corresponding price change in 
Canada. As a result, this makes Canadian refining services more competitive (in the sense 
that services are cheaper than in ROW) and thus retailers substitute away from the ROW 
refining services. As far as the quantity supply at the refinery level is concerned, due to 
the decreased demand at the final level, the quantity supplied will drop. This decline will 
be higher for the ROW compared to Canada because of the lower adjustment in the ROW 
refining prices, as shown above. 
Comparing the two policies, for cap and trade the pre-tax gasoline price increase 
is significantly lower compared to the carbon tax case, namely, less than 40 percent of the 
price increase after introducing a tax. The reason for this lower value is the absence of a 
GHG emission reduction policy at the final consumers’ level. As a result, the drop in the 
quantity of gasoline consumed is lower than under a tax. 
Turning to the prices at the refining level, implementing a cap and trade policy 
leads to a significant increase in the price of Canadian refining services. In contrast, in 
the carbon tax case, the price impact is determined not only by the tax at refiners’ level, 
but also by the decline in the final demand due to the simultaneous tax at consumers’ 
level. This is the reason why, for the carbon tax, the Canadian refining services price 
decreases, while for a cap and trade policy it increases significantly. As a result of this 
price increase, the demand for Canadian refined oil decreases. As retailers have the 
option to substitute Canadian refined oil with cheaper ROW oil, the demand for ROW oil 
increases. Thus, the new equilibrium corresponds to a lower quantity of Canadian refined 
oil, higher quantity of ROW refined oil and higher refineries’ prices, particularly for 
Canada.  
The last three rows of Table 4-6 show the percentage change in carbon dioxide 
from gasoline burning, as well as Canadian49 and ROW refining. With this respect, the 
most efficient policy is the carbon tax, as it reduces CO2 released from gasoline burning 
the most. Indeed, numerically, the highest percentage reduction belongs to the cap and 
                                                 
49 Total Canadian GHG emissions in 2009: 690,000 kt CO2, out of which, fossil fuel production and refining, petroleum refining and 
upgrading, fossil fuel production, and fugitive sources oil amount to 133,530 kt CO2 (Environment Canada, 2011). 
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trade policy effects, at the refiners’ level, but it should be noted that the bulk of CO2 
emissions are released from gasoline burning50, and not from crude oil refining. Further 
calculations on emissions reduction are presented in the following section.  
4.3.3.2 Carbon tax versus cap and trade when input substitution is allowed – 
impacts on welfare and cost of emissions 
This table illustrates the welfare changes along the vertical system, revenues, 
rents and cost of emissions changes that carbon tax and cap and trade policies determine 
under the assumptions of input substitutability. 
 
Table 4-7: Welfare and emission changes for a carbon tax and a cap and trade policy 
when input substitution is allowed 
 Variable prop. Variable prop.
Welfare Impacts ($ millions) Carbon tax Cap and trade
Change Consumer Surplus -998,817 -355,524 
Change Producer Surplus Retail -24,081 12,698 
Change in Producer Surplus ROW Refining -10,806 13,816 
Change in Producer Surplus Canadian Refining -261,961 -1,351,102 
Change in Producer Surplus Canadian Crude Oil -260,145 137,003 
Change in Private Surplus Canada -1,545,003 -1,556,923 
Change in Canadian Tax Revenue 1,539,818 0 
Change in Permit Value 0 1,458,220 
Change in Canadian Market Surplus -5,185 -98,704 
Change in the Cost of Emissions Canada -31,908 -29,011 
Change in the Cost of Emissions ROW -1,631 2,001 
Change in the Global Cost of Emissions -33,539 -27,010 
Change in Welfare Canada 26,723 -69,693 
Change in Welfare ROW -9,175 11,815 
Change in Welfare World 17,548 -57,877 
Tons of Global GHG Reduction per $ of Canadian Cost -0.4312 -0.0182 
Economic Cost per Ton of Carbon 0.0036 0.0312 
Source: own calculations 
 
The analysis of the welfare distribution for a carbon tax reveals that Canadian 
consumers are the most affected, followed by Canadian refiners and Canadian crude oil 
                                                 
50 Approximately 80 percent of GHG emissions are produced from gasoline burning; the rest of 20 percent of emissions is produced 
from crude production, refining, transportation and distribution, Keesom et al., 2009 (p. 2). 
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producers. The consumers’ surplus reduction has a high value as consumers have to 
reduce consumption while at the same time having to pay a higher price. Canadian 
refiners and crude oil producers lose a large amount of surplus as they have to lower their 
supply and also charge a lower price. By adding up the surplus at each of the vertical 
market levels for the Canadian market, Canadian Private Surplus is obtained. Its value is 
negative due to the surplus loss at each level, while the main component of the Canadian 
Private Surplus is the consumer surplus loss amount. 
As expected from the price and quantity changes, when inputs have a high degree 
of substitutability, the welfare distribution for a cap and trade policy is different than the 
previous case. Canadian refiners experience a substantial welfare loss, while consumers’ 
surplus loss amounts to about one third of the corresponding loss under a carbon tax. The 
reason for refiners’ significant surplus loss is due to the sharp decline in the quantity of 
gasoline supplied. Consumers lose less than in the carbon tax case as the change in 
equilibrium price and consumption levels is not as high. At the same time, all other 
producers gain as a result of introducing the cap and trade policy. Crude oil producers 
have a positive surplus in this case as under a higher crude oil price they have the 
incentive to produce more and turn to export for the excess supply. 
However, a carbon tax creates additional financial benefits, namely the carbon tax 
revenue. The Change in Tax Revenue that the government collects after introducing the 
carbon tax is calculated as follows: 
refined) Canadian ofquantity  in change(1*gasoline refined Canadian of value
*T9consumers) final for gasoline ofquantity  in change(1
*demand retail tax-pre Canadian of value*T1 revenue tax Canadian Change



 (4.35) 
 
Further, by adding up the Change in Private Surplus Canada and the Change in 
Canadian Tax Revenue, the Change in the Canadian Market Surplus is determined. 
Regarding the calculation of financial benefits for a cap and trade policy, as 
graphically shown in Chapter 3, there is rent creation at policy’s level of enforcement, 
which is the Canadian refiners’ level. Employing an analogous formula as in the carbon 
tax case, the magnitude of producers’ rents is calculated as: 
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gasoline) refined Canadian ofquantity 
 in change(1*gasoline refined Canadian of valueTvalue permit in Change  *9
 (4.36) 
 
Comparing the two policies, a cap and trade policy under variable proportions 
generates lower rents for refiners than the revenue captured under carbon tax.  
Based on the above result and the Change in Private Surplus Canada, the Change 
in Canadian Market Surplus can be computed by adding up the two values. Input 
substitution availability for a cap and trade policy is associated with a significant loss in 
the Canadian Market Surplus, while the loss registered for carbon tax has much lower 
values. 
Further in the investigation, insights about the environmental impact and 
efficiency of the two policies can be obtained using the results and data available. The 
Change in Cost of Emissions after implementing both policies, for Canada and the ROW 
respectively, can be calculated employing the following formulas: 
refining gasoline Canadian from emissions of value*
gasoline refined Canadian ofquantity  in change
burning gasoline from emissions of value* consumers final for 
gasoline ofquantity  in changeCanada emissions of cost in Change


 (4.37) 
 
refining gasoline ROW from emissions of value*
ROWby  refined gasoline ofquantity   in  changeROW emissions of cost in  Change 
(4.38) 
 
Hence, the Change in the Global Cost of Emissions is the sum of emissions costs 
in Canada and the ROW. It should be noted that for a cap and trade policy there is a 
lower reduction in cost of emission. The rationale is that, although there is a much higher 
decline in the quantity of emissions at refiners’ level, this effect is outweighed by the 
higher emissions from gasoline burning at consumers’ level. 
Comparing the cost of emissions in the ROW, in the case of a tax, a lower amount 
of GHG emissions is emitted due to the lower ROW supply in Canada. The opposite is 
true for a cap and trade policy where more emissions are released for the higher 
production supplied in Canada. 
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In turn, when calculating the change in the Global Cost of Emissions, the ROW 
values and the higher quantity of gasoline demanded by Canadian consumers imply a 
larger gap between the two policies. However, it is important to point out that by 
introducing any GHG emissions reduction policy, Canada would price carbon dioxide 
and Canadian emissions would be mitigated, but when the ROW does not have a similar 
carbon reduction policy in place, there are still going to be carbon emissions someplace 
else when refining crude oil. At the same time, carbon from burning gasoline will still be 
emitted in Canada, being released into the atmosphere by burning the gasoline supplied 
by the ROW countries. 
Based on these results, Changes in Welfare for Canada can be further calculated 
by adding up the Change in Private Surplus Canada and the Change in Canadian Tax 
Revenue, and subtracting from the result the Change in the Cost of Emissions Canada. 
Similar calculations are undertaken for determining the Change in Welfare for ROW. As 
expected, the Change in Welfare World sums up the former and the latter changes. 
The welfare distribution results of the policies are presented in Figure 4-2. 
Canadian Private Surplus is negatively affected by introducing any of the GHG emission 
reduction policies. However, the higher loss in Canadian Market Surplus is determined 
by the cap and trade policy because of the lower rents that refiners capture in this 
scenario. At the same time, Figure 4-2 illustrates that Consumer Surplus is more 
negatively impacted when a carbon tax is implemented. 
  100
-1,600,000
-1,400,000
-1,200,000
-1,000,000
-800,000
-600,000
-400,000
-200,000
0
Tax 10 C&T 10
Th. $
Change CS Change private surplus Canada Change Canadian market surplus
 
Figure 4-2.: Welfare changes for carbon tax and cap and trade policies under variable 
proportions 
Given that the Canadian welfare is negatively impacted by the cap and trade 
policy and that the same policy creates positive surplus for the ROW countries, it is not 
surprising that the global loss is negatively affected. When comparing a carbon tax and a 
cap and trade policy, it is the cap and trade policy that generates the loss in the global 
welfare, while when a carbon tax is implemented there is a surplus in world welfare. 
The coefficients computed up to this point allow calculating the Tons of Global 
GHG Emissions Reductions per Dollars of Canadian Cost. This value is obtained by 
dividing the Change in the Global Cost of Emissions to 15 $/ton and dividing again the 
result to the Change in Canadian Market Surplus. The results illustrate the reduction in 
tons of GHG emissions per dollars of Canadian cost, e.g. for carbon tax, there is a 
reduction of 0.4312 tons of carbon per dollar of Canadian cost, while for a cap and trade 
policy the reduction is of 0.0182 tons of carbon per dollar of Canadian cost. 
As a reciprocal of this formula, the Economic Cost per Ton of Carbon is further 
computed as the ratio of the Change in Canadian Market Surplus and the quantity of 
emissions reductions from burning and refining. In the same line with the above 
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coefficient, the values obtained reveal that the most efficient policy is carbon tax when 
input substitution is possible. 
4.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis  
The following graphical illustrations aim at comparing the impacts of the two 
policies analyzed for various elasticity of substitution values. Simulation analysis is 
performed for observing policies’ impact on welfare and cost of GHG emissions when 
the industry gradually opens to trade; hence, the elasticity of substitution takes values 
from 0.0001 to 10. In the simulations performed, still a modest substitution is allowed 
between crude oil and retail services ( 0001.014  ), while gradually higher values are 
considered for illustrating the opportunity of more trade taking place between Canadian 
and ROW refined gasoline (i.e. 23  takes values from 0.0001 to 10).  
Figure 4-3 presents the response of the Canadian crude oil/refining market to 
introducing a carbon tax, when the elasticity of substitution takes values from 0.0001 to 
10 between Canada and ROW. Although there is little variation in the results, given that a 
similar graphical illustration for cap and trade policy follows, the aim of this figure is to 
highlight the different impacts of the two policies for the current assumptions. 
In Figure 4-3, the losses of Canadian crude oil suppliers and refiners are in a close 
range value when the system moves from fixed to variable proportions. However, for 
elasticity of substitution values higher than 1, the results overlap, which illustrate that 
when more trade takes place, the more the surplus loss of Canadian crude oil producers 
and the better off the Canadian refiners. Meanwhile, for very low or very high elasticity 
of substitution values, Consumer Surplus has large negative values which decrease 
slightly when more input substitution is allowed. In contrast, although with significant 
negative values, the Change in Private Surplus is insensitive to increasing values of 
elasticity of substitution, mainly because of the Canadian refiners’ surplus increase. 
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Figure 4-3.: Welfare effects of carbon tax when the elasticity of substitution ranges 
between 0.0001 and 10 
The same simulations are performed in the case of a cap and trade policy, as 
illustrated on Figure 4-4. Welfare distribution is very differently impacted by this policy 
when compared to carbon tax. Thus, implementing a cap on emissions at refiners’ level 
only leads to a large surplus for consumers and crude oil producers when trade is 
gradually allowed in the system. For the same elasticity of substitution values, Canadian 
refineries are the most drastically affected, with a substantial surplus loss under variable 
proportions. However, the Change in Private Surplus trend illustrates that this effect is 
outweighed by the increase in consumers and crude oil producers gain.  
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Figure 4-4.: Welfare effects of a cap and trade policy when the elasticity of substitution 
ranges between 0.0001 and 10 
Regarding the environmental impact, the changes in Canadian and Global Cost of 
Emissions for both policies are presented in Figure 4-5. The figure illustrates the 
superiority of carbon tax policy, particularly when input substitution is high. In the case 
of a carbon tax, when more trade is allowed in the system, the cost of Canadian carbon 
emissions monotonically decreases. The decrease in the Global Cost of Emissions is 
sharper, given that it accounts for the ROW cost of emissions as well. Meanwhile, for a 
cap and trade policy, the change in Canadian and Global Cost of Emissions has a 
substantial upward trend when input substitution is gradually allowed. 
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Figure 4-5.: Environmental benefits of carbon tax and cap and trade policies in Canada 
and ROW when the elasticity of substitution ranges between 0.0001 and 10 
Further in the investigation, Figure 4-6 shows the elasticity of substitution values 
impact on the Canadian and global welfare for both carbon tax and cap and trade policies. 
Once again, carbon tax is preferred over cap and trade, as more trade determines higher 
and steadily increasing welfare values for a tax, while there is a significant drop in 
welfare determined by a cap and trade policy. 
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Figure 4-6.: Net benefits of carbon tax and cap and trade policies in Canadian and ROW 
when the elasticity of substitution ranges between 0.0001 and 10 
In conclusion, from the simulations and graphically illustrations performed, the 
above results reveal that, under free trade, when weighing the effects of welfare 
distribution and GHG emission reductions, a carbon tax is a preferred instrument for 
reducing GHG emissions. The sensitivity analysis performed also reveals that the results 
obtained are consistent with the findings of Alston and Scobie (1983) and Mullen et al. 
(1988) as higher values of the elasticity of substitution impact differently the prices, 
quantities and implicitly surplus distribution within the vertical market system. Moreover, 
consistency of results with Alston (1991) can be extrapolated under input substitution 
possibility as the incidence of carbon tax on total surplus (either Canadian or world) 
differs from the incidence of cap and trade. 
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4.4 Conclusions 
The results of the simulations illustrate two major points. To begin with, the 
analysis of the impacts of a carbon tax and a cap and trade policies on prices, quantities 
and welfare distribution of firms in a closed economy are similar. Hence, the Muth model 
and the simulations developed in this chapter confirm the Chapter 3 results: in a closed 
economy a cap and trade policy and a carbon tax are quasi-equivalent. 
In the second scenario, when the elasticity of substitution is assumed to be 10, 
consumer surplus is negatively affected in both scenarios, more seriously for a carbon tax 
than for the cap and trade. However, the difference between these policies is that a carbon 
tax can be designed as revenue neutral, which means that the government can keep little, 
if any, of the revenue raised by taxing carbon. The government can return this money to 
the consumers through direct rebates or decide that other taxes be reduced. Although, 
under limited trade, the two policies have a close value for the consumer surplus loss, 
their trends are opposite when more trade is allowed. Thus, when the elasticity of 
substitution takes values from 0.0001 to 10, carbon tax implies an insignificant decrease 
of consumer surplus. Meanwhile, cap and trade implies a considerable reduction in 
consumer surplus loss. 
With regards to producer surplus for cap and trade policy, in contrast with carbon 
tax, a higher degree of substitution between inputs increases the Canadian refineries loss. 
Moreover, the more trade is allowed, the higher the ROW surplus. This shows that when 
inputs and final outputs are traded with countries that do not have a similar policy in 
place, a cap and trade instrument is harmful for the domestic industry, while dirty foreign 
firms increase output and surplus to the detriment of the domestic industry. Therefore, in 
a free trade world, implementing a cap and trade policy with the aim of stabilizing the 
level of GHG emissions is not an efficient policy as long as foreign input substitutes are 
available. 
Regarding the GHG emissions mitigation, a carbon tax is a preferred instrument 
over a cap and trade policy for its ability to reduce more GHG emissions and at a much 
lower economic cost per ton of emissions. The issue remains that, under free trade, for 
this specific product with a relatively inelastic demand, consumers have the option to buy 
the gasoline from the ROW and still emit almost the same amount of GHG. For this 
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particular industry, the results of the current analysis illustrate that cap and trade is not an 
efficient instrument to mitigate GHG emissions due to its very high cost and low quantity 
abated.  
Whether carbon tax or cap and trade represent the solution for mitigating GHG 
emissions have polarized the literature and the mass-media all over the world. Metcalf 
(2009), Nordhaus (2006), Stavins (1995, 2008) and others support the effectiveness of 
carbon tax, while Keohane (2009), Murray et al. (2008), Ellerman and Buchner (2007) 
argue in favour of cap and trade. Regarding carbon tax impacts on fossil fuels, Goulder 
(1995) highlights that carbon tax distortions depend on the level of prior taxes on or 
existing subsidies to these fuels (p. 273). Therefore, the cost efficiency of a carbon tax is 
impacted by how carbon tax revenues are used and the nature of pre-existing taxes. For 
instance Metcalf (2007[2]) estimates that a tax of $15 per metric ton of CO2 will increase 
the petroleum products price by 13% and this tax will be passed on other industries where 
petroleum products represent inputs. The cap and trade effects on the US petroleum 
industry confirm some of the findings of this chapter (EPRINC, 2008). The authors of the 
report identify that a cap and trade would increase the costs of energy intensive inputs 
and petroleum firms would not be able to pass on all the increase, particularly if there is 
possibility to substitute from foreign sources. Moreover, other adverse effect identified 
when implementing a cap and trade refer to a reduced demand for petroleum products. At 
the same time, the authors acknowledge that the emission permits distributed to the 
domestic petroleum firms may represent “opportunities to profit” (p. 21). Last, but not the 
least, Paltsev et al. (2007) point out that how much of the mitigating cost is passed on to 
consumers depends on the elasticities of supply and demand for various goods and 
services. The results of this chapter illustrate that in the current framework that employs a 
Muth model and data from a particular industry, a carbon tax performs better than a cap 
and trade. 
As a possible solution to the above results, if cap and trade is the instrument of 
choice to mitigate GHG emissions in Canada, there will be more significant emission 
reduction if Canada would consider imposing border tariffs adjustments (BTAs). In this 
respect, Neuhoff (2007) discusses various industries particularities and challenges and 
argues for a free permit allocation for certain sectors along with considering BTAs for 
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other sectors so as to prevent carbon leakage. As Chapter 2 outlines, BTAs have been a 
controversial import measure under the WTO/GATT (General Agreement of Tariffs and 
Trade) rules and still it is not clear whether and which policy format can be implemented. 
Moreover, by imposing BTAs to its trading partners, Canada can achieve real GHG 
emission reductions without harming its economy. The revenue raised from BTAs can be 
used towards climate change funds, investment in less emission intensive technology, 
GHG mitigating actions, etc. However, introducing cap and trade in the absence of BTAs 
gives this policy the status of second best instrument of choice due to its lack of 
efficiency in redistributing industry surplus and achieving real emission reductions.  
Furthermore, when Canadian producers lose surplus as a result of implementing a 
cap and trade mechanism and this surplus is directed to dirty foreign industries, Canadian 
firms may have the incentive to sell their business and emission permits, and relocate to 
other jurisdictions which are not as strictly regulated for reducing their GHG emissions. 
In practice, this situation is experienced by certain European industries and companies 
which threaten to relocate if they do not receive enough permits for free to cover the 
expenses undertaken for emissions reduction (Neuhoff et al., 2007). However, these 
circumstances are valid for certain industries, and the relocation decision depends on the 
degree of exposure to trade, the specificity of the industry (whether it is an emission 
intensive industry), as well as on the market structure.  
Regarding carbon tax implementation effects outside the framework of this model 
– in the real world, it is interesting to note that, a $15/ton of CO2 carbon tax, which 
means additional 3.5 cents/litre of gasoline (Metcalf, 2007[2]) has led to many arguments 
and much opposition. Meanwhile, the price fluctuation, as well as the steady increase in 
the gasoline price (approximately 30 cents/litre price increase51 in the interval 2007-
2011) seems to be much more easily accepted by consumers.   
So far, the results of this research acknowledge the environmental and economic 
trade offs that a social planner has to consider when deciding which policy to implement 
for achieving real emissions reductions. However, it is obvious that under strict 
environmental regulations industrial flight may represent a solution for certain industries. 
The outcome of the present investigation illustrates that extending a cap and trade system 
                                                 
51http://www.torontogasprices.com/retail_price_chart.aspx?city1=Toronto&city2=USA%20Average&city3=Canada%20Average&cru
de=n&tme=60&units=ca  
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without other accompanying measures such as a BTA, it may not be the much sought 
after panacea of GHG emission reductions. 
In this context, the next chapter explores firms’ incentives to relocate to less 
severely regulated jurisdictions using the comparison of a cap and trade policy versus an 
emissions intensity one. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RELOCATION INCENTIVES IN THE PRESENCE OF CAP AND TRADE VERSUS 
EMISSION INTENSITY 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter indicates that, under free trade, the two different GHG 
emission reduction policies can lead to different economic welfare distribution effects. In 
practice, the ongoing experience of European policy makers regarding the cap and trade 
policy warns that the design of such a policy and the implementation details, such as the 
number of permits allocated per industry, may lead firms to either gain financial 
advantage or to lose market share and profits. Furthermore, heavy industries in Europe 
(e.g. aluminium, steel, etc.) under climate change legislation threatened the European 
Commission with relocation to countries with less strict environmental policy if they did 
not receive free emission rights (European Commission, 2008). 
Thus, industry relocation becomes a policy consideration as long as the stringency 
and form of GHG emission reduction policies implemented across countries are so 
different that they create incentives for firms to move to jurisdictions with less strict 
environmental regulations. This consideration particularly applies to the cap and trade 
system which creates additional incentives to relocate due to firms’ ability to trade the 
emission permits allocated. 
In this context, this chapter explicitly considers firms’ incentives to relocate when 
the regulator has the option to implement either a cap and trade policy or an emission 
intensity one. The choice of the two policies is motivated by the fact that the Canadian 
government has chosen to implement an emission intensity trading system, but intends to 
change to cap and trade in the 2020-2025 interval. The Canadian emission intensity rates 
are capped per unit of production and can be traded both domestically and 
internationally52. Meanwhile, the US considered a cap and trade system as the main 
policy for GHG emissions reductions. China, like Canada, has indicated it will implement 
an intensity regulation. 
                                                 
52 Intensity caps are established through a baseline-and-credit system, where the baseline represents firms’ emission intensity targets. 
Firms that emit less than the mandated baseline will receive tradable credits, which are calculated as the difference between each 
firm’s target and its actual intensity multiplied by the yearly production (Environment Canada, 2007 [2]). 
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This chapter compares and contrasts LFEs incentives to relocate when the 
domestic social planner decides to reduce GHG emissions. Using a two-country, three 
stage sequential game, the model identifies each firm’s profit, relocation incentives, and 
resulting national social welfare when the domestic social planner chooses to reduce 
carbon emissions using either a cap and trade (Scenario 1) or an emission intensity 
system (Scenario 2). A series of simulations and sensitivity analysis for each of the 
scenarios are used to quantify, under certain circumstances, the effects of the policies on 
social welfare and on pollution haven creation. 
The results show that, when considering the consequences of other countries’ 
policy choices, pollution havens as a result of capital flight are more likely under cap and 
trade regulation. For example, one can imagine that, in a Kyoto-signatory country with a 
cap and trade policy, multi-product firms have an incentive to shut down one of their 
plants, make a profit from selling their allocated permits and move production to another 
country which, not being a Kyoto-signatory state, has lower GHG emission obligations. 
The current Canadian regulations are still under revision and might not take into 
account all possible scenarios that firms can legally consider regarding their mobility 
across borders and relocation decisions. Since the framework is unclear about how to 
identify the shift in production due to economic reasons, this chapter investigates the 
incentive to do so.  
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents the socio-economic 
issues created when implementing different environmental policies worldwide. The two 
following subsections introduce the conclusions of previous research on pollution haven 
and industrial flight concepts. Section 5.3 explains the theoretical model and compares 
and contrasts the results of the simulations and sensitivity analysis for both cap and trade 
and emissions intensity policies. The chapter ends with the conclusions of the simulation 
and sensitivity analysis. 
 
5.2 Environmental Regulations in a World of Pollution Havens and Industrial flight 
Designing policies to deal with domestic environmental concerns is a complex 
task and must take into account the industry, consumers, and interest groups involved. 
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Developing policies to deal with global GHG emissions is an inherently difficult 
challenge as well because, in addition to domestic impacts, policies of one country affect 
other countries through trade or capital markets. In the case of GHG pollution in a global 
context, domestic regulators have to consider the possible environmental impacts of other 
countries’ policies when assessing the overall environmental performance. Given the 
impossibility of a global government, this can require negotiating international 
agreements for dealing with transboundary issues that reflect public and international 
policy concerns. These circumstances are clearly explained by Ulph (1997) who argues 
that trade and environment interact through three main aspects. First, if international trade 
affects the pattern of production and consumption of that country and in turn, they 
negatively impact the environment, then it can be considered that trade impacts the 
environment. The corollary is that, if environmental policies are enforced with the aim of 
correcting production and consumption externalities, trade will be affected too. Second, 
production and consumption in one country may have global environmental effects 
(through transboundary pollution) in which case, the trading partner country has an 
incentive to use trade policy as an instrument to reduce damage. Third, trade policies are 
often part of enforcing international environmental agreements.  
Environmentalists and economists debate whether or not the benefits of trade 
liberalization are outweighed by the damage brought to the environment through 
increased production and consumption (Copeland and Taylor, 2004). In this context, 
when the focus comes on enforcing GHG emission reductions policies, their trading 
mechanism and global effects, the situation is even more elusive to analyze. Ulph (1997) 
highlights that the international competitiveness that trade promotes may encourage 
domestic industries to lobby for less stringent environmental policies. 
Research has identified other facets with respect to pollution regulations and their 
consequences. Most important are international competitiveness and relocation of 
polluting industries. Both competitiveness and relocation issues may lead to a pollution 
haven phenomenon, which can take place in a region or country that expands industries 
that pollute the environment due to its weak or poorly enforced environmental regulations 
(Copeland and Taylor, 2004). Some of this growth in domestic production can arise from 
industrial flight, whereby firms leave stringent environmental regimes and invest in 
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jurisdictions with weaker regulations. As explained in Chapter 2, industrial flight 
represents the action of moving to a country with less strict environmental standards that 
polluting companies face, while a pollution haven represents the result of having low 
environmental standards that attracts polluting industries (either domestic or foreign). 
Capital mobility between countries may speed up and strengthen the pollution haven 
creation, but capital flight is not necessary for pollution havens to emerge. 
The form of regulation will matter as well. In general, cap and trade will generate 
a stronger incentive to move. The intent of tradable permits is to allow firms that invest in 
abatement to benefit through permit sales. But firms can generate excess permits by 
moving some production abroad. Governments may not be able to identify the reason so 
may be in no position to do much about it. The idea is that excess permits under cap and 
trade can be sold even if firms generate the excess permits by reducing output as opposed 
to improving abatement. However, under emission intensity regulations, firms that reduce 
output have no permits to sell. Hence, cap and trade will introduce an additional incentive 
to move. For example, in practice, to operationally and legally distinguish between multi-
plant firms that are making production adjustments to reduce GHG from those that are 
strategically moving production out of country is nearly impossible. For instance, 
suppose an electrical utility shuts down an American coal fired plant while it builds fully 
offsetting American wind generation capacity and simultaneously contracts with a new 
Canadian coal fired affiliate to meet demand growth. Did the sale of the permits from the 
American coal fired plant go to finance new wind generation or did it go to the Canadian 
affiliate? Or, as another example, suppose an American car producer closes four car 
plants and opens two truck plants over a three year period and emissions fall by 30 
percent. Should any permits be revoked? Further, how do we measure changes in output? 
Further on, assuming a case where a firm K closes its only plant which was a 
large GHG emitter. A new firm, J, buys these permits to set up a new, more efficient 
plant in the US and then sells any residual permits to help finance the new plant. Is the 
sale of permits allowed? What if the permits are sold by company K to company X and 
the new company J purchases permits from company Y? These examples and the 
questions that follow illustrate that implementing cap and trade regulations will be a 
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challenging issue given that firms may have the incentive to relocate some of their 
production abroad.  
5.2.1 Industrial Flight 
As pollution haven and industrial flight concepts were introduced in Chapter 2, 
the present section focuses mainly on reminding few aspects related to industrial flight. 
In general, in the literature related to trade and environment, the research 
hypotheses assume that lax environmental regulations can lead to pollution havens while 
strict regulations lead to industrial flight. Kolstad and Xing (1998) reason that stringent 
environmental regulations have a strong effect on industry location and that different 
policies among countries will induce specialization and capital movement to the country 
with weaker regulations. They explain that the industrial flight occurs when overly 
stringent environmental regulations cause increased production costs for polluting 
companies, which have incentives to ‘fly’ to countries with weaker environmental 
regulations. The authors present the following arguments that may determine industrial 
flight. Firstly, strong environmental policies increase production costs as they require 
certain equipment. Secondly, the waste disposal capacity is restricted, and, last but not 
the least, severe environmental regulations often prohibit the use of particular inputs, 
outputs or processes. 
Briefly summarizing the main features of the literature review on industrial flight 
concept, in the early 2000s, the research was focused on using various econometrics 
techniques and modeling for identifying whether there is positive or negative evidence of 
industrial flight. As in the pollution haven case, the results are polarized and there are no 
clear conclusions of whether stringent environmental regulations influence industrial 
flight or not (Millimet and List, 2004, Albrecht 1998, List et al. 2003, Dean et al., 2003). 
In parallel, the industrial flight hypothesis has been researched in relationship with 
foreign direct investment (FDI). The motivation is that FDI has expanded as a result of 
trade and investment liberalization at a global level. As FDI has been mainly directed 
towards developing countries, regulatory differences between developed and developing 
countries have raised concerns about environmental and social impacts (Zarsky, 1999).  
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In 2002, Keller and Levinson researched the effects of pollution abatement costs 
on foreign direct investment (FDI). Using panel data, the authors verify the possible 
creation of pollution havens in various US states that have different environmental 
regulations and they obtain negative results. They suggest that few of the reasons why the 
pollution haven hypothesis is not supported by conclusive evidence are related to using 
cross-sectional data (and thus not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity) and also to 
the challenges of quantifying various environmental regulations. 
Kolstad and Xing (1998) test the industrial flight hypothesis, while 
acknowledging that FDI is a more sensitive proxy than other variables. Their results show 
that, regarding intensive polluting industries, there are significant negative effects of 
environmental legislation stringency on FDI that are leading to industrial flight; 
meanwhile, less intensive polluting industries are not affected. They argue that this is an 
expected result which was not captured in previous research that employed econometric 
modeling given the difficulty to quantify endogenous variables such as the effects and the 
degree of stringency of environmental regulations. 
Herath et al. (2005) examine the factors affecting the location choice of hog, dairy 
and fed-cattle sectors in the US for the interval 1976-2000. This paper addresses two new 
and interesting aspects: developing an environmental stringency index, as well as various 
instrumental variables that control for the possible endogeneity bias between livestock 
production decisions and regulatory stringency. The authors’ findings reveal that the hog 
and dairy sectors are increasingly moving production away from traditional production 
regions. They identify that the relocation could be due to the tightening of compliance 
requirements and enforcement which can increase the relative costs of abatement. 
In the last years, unilaterally implemented GHG emission reduction policies by 
certain governments have raised concerns about carbon leakage, which has been explored 
in the literature along with industry relocation aspects. The motivation is that firms’ 
alternative to relocate internationally is considered to make carbon leakage even worse 
(Fullerton, 2011). For instance, considering industry relocation to countries with a less 
stringent climate change policy as a main reason for carbon leakage, Oikonomou et al. 
(2006) analyze the relocation effect of previous environmental regulations in the iron and 
steel sectors, differentiating between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries. First, the 
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authors conclude that the results of previous research should be differentiated into 
energy-intensive and conventional energy-intensive sectors, as the results for the two 
categories should not be interpreted similarly. Second, they observe that there is a limited 
effect of climate change policy on location decisions. In their opinion, factors like market 
size, growth and wages have more weight when firms contemplate relocation. However, 
other authors have found evidence of carbon leakage associated with Kyoto Protocol. 
Paltsev (2001) identified that the carbon leakage rate from Annex B Kyoto countries is of 
10% while Elliot et al. (2010) find a rate of 20%. 
In the EU, as a results of industry groups continuing to argue the threat of EU 
ETS against their international competitiveness, carbon leakage issues and industry 
relocation threats have already been addressed in the EU ETS53 through requested border 
protective measures that can be considered ‘border adjustments for GHG-intensive 
imports’ (Monjon and Quirion, 2010, p.3). The authors acknowledge that while there is 
limited evidence on firms’ international competitiveness threat, in theory, a different 
carbon price determines changes in the trade patterns, which leads to relocation, and 
further, to operational or investment54 carbon leakage.  
Some earlier research anticipates these circumstances and tries to find solutions. 
Sheldon (2006) presents a thoroughly review of pollution haven effects, relocation 
incentives and race to the bottom and suggests that WTO rules regarding import tariffs 
should have more flexibility such that to allow countries to “…renegotiate their bound 
tariffs if unilateral changes in their environmental policies would increase access to their 
countries”. 
In this context, Gros (2009) argues that border measures, such as carbon tariffs, 
should be in place against imports from developing countries with no or low binding 
GHG emission reductions. He concludes that, for a small carbon tariff, this solution 
would increase global welfare and at the same time would raise revenue to support poor 
developing countries to reduce their GHG emissions.  
Obviously, given the complexity encountered by policy makers when imposing 
appropriate environmental standards for their own socio-economic situation, arguments 
                                                 
53 Actually through Directive 2009/29/EC which revises EU ETS. 
54 Graichen et al., (2008) define operational leakage as occurring from production relocation from existing installations to production 
facilities outside the EU ETS scheme; investment leakage occurs as a result of a redirection of investments from Europe to regions 
without similar climate policies. 
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arise now from defining and/or measuring the severity of environmental policies. 
Eventually, stringent environmental regulations can cause increased production costs for 
firms, which in turn may lead to effects on firms’ competitiveness, industry location and 
country’s trade structure.  
 
5.3 The Model 
The following model focuses on the hypothesis that the incentive to relocate to a 
pollution haven is far less with the emission intensity regulation than with a cap-and-
trade regulation. With emission intensity rates, a firm shutting down production to move 
to the pollution haven would not have saleable permits, whereas with a cap and trade 
system the firm could relocate production to the pollution haven and sell emission 
permits domestically. When this exodus effect to the pollution haven is taken into 
account, emission intensity rates could be a superior instrument to limit GHG emissions. 
The interaction between firms and policy makers is modeled as a three stage 
sequential game and is solved through backward induction. The agents involved in the 
game are the policy maker (government) that decides the level of emissions and the firms 
(LFEs) that emit greenhouse gases under perfect competition. The goal of the policy 
maker is to choose a level of emissions that maximizes domestic social welfare. It is 
assumed that the policy maker accounts for the relocation of domestic firms. When 
assessing the domestic social welfare, the policy maker takes into account the pollution 
generated by all its firms regardless the jurisdiction in which emissions were generated. 
The LFEs goal is to maximize profit by choosing where to produce and how 
much. Once the policy maker decides the emission target, depending on how efficient 
they are at reducing emissions, firms can decide to comply with the regulations and 
remain in the domestic country or relocate to jurisdictions with lower environmental 
standards and abide by their standards. As profit maximizers, firms’ relocation decisions 
are based on their fixed costs of setting up a new plant, the costs of relocation, and the 
benefits of staying. This means they account for potential sale of emissions. In the case of 
cap and trade, firms have the ability to sell their permits in the domestic market when 
they leave. This will lead to the situation where there are more emission permits in the 
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domestic market for a fewer firms and a lower price.  Hence not all firms will choose to 
leave. In the case of emissions intensity policy, once firms start relocating, the 
government can allow higher emission intensities for the firms that stay. Again, not all 
domestic firms will find it profitable to relocate. 
In the first stage of the game the domestic government chooses the stringency of 
GHG emissions that would maximize social welfare under a cap and trade or an 
emissions intensity policy. In the second stage, domestic firms observe the regulation and 
decide whether to stay or relocate. In the third stage, firms, which take as given the 
stringency and the type of policy decided by the government, maximize profits by 
choosing their output.  
The solving procedure for backward induction implies solving first the third stage 
which reveals the quantity, price and profits of the firms. Stage two presents firms’ 
motivation to relocate or not and the equilibrium conditions. Stage 1 shows the 
regulator’s choice of emissions stringency when considering social welfare 
maximization. 
As this investigation compares and contrasts government and firms’ decisions 
firstly under a cap and trade and then under an emissions intensity policy, the following 
section comprises a scenario for each of the policies. 
5.3.1 Theoretical Framework 
5.3.1.1 Scenario 1: Cap and trade policy 
The theoretical framework of the model includes two countries, the domestic or 
Home (country H) and Foreign (country F). In this scenario, the regulator in Home 
decides to implement a cap and trade policy. The social planner in Foreign also has an 
environmental policy in place but with higher levels of emissions than in the domestic 
country. 
The model is solved using backward induction, which means that the third stage 
of the model is solved first. In this stage, a price-taking representative LFE takes profit 
maximizing decisions in a perfectly competitive industry. In the absence of regulation, 
the domestic and foreign industries are composed of M, and respectively N, homogenous 
firms. Each firm i  produces iHq , and correspondingly iFq  units of output at an emission 
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rate of iHr  and iFr . The emission rate ir  is defined as the ratio of the quantity of 
emissions of a firm and the analogous units of output, e.g. 
i
i
i q
er  .  ie  denotes the 
quantity of emissions such that iii qre   and thus aggregate emissions can be written 
as 


M
i
ieE
1
.  
STAGE 3: Each firm maximizes profit subject to the cap on emissions. Since all 
firms are identical, there are no trades in equilibrium. That is, the equilibrium price of 
emission permits will ensure that no firm wishes to buy or sell permits. Hence, this can be 
modeled as non-tradable permits system with an implicit permit price.   
The domestic social planner decides the number of permits that are distributed 
among LFEs ( HE ) and implicitly establishes the optimal levels of emissions for 
maximizing its country’s social welfare. The constrained profit function that each 
domestic agent maximizes under a fixed world price for output can be stated as:  
iH
iH
iHiH r
qpq
2
2  such that iHiHH qrE   ,      (5.1) 
where iHpq  represent the revenue and 
iH
iH
r
q
2
2  is the quadratic cost function. 
Firms’ costs are increasing in output and decreasing in emission intensity. Note 
that the cost function used is a reduced form. One could explicitly include abatement as a 
firm choice. That is, the firm would choose output and abatement simultaneously given 
their individual cap on emissions. But as long as there are one-to-one relationships 
between abatement, output, and emissions, the choice of output and the intensity of 
emissions implicitly determine abatement. The cost function can capture this in reduced 
form by focusing on output and intensity choices only. 
Based on equation (5.1), the first order conditions are obtained by deriving the 
Lagrangean equation with respect to output ( iHq ), emission rate ( iHr ) and the 
Lagrangean multiplier ( ). 
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Solving the above system of three equations and three unknowns, optimal values 
are obtained for the emission rate iHr  and the output iHq . The value obtained 
for represents the shadow value of the permits or the permits price. 
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The results show that output is increasing in prices and allowable domestic 
emissions, which means that higher market prices or more permits distributed lead to 
more output. The intensity is increasing in the number of permits and decreasing in 
prices, while the shadow value of permits (or permit price) is decreasing in permits and 
increasing in prices. 
To focus on the domestic regulators problem, it is assumed that there is no cap on 
total foreign emissions.  However, firms are not unregulated as the foreign country has a 
constraint on firms’ emission rates. By assumption, though, the foreign emission rate is 
assumed to be higher (but at the same time it can take lower values) than the rate allowed 
in Home: iHiF rr 

. 
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q
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2
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The Lagrangean equation for the above constrained maximization and the first 
order conditions are: 
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Solving the above, given that iFr  is constant and known, similar to the case of 
domestic firms, output is a function that increases in prices and intensity: 
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The maximum value of the profit is obtained by inserting the optimal values of 
the output and emissions in the profit function. This value is employed in the simulation 
section. 
STAGE 2: Based on anticipated domestic output and rate of emissions obtained 
from the profit maximization, firms are faced with the decision to stay or relocate. Firms’ 
decision to move to Foreign is based on the costs of relocation, the value of permit sales, 
and the benefits to staying. Thus, in the second stage of the game, the equilibrium 
condition is that the fixed costs of relocation to the foreign country must be lower than 
the expenses of reducing carbon dioxide emissions in the domestic country, as shown in 
the following equilibrium conditions.  
The first equilibrium condition shows that, with the exception of their profits and 
the value of the emission permits, LFEs have a range of fixed costs (F) that will lead 
them to relocate. 
FFi
H
i            (5.15) 
where: Hi  is domestic firm’s profit, Fi is foreign firm’s profit, while F stands 
for the fixed costs of the firm. 
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At this point, firms are indifferent whether to relocate or not. When a firm 
relocates, it will bear the appropriate fixed costs for setting up the plant in the new 
location. The second equilibrium condition states that, if these fixed costs diminish a 
firm’s profit in the foreign country below the level of its domestic profit less the 
compliance costs (CC), relocation is not worthwhile. 
F
i
H
i CC             (5.16) 
Thus, assuming no other reasons to move, the break-even point for relocation 
CCF   is determined by the relationship between the costs of respecting the cap on 
emissions and the possible fixed costs of relocation.  
At this point, it is necessary to underline the assumption that firms that are able to 
relocate are going to sell the permits they have already received to the firms that remain 
in the domestic country. The importance of the relocation costs that firms incur when 
moving comes from the possible costs range that could diminish the incentive to move. 
On the one hand, there are the costs that the LFE incurs when investing in technology or 
equipment that helps reduce its GHG emissions. With an absolute cap, the emitter would 
bear the costs of trying to become more efficient and would incur the risk of having to 
restrict its output. However, under these circumstances there is one more incentive for 
relocation: the value of the previously allocated permits to the LFEs; permits that 
constitute a valuable asset because of the trading opportunity. Thus, the equilibrium 
conditions refer to costs of relocation, fixed costs and profits. Hence, the profit of the 
firms that stay in the domestic country is still a function of revenue and costs less the 
value of the permits that are sold in the domestic country by the firms that leave: 
I
ME
r
qpq H
H
H
HH   2
2
       (5.17) 
The profit of the firms that relocate include the value of the emission permits sold 
minus the fixed costs of relocation: 
F
I
ME
r
qpq H
F
F
FF  2
2
       (5.18) 
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where I is the number of firms that remain in the domestic country, M represents 
the number of existing firms before implementing any emissions reduction policy, HE  is 
the number of permits distributed by the regulator. 
Further in the analysis of the factors that impact relocation, the number of firms 
that remain in the domestic country ( I ) depends on the number of permits distributed by 
the regulator ( HE ) as well as on the fixed costs incurred for relocation. Therefore, the 
variables of interest are HE  (as a policy variable – the cause) and I  (as an endogenous 
variable – the effect of choosing HE ), since the grounds of the analysis attempt to reveal 
their roles and impacts on each other as well as their impact on social welfare. 
In this context, in equilibrium, the zero profit condition of this model is expressed 
in equation 5.19. The condition states that, in equilibrium, the domestic firms profits 
minus the value of the emission permits bought from the firms that relocate equals the 
profits of firms that relocate to Foreign less the fixed costs of relocation,  
)( IMFE FHH          (5.19) 
With the aim of exploring the relationship between HE  and I Equation 5.19 can 
be written as follows: 
HFH EIMF  )(        (5.20) 
where )( IM  represents the number of firms that relocate. 
It is observed that equation 5.20 can be totally differentiated with respect to the 
number of permits. The values of both profit functions for home and foreign (equations 
5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.14) were replaced in the above formula and the total differentiation 
yields:  
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       (5.21) 
The end result has a positive sign which shows that there is a positive relationship 
between HE  and I . The interpretation is that an increase in the emission cap induces 
fewer firms to leave the home. This result is justified by the fact that with a greater 
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number of permits distributed among the remaining LFEs, firms would be able to emit 
more and certainly spend less on abatement.  
Recalling the assumption that firms that relocate are going to sell the permits they 
have already received to the firms that remain in the domestic country. Thus, for 
incorporating this assumption in equation (5.20), HE  was adjusted (multiplied) by 
IM / (the ratio of the total number of domestic firms to the number of firms that remain) 
for both the social welfare and zero profit functions. 
STAGE 1: In the first stage on the game, the government chooses the stringency 
of regulation to maximize social welfare. The regulator values the sum of producer 
surpluses generated from home production as well as the pollution generated by all its 
firms regardless of their location. Thus, when the social planner chooses the emission 
cap, total emissions damage also matter: 
])()[(max iFiFiHiHHE
qrIMMqrDISW
H
      (5.22), 
D  corresponds to the damage caused by the emissions and it is assumed to be a linear 
function (index). In other words, the social welfare function is shown as the difference 
between the profit of the firms that stay in the domestic country and the emissions 
damage of the domestic firms that stay and the domestic firms that relocate55. 
Given the seven constraints (the first order conditions for both jurisdictions and 
the zero profit conditions), the seven endogenous variables and the non-linear nature of 
the social welfare function, optimal solutions and comparative static results were very 
difficult to derive analytically. As the previous mathematical development shows, it was 
possible to solve the equations up to a point and sign them, but it was needed to, at least, 
roughly quantify them and reveal the magnitude of their effects for each of the policies. 
This allows comparing and contrasting the outcome of the two policies, as well as the 
sensitivity of the variables employed, in the three stage game over a range of parameter 
values.  
The formulas obtained from solving the Lagrangean, such as output, emission 
intensity, and shadow values, along with the optimal profit functions, the zero moving 
condition and the social welfare function were inserted in an Excel file. As will be shown 
                                                 
55 If the social planner was concerned with only domestic emissions, domestic welfare would be higher, but she would ignore the 
adverse effects of pollution generated elsewhere. 
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in the simulation section, based on the parameter values of the exogenous variables (such 
as price, fixed costs of relocation, damage coefficient, total number of domestic firms, 
etc.) and the formulas previously introduced, the endogenous variables are calculated 
using the optimization software Solver. The non-linear constraint optimization algorithm 
numerically finds the rate of emissions that maximizes social welfare subject to each of 
the first order conditions and the zero profit condition to firms being maintained. 
Comparative statics were derived by examining the changes to social welfare and the 
endogenous variables by changing exogenous variables and parameters. 
Therefore, given the complex mathematical manipulation of the above function, 
for illustrating the relationships between the variables involved and the social welfare, 
excel simulations and comparative statics were performed for both Scenarios 1 and 2, and 
further detailed in Section 5.4.  
5.3.1.2 Scenario 2: Emissions intensity policy 
The second scenario is the implementation of an emission intensity policy by 
home. While the cap and trade system was designed to reduce total emissions, the 
emissions intensity system reduces average emissions intensity56. Thus, the two policies 
will have a different impact on both output and the quantity of emissions. As noted by 
others, the emission intensity system contains an inherent output subsidy which 
encourages additional output (Helfand 1991, Bruneau 2005).  
STAGE 3:  In the third stage of the game, as in Scenario 1, firms maximize profits 
by selling their output on the world market and emitting greenhouse gases. The profit 
function is the same as above. The constraint differs because the regulator sets an 
emissions intensity value iSH  that is valid for the entire industry, where iSH  is defined 
as the ratio of emissions per unit of output57. As previously mentioned, in this scenario it 
is assumed that no emission permits or allowances are distributed to the firms. Thus,  
                                                 
56 Recalling the definition currently employed by the Canadian government, emissions intensity is defined as greenhouse gas 
emissions per unit of production. The set-up of this ratio suggests that production, and implicitly, emissions can be increased as much 
as intended as long as emissions per output are reduced (Environment Canada, 2007 [2]). 
57 Both iHr and iSH  represent the rate of emissions. The notation differs to show that the rate of emission is differently defined in 
each scenario; however, both parameters define the same variable. 
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2
2  such that iSiH HH         (5.23) 
The Lagrangean equation for the above constrained optimization and the first 
order conditions with respect to output, emissions and the Lagrangean multiplier are: 
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As the rate of emission is known from the constraint, first order conditions allow 
calculating optimal values for output iHq . 

iS
iH
Hp
q 
          (5.28) 
The above result illustrates that firms choose the maximum intensity allowed 
when deciding their output. Under perfect competition assumptions, their output ensures 
that marginal costs equal marginal revenues. 
The foreign country has its profit function and a constraint that shows that there is 
no specific GHG emissions reduction policy. However, keeping the same measurement 
unit, the emission intensity level in the foreign country iFS is going to be higher (but, as 
in the previous scenario, it can be lower) than in the domestic country. Moreover, a very 
important assumption for comparing the two scenarios is that the level of allowed 
emissions is assumed have the same value for both cap and trade and emission intensity 
implemented in the foreign country: iFiF Sr  . 
Thus, the profit formula for each firm of the foreign country is the following: 
iF
iF
iFF S
q
pq
2
2  such that iFiF SS        (5.29) 
In this case the Lagrangean equation and the first order conditions are: 
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          (5.34) 
As expected, the results are similar to the previous case, the difference consisting 
in the higher emissions intensity allowed in Foreign.  
STAGE 2: As in Scenario 1, based on their compliance costs and fixed costs of 
relocation, firms choose whether to move across the border or remain in Home. It should 
be noted that no emission permits are distributed, in this case. As a consequence of the 
emissions limitation and the inherent increased costs, domestic LFEs are enticed to 
displace their business to Foreign.  
Thus, in the second stage of the game, the equilibrium condition is that the fixed 
costs of relocation to the foreign country must be lower than the expenses of reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions in the domestic country, as shown in the following equilibrium 
conditions.  
FFi
H
i           (5.35) 
where: Hi  is domestic firm’s profit, Fi is foreign firm’s profit, while F stands 
for the fixed costs of the firm. 
At this point, firms are indifferent whether to relocate or not. The second 
equilibrium condition states that, if the fixed costs of setting up the plant diminish a 
firm’s profit in the foreign country below the level of its domestic profit less the 
compliance costs (CC), relocation is not worthwhile. 
F
i
H
i CC           (5.36) 
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Thus, assuming no other reasons to move, the break-even point for relocation 
CCF   is determined by the relationship between the costs of respecting the emissions 
intensity imposed and the possible fixed costs of relocation.  
In this scenario, the profits of the firms that relocate are diminished by the costs of 
relocation, but they have the advantage of a higher intensity allowed in Foreign.
 
F
r
q
pq
iF
iF
iFiF  2
2
        (5.37) 
Further, the zero profit condition in equilibrium states that, the domestic firms 
profits should equal the profits of firms that relocate to Foreign less the fixed costs of 
relocation: 
)( IMFFH          (5.38) 
thus, if firms close up and sell, they will get only the value of their business, but 
no permits. 
STAGE 1:  Anticipating firms’ location, output, and emission decisions, the 
policy maker decides the stringency of the intensity regulation that maximizes domestic 
social welfare. 
The social welfare maximization implies using an analogous function to the one 
introduced in the earlier scenario. The difference is that, under an emission intensity 
policy there are no permits to be distributed to the firms, and thus, they are not captured 
in the equation. 
])()[(max iFiFiHiHHH
SqIMMqHDISW
H

     (5.39) 
When implementing this policy, the social planner is interested in choosing a 
level of intensity HH  that will maximize the social welfare of its country.  
5.3.2 Simulation Results 
In general, the three-stage game above can be solved analytically. However, given 
the complex social welfare function form, the results are better understood when 
employing simulations, as they allow varying important parameters to identify under 
which circumstances the two policies differ. The equations and constraints previously 
discussed were introduced in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. For both cap and trade and 
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emission intensity settings, the endogenous variables such as output, profits, emissions 
rates, number of permits etc. were introduced in Excel as formulas representing the profit 
maximization’s first order conditions. Using Solver Excel, optimal values for the 
endogenous variables were found by assuming various values of the exogenous 
parameters with particular attention to market price (P) and environmental damages (D). 
In turn, the endogenous variables are embedded into the social welfare functions. 
Maximizing social welfare implies that the profits of the firms that stay are the same as 
the profits of the firms that leave (equation 5.19), a constraint that was taken into account 
for both scenarios.  
Further in the research, sensitivity analysis of the endogenous variables implies 
attributing a wide range of values to two of the exogenous variables: the damage 
coefficient and the domestic output price. For comparison purposes, the same values of 
the exogenous variables are employed in both Scenario 1 and 2.  
 
5.3.2.1 Cap and trade policy 
The simulation process reveals that certain values attributed to the exogenous 
variables lead to maximizing social welfare, while respecting all the constraints imposed 
in the optimization process. The main conditions to be respected in the optimization 
process are that social welfare function must be maximized under the zero profit 
constraint, while allowing the number of permits issued ( HE ) and the number of firms 
that decide to stay in the domestic country ( I ) to vary. Given the nature of the simulation 
process, the focus of the analysis is not on the percentage or magnitude changes of each 
parameter, but on the pattern of changes from the equilibrium solutions found. Table 5-1 
presents the initial values of the exogenous variables in a cap and trade scenario that 
maximize social welfare as well as the values of the endogenous variables. The initial 
simulation (absence of regulation) uses 200 firms, a market price of 150 units, a damage 
coefficient of 0.5, and a rate of emissions in the foreign country of 200 units per unit of 
output58. The welfare maximizing cap and trade target is then identified. 
 
                                                 
58 The Excel formulas used for simulations are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 5-1.: Values of exogenous and endogenous variables that maximize social welfare 
while respecting all constraints under a cap and trade policy 
Exogenous 
variables 
Value of 
exogenous 
variables 
Endogenous 
variables 
Values of endogenous 
variables that maximize 
social welfare 
p  150 HE  850 
Fr  200 Hq  7.9 
D  0.5 Hr  107 
M  200 I  176 
  Fq  30 
  H  897 
  F  2,250 
  SW  2,596 
Source: own calculations 
 
The results obtained validate the modeling approach and the numerous constraints 
involved. Thus, one of the consequences of a lax environmental policy is that the output 
and profit obtained in the foreign country are higher than in the domestic country. Out of 
the 200 existing domestic firms, 24 (12 percent of them) consider it more profitable to 
sell their permits and relocate abroad59. 
Sensitivity analysis is performed with the aim of observing the pattern of the 
endogenous variables when a range of values is attributed to specific exogenous values of 
damage and market prices. Further on, it is investigated how the domestic total emissions, 
number of permits distributed to firms, emissions rate, capital flight and social welfare 
are impacted when the output price takes values between 100 and 165 units, and the 
damage coefficient takes values from 0.1 to 6. The other exogenous variables have the 
same values as shown in Table 5-1.  
The sensitivity analysis begins with Table 5-2, which presents the optimal total 
emissions given the range of prices and damage coefficients by enforcing a cap and trade 
policy. The total emissions in the domestic country are calculated as the product between 
the number of firms, their output and their average emissions rate. 
                                                 
59 In the Solver simulations, another constraint imposed was using integer numbers (e.g.: no decimals).  
   
Table 5-2.: Total Home emissions under a cap and trade (thousand tons) 
 Output price (units) 
 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 
0.1 134 149 165 181 198 215 232 250 268 286 305 324 344 363 
0.2 97 108 119 131 143 155 168 180 193 207 220 234 248 262 
0.3 81 90 99 109 119 129 140 151 162 173 184 196 208 220 
0.4 71 79 88 97 105 115 124 134 143 153 164 174 184 195 
0.5 65 72 80 88 96 105 113 122 131 141 150 159 169 179 
0.6 61 68 75 82 90 98 106 114 123 131 140 149 158 167 
0.7 57 64 71 78 85 93 100 108 116 124 133 141 150 159 
0.8 54 61 67 74 81 88 96 103 111 119 127 135 144 152 
0.9 52 58 65 71 78 85 92 100 107 115 122 130 138 147 
1 50 56 63 69 75 82 89 96 104 111 119 126 134 142 
2 41 46 52 57 63 69 75 81 87 94 100 107 114 121 
3 38 43 48 53 58 63 69 75 81 87 93 100 106 113 
4 36 41 45 50 55 61 66 72 78 84 90 96 102 109 
5 35 39 44 49 54 59 65 70 76 82 88 94 100 106 
D 
A 
M 
A 
G 
E 
 
C 
O 
E 
F 
F. 
 
(units) 
 
6 34 39 43 48 53 58 63 69 74 80 88 94 100 106 
Source: own calculations 
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The results shown in Table 5-2 illustrate that a higher output price leads to higher 
total emissions: the regulator allows emissions to rise since the higher profits available 
contribute to welfare. At the same time, when more weight is placed on damages, the 
total emissions decline. However, when the damage coefficient takes values between 0.1 
and 2 and the price ranges from 100 to 140, the price effect overcomes the damage effect 
as the gradual increase in emissions is more significant than the decrease determined by a 
higher damage coefficient. Given the low rate of reduction in the optimal emissions when 
the damage coefficients takes values between 2 to 6, it can be stated that emissions are 
more sensitive to changes in the damage coefficients when they have low values. 
More insights about the pattern of the total emission presented in Table 5-2 are 
revealed by the average emission rate in the domestic country. Thus, Table 5-3 shows 
that, when a cap and trade policy is in place, the average emissions rate follows the same 
pattern as the total emissions. As in the previous table, the value of the emission rates 
decreases at a lower rate when the damage coefficient decreases by 1 unit, compared to 
the reduction registered when the damage coefficient decreases by 0.1 units. It should be 
noted that the Home emission rate rises above Foreign in some circumstances. That is, if 
price is high and damage low, the Home regulator allows an increase in the rate of 
emissions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Table 5-3.: Home emissions rate under cap and trade (tons per unit of output) 
 Output price (units) 
 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 
0.1 155 162 168 174 179 185 191 196 202 207 213 218 223 229 
0.2 112 117 121 126 130 134 139 143 147 151 155 159 163 167 
0.3 94 98 102 105 109 113 116 120 123 127 130 134 137 141 
0.4 83 87 90 94 97 100 103 107 110 113 116 119 123 126 
0.5 76 79 83 86 89 92 95 98 101 104 107 110 113 116 
0.6 71 74 77 80 83 86 89 92 95 97 100 103 106 109 
0.7 67 70 73 76 79 81 84 87 90 93 95 98 101 103 
0.8 64 67 70 72 75 78 81 83 86 89 91 94 97 99 
0.9 61 64 67 70 72 75 78 80 83 86 88 91 93 96 
1 59 62 65 67 70 73 75 78 81 83 86 88 91 93 
2 49 51 54 56 59 61 64 66 68 71 73 75 78 80 
3 45 47 50 52 54 57 59 61 64 66 68 71 73 75 
4 43 45 48 50 52 55 57 59 61 64 66 68 71 73 
5 42 44 46 49 51 53 55 58 60 62 65 67 69 71 
D 
A 
M 
A 
G 
E 
 
C 
O 
E 
F 
F 
 
(units) 
6 41 43 45 48 50 52 54 57 59 61 65 67 69 71 
Source: own calculations 
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Another representative endogenous variable used to explain the total emissions 
results is the number of firms that decide to stay in the domestic country. This variable 
shows the magnitude of capital flight for given values of the exogenous variables after 
implementing a cap and trade policy. Thus, Table 5-4 illustrates the LFEs decision to 
relocate when the damage coefficient and output price vary.  
The sensitivity analysis simulations illustrate that out of 200 initial firms, for the 
lowest price and the lowest value of the damage coefficient, 5 percent of firms decide to 
relocate. Even when the output price increases, the capital flight phenomenon persists; 
e.g. for a price of 165 units and a damage coefficient between 4 and 6, 12.5 percent of 
firms relocate to the country with less strict environmental regulations. Obviously, capital 
flight intensifies when the output price has a higher range of values. Relating these results 
with the figures shown in Table 5-3, one possible explanation is that, even though firms 
can increase their profit in the domestic country, given that they receive more permits 
from the regulator when the output is more expensive, they are more tempted to make a 
profit from selling their permits and relocate to another jurisdiction where they are not 
bounded to a certain magnitude of emissions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Table 5-4.: Number of firms that remain in Home under cap and trade 
 Output price (units) 
 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 
0.1 190 189 189 188 187 186 185 184 183 182 181 180 176 175 
0.2 190 189 188 187 186 185 184 183 181 180 179 178 177 175 
0.3 189 188 187 186 185 184 183 182 180 179 178 176 175 174 
0.4 189 188 187 186 184 183 182 181 180 178 177 176 174 173 
0.5 188 187 186 185 184 183 182 180 179 178 176 175 174 172 
0.6 188 187 186 185 184 182 181 180 179 177 176 175 173 172 
0.7 188 187 186 184 183 182 181 179 178 177 175 174 173 171 
0.8 188 186 185 184 183 182 180 179 178 176 175 174 172 171 
0.9 187 186 185 184 183 181 180 179 177 176 175 173 172 170 
1 187 186 185 184 182 181 180 178 176 175 174 173 171 170 
2 186 185 184 182 181 180 178 176 175 174 173 171 169 168 
3 186 184 183 182 180 179 178 176 175 173 172 170 169 167 
4 185 184 183 181 180 179 177 176 174 173 171 170 168 166 
5 185 184 182 181 180 178 177 175 174 172 171 169 168 166 
D 
A 
M 
A 
G 
E 
 
C 
O 
E 
F 
F 
 
(units) 
6 185 184 182 181 180 178 177 175 174 172 171 169 168 166 
Source: own calculations 
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In conclusion, the simulation tables previously introduced show that higher prices 
lead to greater output and capital flight. At the same time, the existing firms’ intensity 
rises. The net effect is fewer firms emitting at higher intensities. This leads to greater 
emissions as the intensity effect dominates the effect of capital flight. Meanwhile, rising 
damages have the opposite effect on emissions. When the regulator imposes stricter 
regulations, they induce more capital flight and lower intensities. 
The simulations for this scenario continue with attributing the same range of 
values to the exogenous parameters with the aim of observing their impact on the 
domestic social welfare. Table 5-5 illustrates the resulting social welfare in Home. For 
any price, larger environmental damages reduce social welfare. These results confirm one 
of the main assumptions of the model: for a social planner who takes into account global 
environmental damage, the more financial weight is attributed to environmental damage, 
the more social welfare is negatively affected. 
The interaction of price and damages yields an interesting pattern. For low 
damages, as shown on the non-shaded region of Table 5-5, social welfare increases with 
output prices. However, for larger damages, the shaded region of the table illustrates that 
social welfare decreases with higher prices. The intuition is that social welfare decreases 
when emissions rise as the regulator competes for market share as well as capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Table 5-5.: Home social welfare under cap and trade (thousand dollars) 
 Output price (units) 
 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 
0.1 55.7 62.9 70.4 78.3 86.6 95.2 104 113 123 132 143 153 164 175 
0.2 39.9 45.1 50.5 56.2 62.2 68.4 74.9 81.5 88.3 95.3 102 109 117 124 
0.3 26.3 29.8 33.4 37.2 41.2 45.3 49.5 53.8 58.2 62.6 67.2 71.7 76.2 80.8 
0.4 13.9 15.7 17.7 19.7 21.7 23.8 25.9 28.0 30.1 32.2 34.2 36.1 37.9 39.5 
0.5 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.0 2.5 1.9 1.0 -0.03 
0.6 -9.2 -10.4 -11.7 -13.1 -14.6 -16.3 -18.2 -20.3 -22.7 -25.2 -28.1 -31.3 -34.7 -38.6 
0.7 -20.3 -22.9 -25.8 -28.8 -32.1 -35.7 -39.5 -43.7 -48.2 -53.0 -58.2 -63.9 -69.9 -76.7 
0.8 -31.2 -35.2 -39.6 -44.3 -49.3 -54.7 -60.5 -66.7 -73.3 -80.4 -87.9 -96.0 -104 -113 
0.9 -41.8 -47.4 -53.2 -59.6 -66.3 -73.5 -81.2 -89.4 -98.1 -107 -117 -127 -139 -150 
1 -52.4 -59.3 -66.7 -74.6 -83.1 -92.1 -101 -111 -122 -134 -146 -159 -173 -187 
2 -154 -174 -197 -220 -245 -272 -300 -330 -362 -395 -430 -467 -506 -546 
3 -252 -287 -324 -363 -404 -449 -495 -545 -597 -652 -710 -770 -834 -900 
4 -350 -398 -450 -504 -562 -624 -689 -758 -831 -907 -988 -1,072 -1,160 -1,253 
5 -448 -509 -575 -645 -720 -799 -882 -971 -1,064 -1,162 -1,265 -1,373 -1,486 -1,604 
D 
A 
M 
A 
G 
E 
 
C 
O 
E 
F 
F 
 
(units 
 
6 -545 -620 -700 -786 -877 -973 -1,075 -1,183 -1,297 -1,416 -1,542 -1,674 -1,812 -1,956 
Source: own calculation 
Legend: 
Low damage coefficients and high prices lead to positive and increasing social welfare values 
Large damage coefficients and high prices lead to negative and decreasing social welfare values  
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5.3.2.2 Emissions intensity policy 
Turning to emission intensity regulations, in the optimization process performed 
for Scenario 2, the level of emissions ( iHH ) and the number of firms that do not relocate 
( I ) are allowed to vary and find their optimal values such that the social welfare is 
maximized. The exogenous parameters have the same values as in Scenario 1, given the 
aim of comparing the social welfare and the rest of endogenous variables for both 
scenarios. Recall that the scenarios differ in that, under intensity regulations, each firm 
must achieve the intensity target but total emissions are not capped. Further, firms cannot 
sell permits. 
 Table 5-6 shows the values of the exogenous variables. It also illustrates that 
emission intensity regulations lead to higher social welfare than in the cap and trade 
setting for the initial price and damages.   
 
Table 5-6.: Values of exogenous and endogenous variables that maximize social welfare 
while respecting all constraints under an emissions intensity policy 
Exogenous 
Variables 
Value of exogenous 
variables 
Endogenous
variables 
Values of endogenous variables 
that maximize social welfare 
p  150 Hq  13.4 
FS  200 HH  118 
D  0.5 I  183 
M  200 Fq  30 
  H  1,010 
  F  2,250 
  SW  10,065 
Source: own calculations 
 
The values obtained illustrate that for the same price, environmental damage and 
number of firms as in Scenario 1, maximizing social welfare in the domestic country is 
achievable through a higher output. When enforcing an emission intensity policy, fewer 
firms than in the cap and trade scenario are tempted to relocate, although they are allowed 
to emit more in the foreign jurisdiction.  
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The investigation continues with a sensitivity analysis similar to Scenario 1. Table 
5-7 illustrates the impact of different output prices and damage coefficients on the LFEs 
total emissions. Total emissions are calculated as the product of emissions rate, output 
and number of firms that remain in Home. 
When the social planner decides to implement an emission intensity policy, for 
the lowest value of the damage coefficient, total emissions register very high values 
which increase at a sharp rate for each incremental unit of the output price. Briefly, for 
any given damages, higher prices lead to more emissions. For any price, greater damages 
lead to fewer emissions. This is the same as in the cap and trade although, in the present 
scenario, the emissions are much more sensitive to parameter values. 
For the values of the damage coefficient in the range 0.1 – 0.4, it is easily 
noticeable that the output price effect overcomes the environmental damage effect. One 
explanation for the high value of the total emissions in the domestic jurisdiction is that 
LFEs have no limits in producing as much output as profitable if they keep the emission 
rate under a specific limit. When the damage coefficient is higher than 0.4, the increase in 
the total emissions has similar values with the first scenario’s total emissions when the 
damage coefficient is 0.1. However, the non-shaded region of the table indicates that, the 
environmental damage effect radically overcomes the price effect when the damage 
coefficient has a weight of 0.6 and above. The motivation is that total emissions decline 
at a much higher rate in Scenario 2 than in Scenario 1. Further on, for a damage 
coefficient of 0.6 and above, when comparing Table 5-2 with Table 5-7, there are 
considerably lower emissions registered in the domestic country under an emission 
intensity system than when a cap and trade policy is in place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Table 5-7.: Home total emissions under emission intensity (thousand tons) 
 Output price (units) 
 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 
0.1 1,753 2,175 2,712 3,409 4,331 5,584 7,340 9,897 13,804 20,158 31,367 53,518 105,278 264,345
0.2 358 424 500 589 694 816 962 1,136 1,346 1,602 1,920 2,321 2,834 3,507 
0.3 223 182 212 246 285 328 378 435 500 574 661 761 880 1,020 
0.4 89 104 120 139 159 183 208 237 270 306 347 393 445 505 
0.5 59 68 79 91 104 119 136 154 174 196 221 248 279 313 
0.6 42 49 57 66 75 86 97 110 124 140 157 176 196 219 
0.7 32 38 44 50 58 66 75 84 95 107 119 133 149 166 
0.8 26 30 35 40 46 53 60 68 76 85 96 107 119 132 
0.9 21 25 29 33 38 44 50 56 63 71 79 88 99 109 
1 20 21 24 28 32 37 42 48 54 60 68 75 84 93 
2 7 8 9 11 13 15 17 19 22 25 28 31 35 39 
3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 13 15 17 19 21 24 27 
4 3 4 5 5 6 7 9 10 12 13 15 17 20 22 
5 3 3 4 5 5 6 7 9 10 12 13 15 17 19 
D 
A 
M 
A 
G 
E 
 
C 
O 
E 
F 
F 
 
(units) 
6 2 3 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 14 16 18 
Source: own calculations 
Legend:   
Output price effect overcomes the environmental damage effect  
Lower total emissions under emissions intensity system than under cap and trade, for damage coefficients above 0.6 
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Table 5-8 illustrates that the average rate of emissions is similar to total 
emissions, higher prices lead to higher intensities and larger damages to lower intensities. 
In the table, the white area shows that, when comparing these results with their 
cap and trade policy equivalent figures (Table 5-3), irrespective of the output price, when 
the damage coefficient is higher than 0.3, the emission intensity policy determines much 
lower rates of emissions. The shade of grey shows that, for low marginal damages and 
higher prices, Home intensities can rise above Foreign’s (assumed to be 200). Generally 
though, the emission rates in Home are lower than in Foreign. The intuition for this result 
is that high output prices in combination with low marginal damages may determine the 
opening of new domestic plants. This can be verified in the subsequent simulation which 
focuses on the number of firms that stay Home. 
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Table 5-8.: Home emissions rate under emission intensity (tons per unit of output) 
 Output price (units) 
 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 
0.1 291 315 341 370 404 443 490 547 618 709 833 1009 1285 1778 
0.2 135 144 152 162 171 182 193 205 218 232 248 266 286 310 
0.3 129 95 100 106 111 117 123 130 137 144 151 160 168 178 
0.4 68 72 76 80 84 88 93 97 102 107 112 117 122 128 
0.5 56 59 62 65 68 72 75 79 82 86 90 94 98 102 
0.6 47 50 53 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 83 86 
0.7 41 44 46 49 51 53 56 59 61 64 67 70 73 76 
0.8 37 39 41 43 46 48 50 53 55 57 60 62 65 68 
0.9 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 55 57 59 62 
1 34 33 35 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 51 53 55 57 
2 19 20 21 23 24 25 27 28 30 31 33 34 36 38 
3 15 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 30 31 
4 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 
5 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 23 24 25 27 
D 
A 
M 
A 
G 
E 
 
C 
O 
E 
F 
F 
 
(units) 
 
6 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 23 24 25 
Source: own calculations 
Low marginal damages and higher prices can lead to higher Home intensities than in Foreign 
Emission intensity policy determines lower intensity rates than under cap and trade 
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Another parameter comprised in the total emissions calculations is the number of 
firms that remain in Home after implementing the intensity policy. Simulations results are 
shown in Table 5-9. 
As with cap and trade, higher damages lead to greater capital flight since the 
optimal intensity in Home falls further below than in Foreign. Similarly, higher prices 
lead to less capital flight as firms can increase their profits through output sale. For low 
damages though, rising prices can lead to opening new plants60 in Home. However, for 
larger damages, there is a net outflow of firms. 
The grey shaded area on Table 5-9 illustrates the possibility of opening new 
domestic plants for higher output prices and low environmental damage values. While an 
increased number of firms may contribute to a high social welfare, as domestic firms’ 
profits are a component of the social welfare, there will be a significant negative impact 
on the magnitude of total domestic emissions. Another plausible explanation for the 
capital creation in Home is that firms have no limits in producing as much output as 
profitable if they keep the emission rate under a specific limit. 
The results show that firms decide to relocate to Foreign when more value is 
placed on the environment (the damage coefficient is above 0.3) and for any output price. 
Comparing this scenario with the cap and trade one, for most of the parameters’ values 
there is less capital flight under an emissions intensity policy than under a cap and trade 
system. However, the same number of firms decides to relocate in both scenarios for the 
upper end of the parameters range for environmental damage and output price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Another explanation for this result could be that firms from Foreign can relocate Home; however, the present model addresses the 
Home firms’ problem and not Foreign firms’. 
   
Table 5-9.: Number of firms that remain Home under an emissions intensity policy  
 Output price (units) 
 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 
0.1 207 209 212 216 221 227 235 245 258 276 302 339 398 507 
0.2 195 196 196 196 197 198 199 201 203 205 208 211 216 221 
0.3 192 192 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 192 192 193 194 196 
0.4 191 190 189 189 188 188 187 187 186 186 186 186 186 186 
0.5 190 189 188 187 186 186 185 184 184 183 183 182 181 181 
0.6 189 188 187 186 185 184 184 183 182 181 180 179 179 178 
0.7 189 188 187 186 185 184 183 182 181 180 179 178 177 176 
0.8 188 187 186 185 184 183 182 181 180 179 177 176 175 174 
0.9 188 187 186 185 184 183 181 180 179 178 176 175 174 173 
1 188 187 186 185 183 182 181 180 178 177 176 175 173 172 
2 187 186 185 183 182 181 179 178 176 175 173 172 170 168 
3 187 186 184 183 181 180 178 177 175 174 172 171 169 167 
4 187 185 184 183 181 180 178 177 175 173 172 170 168 167 
5 187 185 184 182 181 180 178 176 175 173 171 170 168 166 
D 
A 
M 
A 
G 
E 
  
C 
O 
E 
F 
F 
 
(units) 
 
6 187 185 184 182 181 179 178 176 175 173 171 170 168 166 
Source: own calculations 
Legend:   
Home firms can open new plants for low values of the damage coefficient and high output prices 
Higher damage coefficients lead to capital flight, while higher prices lead to less capital flight 
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Table 5-10 shows the resulting social welfare under the emission intensity policy. 
As expected, larger damages lead to lower welfare. However, higher prices need not raise 
welfare.  
The grey shaded region in Table 5-10 illustrates that for damage coefficient 
values lower than 0.6 social welfare values increase along with the increase in output 
price. Conversely, for damage coefficient values from 0.6 and on, social welfare 
monotonically decreases. Consistent with the previous findings, when comparing the two 
scenarios, for most of the parameters considered, implementing an emission intensity 
policy leads to a higher social welfare. 
   
Table 5-10.: Social welfare Home under an emission intensity policy (thousand dollars)  
 Output price (units) 
 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 
0.1 133 158 187 221 261 308 366 438 529 646 806 1,036 1,395 2,037 
0.2 55.2 64.4 74.7 86.3 99.3 113 130 148 169 192 219 250 286 328 
0.3 28.4 33.1 38.3 44.1 50.6 57.7 65.7 74.4 84.2 94.9 106 120 135 152 
0.4 9.1 14.8 17.3 20.0 23.0 26.4 30.2 34.3 38.9 44.0 49.7 56.0 63.0 70.8 
0.5 1.1 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.2 3.9 4.8 5.8 7.0 8.4 10.0 11.9 14.1 16.6 
0.6 -8.3 -10.3 -10.5 -11.7 -13.0 -14.4 -15.8 -17.2 -18.7 -20.2 -21.7 -23.2 -24.6 -26.0 
0.7 -16.6 -19.0 -21.6 -24.4 -27.3 -30.5 -33.9 -37.5 -41.2 -45.2 -49.4 -53.7 -58.2 -62.8 
0.8 -24.3 -27.8 -31.7 -35.9 -40.4 -45.2 -50.4 -55.9 -61.8 -68.0 -74.5 -81.4 -88.6 -96.2 
0.9 -31.5 -36.1 -41.2 -46.7 -52.7 -59.1 -66.0 -73.3 -81.1 -89.4 -98.1 -107 -117 -127 
1 -38.3 -44.1 -50.3 -57.1 -64.4 -72.3 -80.8 -89.8 -99.5 -109 -120 -132 -144 -157 
2 -100 -115 -132 -150 -170 -191 -214 -238 -265 -293 -323 -354 -388 -423 
3 -158 -182 -208 -237 -269 -303 -339 -379 -421 -465 -513 -564 -618 -675 
4 -215 -248 -284 -324 -366 -413 -463 -517 -574 -636 -701 -771 -844 -923 
5 -271 -313 -359 -409 -464 -522 -586 -654 -727 -805 -888 -976 -1,070 -1,169 
D 
A 
M 
A 
G 
E 
 
C 
O 
E 
F 
F 
 
(units) 
6 -328 -378 -434 -495 -560 -632 -708 -791 -879 -973 -1,074 -1,181 -1,294 -1,414 
Source: own calculations 
Legend:   
For lower damage coefficients, social welfare increases with the increase in output price 
Social welfare decreases monotonically for damage coefficient values above 0.6 
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5.3.2.3 Summary of results 
For a better assessment of the social welfare between the two policies, Table 5-11 
presents the difference in social welfare between emission intensity and cap and trade. 
The results confirm that social welfare is generally higher for an emission intensity 
system.  
The magnitude of social welfare depends on profits (hence the number of firms 
that remain in the country), their emission intensity, and the amount of output. The most 
important factor to impact social welfare magnitude is the presence of capital flight. 
Thus, the results obtained show that, under an emission intensity policy, there is less 
capital flight, and, for certain values, there is the possibility for capital creation. Under an 
emissions intensity policy, much higher values were obtained for the emission rate and 
output variables. Nonetheless, as shown in Region 2 – the white region of the table, the 
social welfare is higher under emission intensity than under its cap and trade policy 
counterpart. The lighter grey shaded areas, Regions 1 and 4, show that the magnitude 
difference between the two policies is quite noticeable. These areas illustrate that the 
output price effect overcomes the damage coefficient effect. 
However, there is one exception from the above. As shown in Region 3 – the dark 
grey shaded area of the table, cap and trade has slightly higher social welfare values for 
low output prices of 100 to 120 and when the damage coefficient takes values between 
0.4 and 0.5. This is explained by the magnitude variation of the social welfare under cap 
and trade (Table 5-5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Table 5-11.: The difference between Home emissions intensity and cap and trade social welfare values (thousand dollars) 
 Output price (units) 
 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 
0.1 77.9 95.5 116 142 174 213 262 325 406 514 663 883 1,231 1,862 
0.2 15.3 19.3 24.2 30.0 37.0 45.4 55.3 67.0 80.9 97.4 117 140 169 203 
0.3 2.05 3.28 4.88 6.90 9.40 12.4 16.1 20.6 25.9 32.2 39.7 48.6 59.0 71.2 
0.4 -4.78 -0.87 -0.37 0.34 1.31 2.59 4.22 6.25 8.76 11.8 15.4 19.8 25.1 31.2 
0.5 -0.91 -0.86 -0.71 -0.45 -0.04 0.53 1.32 2.37 3.71 5.39 7.46 10.0 13.0 16.7 
0.6 0.97 0.11 1.16 1.33 1.59 1.95 2.44 3.10 3.95 5.03 6.39 8.07 10.1 12.5 
0.7 3.69 3.94 4.20 4.48 4.80 5.18 5.65 6.22 6.93 7.80 8.87 10.1 11.7 13.8 
0.8 6.89 7.40 7.90 8.40 8.92 9.46 10.0 10.7 11.4 12.3 13.3 14.5 15.9 17.6 
0.9 10.3 11.2 12.0 12.8 13.6 14.4 15.2 16.0 17.0 18.0 19.1 20.4 21.8 23.4 
1 14.0 15.2 16.4 17.5 18.6 19.7 20.8 22.0 23.1 24.4 25.7 27.1 28.7 30.4 
2 54.0 59.4 64.9 70.3 75.8 81.2 86.5 91.8 97.1 102 107 112 117 122 
3 94.8 104 115 125 135 145 156 166 176 186 196 206 215 225 
4 135 150 165 180 195 211 226 241 256 271 286 301 315 330 
5 176 196 215 235 256 276 296 316 337 357 377 396 416 435 
D 
A 
M 
A 
G 
E 
 
C 
O 
E 
F 
F 
 
(units) 
6 217 241 266 291 316 341 367 392 417 442 468 492 517 541 
Source: own calculations 
Legend:  
Region 1: Social welfare under emissions intensity has much higher values than under cap and trade 
Region 2: Social welfare under emissions intensity has higher values than under cap and trade 
Region 3: Social welfare is higher for cap and trade than for emissions intensity policy 
Region 4: Social welfare under emissions intensity has much higher values than under cap and trade 
 
 
 
 
148 
  149
Summarizing the results of the two scenarios, for a social planner who takes into 
account global pollution, when the environmental damage coefficient is valued at 0.4 or 
greater, the emissions intensity system is a superior instrument to cap and trade. The 
emission intensity policy leads to lower total emissions, lower intensity rates, and less 
capital flight.  
Further, for the highest values of the damage coefficient and output price, the two 
policies yield similar results. Hence, when damages are very high, the two policies seem 
to converge. This may be explained by the environmental efficiency of each policy and 
their sensitivity reaction (embedded in their design) when considerable substance is 
attributed to environmental damage. 
With regard to the social welfare comparison, Table 5-11 shows that for the same 
set of exogenous parameters, the emission intensity policy would be preferred over cap 
and trade, given social welfare’s higher values. Indeed, when an emissions intensity 
system is in place, for lower values of the damage coefficient there is the possibility of 
opening new plants in the domestic country that can contribute to a much higher social 
welfare magnitude. This situation implies that firms’ emissions have very high values and 
acutely damage the environment. Another explanation for the high social welfare is that 
the output obtained is much higher than under a cap and trade system (given the implicit 
output subsidy effect of an emission intensity policy) and, in turn, firms’ profits are 
higher. For higher values of the damage coefficient than 0.4, an emission intensity system 
leads to decreasing values of the social welfare, although still higher than under a cap and 
trade policy. 
Comparing the total emissions (Table 5-2 versus Table 5-7) shows that when the 
environmental damage is low (damage coefficient is between 0.1 and 0.6), the 
environmental friendlier policy is cap and trade rather than emissions intensity. On the 
other hand, for higher values of the damage coefficient, emissions intensity system has 
fewer emissions. Hence the idea that intensity measures are less environmentally friendly 
does not hold when damages are high, and this is the time when emissions would 
preferably fall. However, under cap and trade, even though damages are high, the 
regulator worries about capital flight.  
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Shifting the focus of the analysis on capital flight, a similar situation is observed 
when comparing the number of firms that stay in Home after enforcing the policies. For 
very low values of the damage coefficient, an emission intensity policy may lead to 
capital creation and not capital flight. When comparing this scenario with the cap and 
trade one, for higher damage coefficient values there is less capital flight under an 
emissions intensity policy than under a cap and trade system. Hence, intensity measures 
allow the regulator to achieve emissions targets with less concern for capital flight. 
The current model setup and the sensitivity analysis actually illustrate the trade 
off between social welfare and environmental damage coefficient that a regulator should 
take into account when deciding which GHG emissions reduction policy to enforce. Very 
briefly, this analysis illustrates that an emissions intensity policy leads to higher social 
welfare and that a cap and trade determines more firms to relocate. However, these 
simulations bring into attention particular issues. For instance, the results illustrate that 
before implementing a policy, the particularities of the output that is subjected to a 
policy, along with each jurisdiction’s specific environmental damage valuation, should be 
considered by the regulator. At the same time, another finding of this analysis shows the 
importance of correlating the two endogenous variables, as under certain circumstances, 
the output price overcomes the environmental damage coefficient effect and vice-versa. 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
Since the emission intensity framework proposed by the Canadian government is 
unclear about how the policy will specifically impact the potential relocation decisions, 
this chapter examines the relative incentives to do so by comparing and contrasting the 
economic relocation incentives under the existing emission intensity to those that would 
exist under a cap-and-trade. 
The simulation analysis reveals that for a given target, cap-and-trade encourages 
firms’ relocation. Under emission intensity system, fewer firms are tempted to relocate in 
jurisdiction with lower GHG emissions rates, but this policy does not encourage real 
emission reduction. In other words, implementing a cap and trade system enhances the 
potential pollution haven effect through the existence of tradable permits. It is difficult to 
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state which of the two policies is more efficient, as due to its output subsidy effect, 
emission intensity system can be considered only a second best policy choice. 
The main point of the analysis is that social planners need to acknowledge the 
weak and strong features of the policies and refine them when considering real GHG 
emission reductions. It may be the case that cap and trade leads to too high targets, since 
capital flight is a bigger problem. Meanwhile, the intensity system may encourage 
opening new domestic plants in addition to decreasing the incentive to move out. 
However, whether emissions intensity systems facilitate net emission reduction below 
cap and trade is open. 
The results of the simulations actually illustrate the trade off between global 
environmental benefits and domestic social welfare as a result of enforcing a GHG 
emission reduction policy versus no or very lax environmental regulation. The results 
show that under certain circumstances (perfect competition, homogenous firms and 
production mobility), the incentive to relocate across border in a more permissive 
environmental jurisdiction constitutes an option for certain industries that, for various 
reasons, may experience competitiveness issues. Environmental economists weigh the 
possibility where all governments will be tempted to relax their environmental policies 
and thus creating an ecological dumping (Ulph, 1997) as a result of regulatory chill61 or 
race to the bottom62 occurrences. Sheldon (2006) addresses the regulatory chill and race 
to the bottom in environmental standards and policies and argues that methods for 
countering these two phenomena are already embedded in existing GATT/WTO rules as 
border tax adjustments63 (BTA). The author considers that based on his research and 
existing literature there is evidence that both trade and investment flows are affected by 
environmental policy (although this is not the only factor that affects them). Moreover, 
regulatory chill or race to the bottom can be overcome by applying more flexibly the 
GATT/WTO tariff bindings (or BTAs) under the condition that ‘…countries do not retain 
complete sovereignty over their environmental policies’ (p. 388). 
                                                 
61 Regulatory chill is defined as the situation where a government resists enforcing a strict environmental policy (Bagwell and Staiger, 
2001). 
62 Race to the bottom occurs when a regulator decide to reduce the stringency of its environmental regulations (Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan, 1996). 
63 In the context of GHG emission reduction policies, BTA are defined as import fees levied by carbon taxing countries on goods 
manufactured countries that do not tax carbon. 
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In practice there is a recent example to be told in this context. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, BTAs have been contemplated by the US Climate Change Bill to accompany 
its future cap and trade policy system. The concern behind this proposal is that domestic 
US producers will be disadvantaged in trade relationships when the US enforces a cap 
and trade policy while developing countries (e.g. India and China) have none or very low 
binding emission targets. However, the BTAs format that the US intends to enforce is 
different than an import carbon fee and may not constitute a challenge under the 
WTO/GATT regulations. Thus, the importers of carbon intensive goods from countries 
with laxer environmental regulations would be obliged to buy certified emissions 
allowances from the federal government or from a US GHG regulatory program if they 
want to sell their goods in the US market. The challenging part, however, would 
represent assessing the carbon content of the goods imported, e.g. whether it is a final or 
an intermediate good, what stage of manufacturing is the most carbon intensive one that 
needs to be taxed (Sheldon, 2006).  
Regarding the Canadian context, policy initiatives such BTAs should be assessed 
given the existing experience in trading carbon in a non-harmonized world and at the 
same time, the reality of the current global environmental context where the last Kyoto 
negations failed to accomplish global GHG emissions commitments. If Canada will 
decide to implement a cap and trade policy, BTAs may represent an option to consider 
for the Canadian regulators considering the lessons to be learned from the 
competitiveness and relocation issues that EU has been experiencing. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Mitigating climate change is a globally acknowledged environmental challenge. 
While the effects and timing of climate change are uncertain at this point, there is a 
convergence of scientific opinions about the necessity of a more focused global 
intervention to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the negotiation of international 
agreements, some countries are undertaking determined targets while others are delaying 
their actions.  
The lack of political consensus was evident in the December, 2009 United 
Nations Climate Change Conference held in Copenhagen (and in the 2010 Cancun 
meeting). The main goal of the Copenhagen Accord was to renew the Kyoto Protocol and 
obtain a new global agreement on mitigating climate change effects beyond 2012. 
However, the negotiations revealed a large divergence among developed and developing 
countries about emission targets responsibilities. While the parties agreed that a 2 degrees 
Celsius increase in the global temperature should be prevented, the result was a vague 
non-binding agreement that failed to achieve a comprehensive global agreement with a 
common strategy to reduce emissions. Briefly, the achievements of Copenhagen Accord 
are that developing countries are going to receive financial help from industrialized 
nations for fighting climate change. However, the participant countries are free to set 
their own emission reductions with no mandatory limits. It is therefore unlikely that the 
Copenhagen Accord will achieve the proposed target. 
The Copenhagen Accord goal of renewing Kyoto Protocol beyond 2012 was 
carried on by the 17th session of the Conference of Parties (COP 17) to the UNFCCC. 
The conference took place in Durban, South Africa, between November 28 and 
December 10, 2011. Among the main goals of the conference was to extend the Kyoto 
Protocol with a second commitment period, to reach an agreement on keeping the 
average global temperature rise below two degrees and to negotiate a future legally 
binding agreements. At the end of the two weeks of gruelling discussions, the 194 
delegate members have reached an agreement and the above goals were achieved. 
According to the press release of the UNFCCC (2011) on Durban conference, the 
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participating countries have recognized the need to keep the average global temperature 
rise below two degrees. The delegate members have agreed to establish the “Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action” to negotiate a new global agreement on climate change 
by 2015; this agreement will not come into effect or start to be implemented until 2020. 
However, the Kyoto Protocol was extended with a second commitment period which will 
start on January 1, 2013; this means Kyoto Protocol remains the only current legally 
binding instrument which stipulates emissions targets and timelines for industrialized 
countries. Other important measure agreed upon refers to the Green Climate Fund, which 
will raise $100 millions per year aimed at helping developing countries cope with climate 
change adaptation issues. 
The end result of the Durban conference can be seen as a step forward or not in 
the climate change battle. Particularly after the Copenhagen talks in 2009, it was feared 
that this conference will not accomplish the proposed goals. The conference lasted two 
more days than initially planned given that some of the participating nations’ 
representatives were reluctant to sign the agreement. A major achievement of the COP 17 
is that, the US, India and China have agreed to reduce emissions as part of the new legal 
treaty. However, the three countries have only voluntary emission targets reductions until 
2020, or whenever the new agreement will enter into force. 
Canada’s position at the climate change talks in Durban began with signals of the 
intention to withdraw from Kyoto Protocol with the motivation that China, along with the 
rest of major polluting developing countries, is not equally bound by a legal treaty. Even 
though China and India showed more flexibility than expected, and ended up signing the 
future agreement, Canada has officially announced withdrawing from Kyoto Protocol one 
day after the conference ended. While several developed countries have complained for a 
long time about the developing nations’ lack of obligations within Kyoto, Canada 
becomes the first country to withdraw from the Protocol (Kennedy, 2011). The 
Environment Minister Peter Kent justified this decision through the failure of the 
previous liberal government to achieve the emission reductions cut that was promised 
when Canada ratified Kyoto. Further, he expressed his disbelief in the Kyoto Protocol’s 
chances to represent the solution for mitigating climate change globally. However, the 
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Minister has stated Canada’s willingness to participate in an international climate change 
treaty “that works” and which “involves all major emitters”.  
So far, the lack of comprehensive global agreement has led to a mixture of GHG 
emission reduction policies across countries. Currently, the main emission reduction 
mechanisms employed by governments are cap and trade, emissions intensity and carbon 
tax. The wide range of policy instruments and emission reduction targets that are globally 
employed has further complicated the challenge of designing effective domestic policy. 
Under these circumstances, there are economic and environmental consequences that 
policy makers need to be aware of, such as industrial flight (Jenkins et al, 2002), where 
firms relocate from jurisdictions with strict GHG emissions reduction regulations to 
pollution havens, which are countries with lower emission reduction standards. For 
instance, the European Union experience with cap and trade policy reveals that industrial 
sectors can face competitiveness issues and incentives to relocate to other jurisdictions 
(Neuhoff 2007, McKinsey and Ecofys 2006).  
Canada has explored a wide range of emission reduction mechanisms in the last 
two decades, but thus far has failed to implement an effective policy. The Canadian 
policy design became particularly complex when the United States, Canada’s main 
trading partner, did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The Canadian policy started with 
voluntary policies and subsidies and it is currently employing a capped emission intensity 
system for regulating heavy industry emissions reductions. With the United States 
contemplating a cap and trade system, Canada has been also considering implementing a 
cap and trade policy starting 2020 (Government of Canada, 2008 [1]), and thus 
acknowledges the policy harmonization necessity. Canada continues to search for a 
viable GHG emission reduction policy to achieve tangible reductions in GHG emissions.  
In the light of the above considerations, this dissertation focused on analyzing and 
comparing some economic and environmental aspects regarding carbon tax, cap and trade 
and emissions intensity policies in various scenarios for a Canadian emission intensive 
industry. The findings of this research reveal the inherent difficulty of implementing 
domestic cap and trade policy in the context of a international trading environment, 
which could be one of the reasons why international reductions in GHG emissions has 
been such an elusive goal.  
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The analysis outlined in Chapters 2 to 5, reveals that while cap and trade may be 
effective in a hypothetical world of single sector within in a closed economy, it will be 
far less effective in the real world in the presence of downstream emissions, international 
trade, or firm relocation. Given the administrative complexity, cap and trade systems are 
designed to be enforced only in the upstream of an industry even though downstream 
consumers are responsible for a large share of emissions. When inputs and final outputs 
are traded with countries that do not have a similar policy in place, a cap and trade 
instrument is harmful for the domestic industry, while dirty foreign firms increase output 
to the detriment of the domestic industry. While this can be remedied by border tax 
adjustments (BTAs) accompanying the cap and trade instrument, BTA’s are not allowed 
in the WTO. Moreover, when emission permits are distributed for free, firms have 
additional incentives to sell the permits and relocate to countries with less stringent 
environmental regulations. 
This dissertation addresses a number of important ‘gaps’ in the literature. In the 
existing literature little attention has been paid to the effects of vertical markets on the 
design of GHG emissions policies (Hamilton and Requate, 2004). Chapter 3 addresses 
the distributional impacts of carbon tax and cap and trade within a vertical market. The 
model developed in Chapter 4 builds on the model developed by Muth (1964), Alston 
(1995), Wohlgenant (1993), Gray et al. (2000) and others, which focus on the distribution 
of research benefits within a vertical market system, in a multistage production settings 
for various agricultural products. Chapter 4 adds to this research by employing a Muth 
model for exploring the price, quantity and distributional effects of the two GHG 
mitigation policies within a vertical market system with and without input substitution. 
Chapter 5 is novel in that it accounts for the saleability feature of emission permits which 
affects firms’ relocation decisions. This is done in the context of social welfare 
maximization where the domestic policy maker takes into account the pollution generated 
by domestic firms regardless the jurisdiction in which emissions were generated. 
The theoretical modeling of the thesis begins by highlighting the different 
economic impacts of implementing a carbon tax and a cap and trade policy in an 
economy. Chapters 2 and 3 describe and explain these instruments and highlight that 
while a carbon tax is a transparent, easy to implement and globally used instrument, a cap 
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and trade policy lacks all these characteristics. In perfect competition and in the absence 
of uncertainty, carbon dioxide abatement, carbon tax and a cap and trade system (where 
the permits are auctioned) are equivalent with regards to the level of abatement achieved, 
the price of carbon and the price of carbon intensive goods. However, under uncertainty, 
the policies are quasi-equivalent and differences between them consist not only in their 
transparency or easiness of implementation but also on welfare distributional effects. 
Regarding the relative advantages of the two policies, carbon tax is a price 
regulatory instrument while a cap and trade is a quantity regulatory instrument. Both 
policies place a price on CO2 emissions64, but they differ in the choice of policy 
instrument. However, the relative GHG mitigation efficiency of the two policies will 
differ under uncertainty. The uncertainty that surrounds the carbon dioxide emissions 
damage effects, is reflected for instance in the range of social cost of carbon dioxide that 
researchers have been assessing. There are estimates ranging between $11 (Nordhaus, 
2009) to $85 per ton (Stern, 2007), while the IPCC report (2007) attributes a possible 
range of values from $3 to $95 per metric ton of carbon dioxide. 
Recalling some of the definitions used along this thesis, a carbon tax places an 
explicit price of CO2 emissions which leads to the adjustment of the quantity of emissions 
corresponding to the tax level. A cap and trade policy sets a specific quantity of 
emissions and allows the price of emissions to adjust accordingly (Murray et al., 2008). 
Under certainty, the two policies can be set to obtain the same emissions reduction, but 
under uncertainty, this is not achievable. The reason is that in the real world, regulators 
are confronted with uncertainty and incomplete information regarding the exact structure 
of the cost and benefits curves (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Thus, policy makers cannot 
know ex-ante the effect that the tax would have on the quantity of emissions and the 
effect that the emissions cap will have on the price. So there will be differences between 
the desired effect of any of the policies and the actual outcome in the market.  
Therefore, for observing a carbon tax and a cap and trade impact on welfare 
distribution within an industry, in Chapter 3 it is assumed that these policies are 
implemented within both a simple market and a fixed proportions vertical market system 
of a closed economy. Under these assumptions, a graphical analysis illustrates that, as a 
                                                 
64 In most jurisdictions several greenhouse gases are included in policy, but are measured in terms of CO2 equivalents.  
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result of implementing a cap and trade system, when inputs are not substitutable, rents are 
created and that there is economic welfare redistribution within the vertical market 
system. Generally, the two policies are not equivalent. They can be quasi-equivalent 
when implemented on the same good or level within a vertical market structure. They can 
also be quasi-equivalent regardless of the level of implementation within the vertical 
structure with a fixed proportions technology within a closed economy, but even in this 
case they can differ substantially in where the rents accrue. Furthermore, the strong 
assumption of input non-substitutability means that production, consumption or 
efficiency within the vertical market system are not impacted by the input and policy 
choices; their impact will be on rent distribution. 
The analysis is continued in Chapter 4, where a Muth model of the oil sector in 
Canada allows comparing fixed and variable proportions in a vertical market structure, as 
well as simulating the welfare distribution effects of enforcing a carbon tax versus a cap 
and trade policy. The Muth model is modified to incorporate a nested CES production 
function with the aim of a more precise representation of the presence of foreign 
competition at the refining level when input substitution is allowed. 
Firstly, under the assumptions of fixed proportions and a closed economy, a 
carbon tax is introduced concomitantly at consumers and Canadian refiners’ level. This 
carbon tax policy is compared to an analogous cap and trade policy implemented only at 
the processors’ level. These two policies are maintained when input substitution is 
allowed for refining within the vertical structure, which provides an opportunity to 
compare the effects of a carbon tax policy and a cap and trade policy when there is trade 
in refining services. 
Under fixed proportions, similar results are obtained for the two policies 
regarding their impact on quantities, prices, welfare distribution and cost of emissions 
reduction. Hence, the Muth model and the simulations developed in this chapter confirm 
the Chapter 3 results: in a closed economy a cap and trade policy and a carbon tax are 
quasi-equivalent. 
When a higher degree of substitution between inputs is allowed, the results of a 
carbon tax and a cap and trade policy are different. A carbon tax negatively affects 
consumers’ surplus as, for a price that incorporates the tax, consumers have to reduce the 
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quantity of gasoline demanded. Canadian producers also know a surplus loss but to a 
lesser extent than the consumers. In contrast, enforcing a cap and trade policy at 
Canadian refiners’ level increases the surplus of ROW refiners at a high expense for 
Canadian producers’ surplus. Given that cap and trade is designed to be enforced only in 
the upstream of an industry, consumers surplus is much less affected than in the case of 
carbon tax. However, in this scenario, Canadian producers significantly reduce their 
gasoline supply on the domestic market, and thus lose a considerable large amount of 
surplus, and at the same time, capture less rent compared to carbon tax. This result shows 
that, when inputs and final outputs are traded with countries that do not have a similar 
policy in place, a cap and trade instrument is harmful for the domestic industry, while 
dirty foreign firms increase output to the detriment of the domestic industry. 
Regarding the GHG emissions mitigation, both carbon tax and cap and trade 
mitigate the same quantity of GHG emissions in a closed economy. However, under free 
trade a carbon tax is a preferred instrument over a cap and trade policy for its ability to 
reduce more GHG emissions and at a much lower economic cost per ton of emissions. 
The issue remains that, under free trade, for this specific product with a relatively 
inelastic demand, consumers have the option to buy the gasoline from the ROW and still 
emit almost the amount of GHG. Regarding the cap and trade effect on GHG emissions 
reduction, the much lower quantity of emissions abated at a very high cost per unit of 
emissions, illustrates that it is not an efficient emission reductions instrument. This 
conclusion is supported by the computations related to the Canadian and global welfare. 
The results illustrate that carbon tax increases Canadian and global welfare when more 
trade takes place, while a cap and trade policy determines very high welfare loss for both 
Canada and the world. 
The results obtained lead to the conclusion that trying to get optimal production 
and consumption of emission intensive goods through implementing a cap and trade 
policy is not efficient as long as free trade allows input and final goods substitution. In 
other words, the results show that when a cap and trade policy is implemented in the 
upstream of a vertically integrated industry, its efficiency is decreased by trade. At the 
same time, as previously mentioned, this policy can not be enforced downstream due to 
its administrative design, hence creating a fundamental challenge for implementation. 
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This outcome reinforces the idea that the choice of a domestic GHG emission reduction 
policy does impact the welfare distribution within an industry. In addition, when 
imposing a cap and trade policy in an open to trade economy, as long as there is foreign 
goods substitution available, and implicitly GHG emissions from them, the real 
magnitude of global emission reductions is questionable. Consequently, the only solution 
possible to achieve efficient GHG emissions reductions would be if Canada imposes 
border tariffs adjustments when importing these goods. However, this solution 
contravenes WTO/GATT rules and it is not clear yet under which circumstances or 
policy format it would be accepted for implementation.  
In conclusion, implementing this policy with the aim of pricing carbon creates 
competitiveness issues for certain industries, which in turn can lead to pollution haven 
effects, industrial flight, or race to the bottom, etc. (Copeland and Taylor 2004, Sheldon 
2006). This is consistent with the EU experience where a number of heavy industries 
threaten with relocation if they do not receive free emission rights to allow them to 
attenuate the costs occurred as a result of implementing a cap and trade policy. Cap and 
trade policy offers an additional incentive for firms to relocate as long as they can sell the 
emission permits, obtain a financial gain and continue to emit greenhouse gases 
someplace else. If this is the case, the next concern addressed in this research is whether 
emission intensity is a more efficient policy than cap and trade. 
In this context, Chapter 5 steps up from a national perspective to consider global 
emissions, where a domestic social planner has the option to decide between enforcing a 
cap and trade versus an emission intensity policy. The choice of the two policies 
considered for the analysis is also motivated by the current Canadian policy in place and 
a possible US policy choice. The three stage sequential model analyzes the relocation 
incentives and the social welfare impact of implementing each of the two policies for a 
social planner who takes into account emissions generated by its industries both 
domestically and abroad. The assumption related to the firms’ relocation incentive is 
explained by the fact that when a cap and trade system is in place, it is easier for firms to 
reduce output, sell the permits, obtain a profit and then relocate to jurisdictions with 
lower emissions standards.  
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The models developed in Chapter 5 are organized as a two-country, three stage 
sequential game solved through backward induction. The models examine firms’ 
relocation incentives and their impact on the social planner’s social welfare, for both 
policies. The results of the constrained optimization and simulations confirm that, for 
Scenario 1, when assuming that a cap and trade policy is in place, there is a positive 
relationship between the magnitude of GHG emissions decided by the regulator (or the 
number of permits distributed) and the number of firms that decide to sell the permits and 
relocate to the others jurisdictions. Meanwhile, scenario 2 assumes welfare maximization 
for a domestic planner who has implemented an emission intensity policy while the 
Foreign jurisdiction has no policy in place or lower emission rates. 
The sensitivity analysis carried out for both scenarios consists of investigating the 
trend of domestic total emissions, number of permits, emissions rate, capital flight and 
social welfare for a wide range of output price and damage coefficient as exogenous 
variables. The sensitivity analysis comparison for the two scenarios illustrates that the 
policies have advantages and disadvantages according to the range of values attributed to 
the exogenous variables. Depending on the environmental valuation versus output price 
pair of values, the environmental damage coefficient effect may overcome the price 
effect and vice-versa. Thus, regarding the capital flight case, for higher values of the 
damage coefficient, the emission intensity is a superior instrument to cap and trade as 
fewer firms decide to relocate to Foreign jurisdictions. When examining the social 
welfare trend for the two policies, emissions intensity leads to higher values of it. 
However, when connecting all the results of the simulations it is observed that the high 
value of social welfare in the case of emissions intensity is determined by the much 
higher values of the output produced than under a cap and trade system. This result 
confirms the main criticism brought to emission intensity policies: it may reduce the rate 
of emission per unit of production, but when output increases, more emissions are 
released into the atmosphere. 
 In conclusion, these results illustrate that pollution haven effect can be enhanced 
when implementing a cap and trade policy through the ability of selling the emission 
permits and relocating. On the other hand, an emission intensity system does create an 
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output subsidy effect and this makes it a second best instrument to impose for achieving 
real emission reductions. 
Summarizing the findings of this dissertation, a cap and trade policy can not be 
considered a first best economic instrument in the presence of downstream emissions, in 
the absence of environmental tariffs or with the inability to prevent firm relocation. This 
policy was designed to be implemented in the upstream of an industry and not at 
consumers’ level, and it is shown that when implemented at producers’ level, its 
efficiency is decreased by input substitution. This is where a BTA would improve the 
efficiency issues of a cap and trade policy singularly implemented. Furthermore, carbon 
tax can be a first best policy instrument if appropriately applied at all the levels and for 
the accurate carbon price. The fact that a carbon tax does not support emission permits 
trading can be addressed easily through regulations. There is the option of globally 
employing a carbon tax through international negotiations and if each country agrees on 
setting a specific carbon price level, real GHG emission reductions can be achieved 
without doubt. The carbon tax proponents (Nordhaus 2009, Metcalf 2009) suggest that 
Kyoto Protocol should be amended such that to include a global carbon tax policy. 
However, the current concern to be addressed regarding policy implementation 
for global reductions of GHG emissions is that the international tendency is towards a cap 
and trade system. Recalling the results of this thesis and the literature, a cap and trade 
may easily lead certain industries to competitiveness issues, relocation incentives and 
potentially to race to the bottom in environmental standards. Thus, if Canada will decide 
to enforce a cap and trade policy, it should seriously consider some accompanying 
measures such as border tariff adjustments (BTAs). 
In the current Canadian economic and environmental context, there are pro and 
con opinions regarding the solutions that BTAs can address. For instance, the National 
Round Table on the Environment and the Economy65 (NRTEE) does not support BTAs 
application in Canada (NRTEE, 2009). Their main reason is that such tariffs would 
broadly increase production costs that would impact both producers and consumers. They 
suggest that a better strategy for Canada would be to maintain the current emission 
intensity system and wait for the ‘major trading partners…have comparable carbon 
                                                 
65 An independent policy advisory agency that advises the Canadian federal government. 
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pricing’ (p. 58). As a contrary opinion, in a report written for Pembina Institute66, 
Bramley and Demerse (2008) argue that a Canadian BTA would level the field ‘between 
imported products and their Canadian competitors’. The authors argue that BTAs could 
be compatible under certain circumstances with WTO/GATT rules and also acknowledge 
possible issues that need to be considered. For instance, they show that one of the 
drawbacks of implementing a Canadian BTA can exempt the oil sands sector from the 
effects of carbon pricing. Furthermore, the authors highlight that calculating BTAs will 
have quantification issues when importing basic versus manufactured goods, as well as 
when deciding the point of imposition of a price, which can be at the point of production 
of the good or at the point of consumption67. Last, but not least, a quite challenging issue 
would be to assess the difference in the environmental regulations severity for two 
trading countries and implicitly evaluating their carbon costs.  
The current research acknowledges that the answer to achieving efficient and real 
GHG emission reductions in Canada is a policy mix that should comprise first of all a 
policy instrument that is compatible with the international propensity and especially with 
Canada’s major trading partners’ policy choices. This policy should be accompanied by 
specific measures that should overcome market barriers or failures both domestically and 
in trading relationships, as well as to address various industries competitiveness concerns. 
At the same time, regulators should decide the policy of choice after careful consideration 
is given to distributional impacts and after performing a comprehensive assessment of the 
domestic environmental damage valuation. In this context, globally implementing a cap 
and trade policy along with BTAs can represent a policy harmonization solution and give 
more chances of success to future international negotiations on climate change 
mitigation. 
Regarding further research that can be carried out on this topic, a subject of great 
interest would be exploring the economic impacts of trade between two or more countries 
that implement BTAs in turn or at the same time. Alternatively, modeling the 
implementation of a global carbon tax policy and its economic, environmental and trade 
effects would definitely represent an important contribution to the literature. 
                                                 
66 Canadian non-profit foundation which focuses on developing innovative sustainable solutions. 
67 The authors use a very good example to illustrate Kyoto’s current emissions accounting practices: producing a barrel of oil in 
Canada is credited to Canada, but if that barrel of oil is burned in the US, then the carbon emissions are credited to the US. 
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APPENDIX 
Formulas used in Solver excel simulations - Chapter 5 
1 A B C 
2 Policy variables SCENARIO 1: CAP AND TRADE   
3 Ea - # of permits 849 849.641029647182 
5 Exogenous variables   
6 P – output price  150  
7 Beta – coeff. 1000  
8 rF – emission rate foreign 200  
9 F – fixed costs 70  
10 D – damage coeff. 0.5  
11 m – total # of firms 200  
12 Endogenous variables   
13 qH – output home =((2*B6*B3*(B11/B17))/(3*B7))^0.5 =((B6-(D15*D14))*D14)/B7 
14 rH – emission rate  =((3*B7*B3*(B11/B17))/(2*B6))^0.5 =C3/C13 
15 Lamda – coeff. =(0.27*(B6^1.5))/((B7^0.5)*(B3^0.5)) =B7*C13/(2*C14*C14) 
16 Ea (m/i) – adjusted Ea =B3*B11/B17 =C3*(B11/C17) 
17 I - # of firms relocating 9.99999996 176.448813804585 
18 Social Welfare =(B6*B13-(B7*B13*B13)/(2*B14)-B10*B13*B14)*B17-(B11-
B17)*B8*B19  
19 qF – output foreign =B6*B8/B7 =B6*B8/B7 
20 Change social welfare 
when change Ea – number 
of permits 
=((0.03*(B6)^3*B11/B17)/B7^0.5*(0.13*(B6)^1.5*(B3)^0.5 
*(B11/B17)^0.5*(B17)^-1)+B9*(B7)^0.5)+(0.27*(B6)^1.5* 
(B3)^-0.5*(B11)^0.5*B17/(B7)^0.5) 
(B10*B11+(B10*B6*(B8)^2)/B7)*(0.13*(B6)^1.5*(B3)^-
0.5*(B11/B17)^0.5) 0.13*(B6)^1.5*(B3)^0.5   
21 Profit Home =((0.54*(B6)^1.5*(B3)^0.5)/(B7)^0.5)-B15*((B3*(B11/B17))-B3) =B6*C13-(B7*C13*C13)/(2*C14) 
22 Profit Foreign =(((B6)^2)*B8/(2*B7))+ (B15*(B3)) =B6*C19-(B7*C19*C19)/(2*B8) 
23 Moving Condition =(B9*(B11-B17)) =B9*(B11-C17) 
24 Zero Profit =(B21-B22)+B9*(B11-B17) =C21-C22+C23-(C15*C3) 
29 SW  
=(B21*B17)-(B10*((B11*B25)+(B11-B17)*(B26))) 
=(C21*C17)-B10*((C3*B11+(B11-
C17)*(C19*B8))) 
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 A B C 
 Policy variables SCENARIO 2: EMISSIONS INTENSITY  
 Exogenous variables   
40 P – output price 150  
41 Beta – coeff. 1000  
42 SF – emission rate 200  
43 F – fixed costs 70  
44 D - damage 0.5  
45 m – total # of firms 200  
46 Endogenous variables   
47 qH – output home =((2*B40*B37*(B45/B51))/(3*B41))^0.5 =((B40)*C48)/B41 
48 Hh – emissions home =((3*B41*B37*(B45/B51))/(2*B40))^0.5 89.8477147621663 
49 Lamda – coeff.  =(0.27*(B40^1.5))/((B41^0.5)*(B37^0.5)) =B40*B40/(2*B41) 
51 I - # of firms relocating 9.99999996 182.296954158205 
52 Social Welfare =(B40*B47-(B41*B47*B47)/(2*B48)-B44*B47*B48)*B51-(B45-
B51)*B42*B53  
53 qF – output foreign =B40*B42/B41 =B40*B42/B41 
54 Change social welfare 
when change Ea - 
number of permits 
=((0.03*(B40)^3*B45/B51)/B41^0.5*(0.13*(B40)^1.5*(B37)^0.5*(B45/B51) 
^0.5*(B51)^-1)+B43*(B41)^0.5)+(0.27*(B40)^1.5*(B37)^-
0.5*(B45)^0.5*B51/(B41)^0.5) 
(B44*B45+(B44*B40*(B42)^2)/B41)*(0.13*(B40)^1.5*(B37)^-
0.5*(B45/B51)^0.5) 0.13 (B40)   
55 Profit Home =((0.54*(B40)^1.5*(B37)^0.5)/(B41)^0.5)-B49*((B37*(B45/B51))-B37) =B40*C47-((B41*C47*C47)/(2*C48)) 
56 Profit Foreign =(((B40)^2)*B42/(2*B41))+ (B49*(B37)) =B40*C53-(B41*C53*C53)/(2*B42) 
57 Moving condition =(B43*(B45-B51)) =B43*(B45-C51) 
58 Zero Profit =(B55-B56)+B43*(B45-B51) =(C55-C56+C57) 
63 SW  
=(B55*B51)-(B44*((B45*B59)+(B45-B51)*(B60))) 
=((C55*C51))-
B44*(((C48*C47*B45)+(B45-
C51)*(C53*B42))) 
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